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Intolerance of uncertainty, “a dispositional characteristic that results from a set of 
negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications” (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007, p. 24), 
has been implicated in worry/generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Despite significant 
advances in our understanding of its role as a cognitive vulnerability for GAD, questions 
remain regarding its measurement and construct validity, as a reliable set of negative beliefs 
has yet to be identified. The goal of this research was therefore to discern the specific 
negative beliefs about uncertainty which result in intolerance of uncertainty. In the first 
study, the factor structure of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; 
Freeston et al., 1994) was re-examined in separate large non-clinical samples, and the 
association of these factors with GAD symptomatology was explored. A second study further 
examined the convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity of these negative beliefs 
about uncertainty, as well as their specificity, in relation to similar behavioural and cognitive 
constructs and to information-processing biases. To this end, the Ambiguous Situations 
Questionnaire (ASQ) was developed to further assess interpretive biases in specific 
ambiguous situations and to differentiate the cognitive, behavioural, and emotional reactions 
that characterize these distinct beliefs about uncertainty.  
Two replicable negative beliefs about uncertainty were identified: 1) the belief that 
Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications, and 2) the belief that 
Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything. The first of these was specifically associated 
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with indecisiveness, procrastination, the tendency to personalize negative situations, and 
with perceptions of specific ambiguous situations as having negative personal 
implications. This belief also showed stronger correlations with GAD analogue status, 
trait anxiety, somatic anxiety, and depressive symptoms. In contrast, the second of these 
beliefs was associated with a preference for order in the environment, with self-oriented 
and other-oriented perfectionism, and with perceptions of specific ambiguous situations 
as unfair and disruptive. Both negative beliefs about uncertainty were also associated 
with information-seeking, with negatively biased interpretations of ambiguous situations, 
and with pathological worry.  
Collectively, these studies’ findings suggest that uncertainty is experienced as 
aversive by individuals who believe it negatively impacts their ability to function and 
who show a tendency to personalize these perceived difficulties. It is also experienced as 
aversive by individuals who believe it to be unfair, as it contradicts their expectations of 
structure in the environment and may be perceived as hindering elevated personal 
standards from being met. These findings further support the validity of this construct, 
and are consistent with a growing literature which suggests that intolerance of uncertainty 
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Cognitive theory proposes that individual vulnerability to anxiety disorders is 
conferred by underlying cognitive schemas or beliefs that affect how individuals view the 
world and influence which situations tend to be identified as threatening, typically 
excessively so (Clark & Beck, 2010). These beliefs are hypothesized to alter information 
processing in threatening situations and to affect “the direction and/or strength of 
association between stress and symptom onset” (Clark & Beck, 2010, p. 103). Research 
into the cognitive vulnerabilities that predispose individuals to worry/generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD) has identified intolerance of uncertainty as a putative cognitive risk 
factor. However, further research is needed to distinguish the negative core beliefs about 
uncertainty that underlie this predisposition to experience uncertainty as intolerable. This 
set of studies sought to identify the negative beliefs about uncertainty that comprise this 
cognitive vulnerability to worry/GAD. In addition, these studies investigated the 
construct validity of these core beliefs by exploring whether they lead to hypothesized 
maladaptive behaviours, information-processing biases, or other cognitive and emotional 
responses in uncertain or ambiguous situations, as proposed by cognitive theory.  
Individual Differences in Tolerance for Uncertainty and Its Impact on Adaptive 
Coping 
 A preference for certainty in events is common, in some situations perhaps even 
ubiquitous, and at high levels uncertainty is salient and typically experienced as aversive. 
High situational uncertainty therefore frequently pulls for a response, either to avoid it 
(e.g., Curley, Yates, & Abrams, 1986), to seek out further information in order to reduce 
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it (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 1997), or to problem-solve a way out of it. The preferred use of 
different coping strategies may be situationally dependent, or it may reflect stable 
individual differences, or traits. Nonetheless, the adaptiveness of a given strategy is to a 
certain extent dependent on its applicability to the situation at hand (e.g., see Masel, 
Terry, & Gribble, 1996, for a review). Adaptive functioning therefore depends on the 
ability to be flexible in the choice of coping strategy, in order to select the coping 
response which will effectively resolve the situational uncertainty or prevent it from 
impeding goal attainment. Difficulties arise when situational expectations and preferred 
coping styles have become inflexible. Individuals who confront stressful, uncertain 
situations with the belief that events should be consistent with their expectations and 
dispositional coping style are vulnerable to having their expectations thwarted, and 
additionally may have less problem-solving options available to them to resolve the issue. 
Thus, individuals with more inflexible attitudes towards uncertainty will likely 
experience unpredictable or ambiguous situations as more stressful or aversive. 
 Among individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty, it has been established that 
a demand for certainty renders these individuals vulnerable to distress in response to not 
only highly uncertain situations, but moderately uncertain situations as well (e.g., 
Ladouceur et al., 1997). As such, it is apparent that at high trait levels of intolerance of 
uncertainty, situational expectations and coping preferences have become inflexible and 
individuals are no longer responding effectively to the demand characteristics of a 
problem situation. In addition, the anxiety and distress generated by perceived threats in 
moderately ambiguous situations have the potential to further interfere with appropriate 
coping responses. Intolerance of uncertainty may therefore interfere with adaptive 
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functioning and contribute to distress both directly and indirectly.  
Intolerance of uncertainty as a cognitive vulnerability for worry/GAD. Since 
it was first proposed as a potential contributor to worry (see Freeston Rhéaume, Letarte, 
Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), much research has examined the usefulness and validity of 
the construct of intolerance of uncertainty. An accumulating body of research has 
demonstrated a prominent relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and GAD 
symptomatology, consistent with its proposed role as a cognitive vulnerability for worry. 
For instance, intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to be a robust predictor of worry, 
even after controlling for other symptom variables such as anxiety and depressed mood 
(Buhr & Dugas, 2002) and generalized vulnerability factors such as negative affect 
(DeBruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2007; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton, Sexton, Walker, & 
Norton, 2005; van der Heiden et al., 2010, Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003). 
Intolerance of uncertainty similarly predicts the severity of worry and somatic anxiety 
symptoms within clinical GAD populations (Dugas et al., 2007).  
Mounting evidence suggests this association between intolerance of uncertainty 
and worry/GAD symptomatology is causal in nature. Consistent with proposed criteria to 
establish cognitive vulnerability (see Garber & Hollon, 1991; Kraemer et al., 1997; 
Riskind & Alloy, 2006), intolerance of uncertainty has demonstrated manipulability 
(DeBruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2006; Grenier & Ladouceur, 2004; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & 
Dugas, 2000; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009), temporal antecedence with respect to changes in 
worry (Donegan, 2010; Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 
2011), stability (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997), and 
evidence of construct validity (Berenbaum, Bredemeier, & Thompson, 2008; Buhr & 
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Dugas, 2006; DeBruin et al., 2006; Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005; Koerner & Dugas, 
2008; Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997). Thus, the relevance of the intolerance of 
uncertainty construct to the phenomenology of worry has been well established. 
However, while numerous examples of maladaptive coping among individuals high in 
trait intolerance of uncertainty have been demonstrated, the reasons for this intolerance 
towards uncertainty are not well understood. 
Construct validity of intolerance of uncertainty. While support for its 
conceptualization and utility has accumulated, the definition of intolerance of uncertainty 
has evolved since its introduction, from the initial concept that individuals high in this 
trait view certain negative outcomes as being preferable to uncertain ones, to the proposal 
that enduring beliefs may underlie this attitude toward uncertainty. Most recently, Dugas 
and Robichaud (2007) have defined intolerance of uncertainty as a “dispositional 
characteristic that results from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its 
implications” (p. 24). This latest definition extends our conceptualization of what 
intolerant of uncertainty entails, but highlights what is still missing in the establishment 
of its construct validity, namely the identification of these distinct negative beliefs about 
uncertainty that result in uncertainty intolerance. 
Thus, the origins of individual differences in the demand for certainty need to be 
further explored. In other words, what leads some individuals to be more prone than 
others to experience uncertainty as aversive?  The answer to this question is likely to lie 
in the beliefs these individuals hold regarding the nature of uncertainty and its 
implications, as suggested by the most recent definition of this construct (see Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007). This poses the question of what “enduring core beliefs” (Clark & 
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Beck, 2010, p. 36) result in inflexible coping responses and the tendency to experience 
certainty as aversive in both highly uncertain and moderately uncertain situations.  
Discerning the Specific Negative Beliefs About Uncertainty Relevant to Excessive 
Worry and Maladaptive Coping in Uncertain Situations 
What are the beliefs about uncertainty that lead some individuals to be more 
intolerant of uncertainty than others? Two studies were designed to answer this question. 
In the first study discussed here, a factor analytic approach was employed to discern the 
composite core beliefs about uncertainty that result in uncertainty intolerance. Intolerance 
of uncertainty was found to be comprised of two negative beliefs, labelled “Uncertainty 
has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications” and “Uncertainty is Unfair and 
Spoils Everything”, which demonstrated construct validity and stability in independent 
factor analyses, showed criterion-related validity with respect to worry, and evidenced 
some degree of specificity with respect to their associations with GAD diagnostic status 
and concomitant symptoms such as anxiety and depressed mood.  
The goals of the second study were to further explore the validity and utility of 
these proposed core uncertainty intolerant beliefs. Both negative beliefs about uncertainty 
were expected to show criterion-related validity with threatening appraisals of specific 
ambiguous situations. In addition, consistent with the conceptualization of these two 
negative beliefs about uncertainty, the belief that uncertainty has negative personal 
implications was expected to show criterion-related validity and specificity with 
behavioural impairments and perceived personal implications of these impairments in 
specific ambiguous situations. Conversely, the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils 
events was hypothesized to evidence criterion-related validity and specificity with the 
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tendency to interpret specific ambiguous situations as unfair and unnecessarily disruptive. 
In addition, both negative beliefs about uncertainty were expected to evidence convergent 
validity and specificity with relevant behavioural and cognitive constructs. It was 
therefore anticipated that the belief that uncertainty has negative implications would be 
associated with a tendency toward indecision, procrastination, and the personalization of 
negative outcomes, whereas the belief that uncertainty is unfair was expected to relate to 
perfectionism, a need for closure, and monitoring. These constructs are discussed below.  
Putative Moderating and Mediated Impacts of Intolerance of Uncertainty on Worry 
and Anxiety 
According to cognitive theory, enduring core beliefs are hypothesized to act as 
moderators, affecting “the direction and/or strength of association between stress and 
symptom onset, whereas more proximal cognitive variables are mediators (i.e., they 
account for the relationship between vulnerability, stress, and disorder onset) (see Baron 
& Kenny, 1986; Riskind & Alloy, 2006)” (Clark & Beck, 2010, p. 103). Partially 
consistent with this view, Laugesen and colleagues (2011) have demonstrated that, 
developmentally, intolerance of uncertainty is a partial mediator of changes in worry 
levels over time in an adolescent sample. Similarly, Donegan (2010) found that changes 
in GAD symptoms over the course of cognitive-behavioural treatment are partially 
mediated by changes in intolerance of uncertainty. Thus, intolerance of uncertainty has 
direct effects on changes in worry over time. However, is it also the case that intolerance 
of uncertainty has indirect effects on the development or reduction of worry and GAD 
symptoms through its impact on other processes? More recent findings suggest that 
intolerance of uncertainty may either moderate or its effects may be partially mediated by 
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the impact of other maladaptive responses in uncertain situations, responses which 
contribute to the tendency to worry excessively and uncontrollably. 
The role of cognitive vulnerabilities in the perception of threat. Clark and 
Beck (2010) have also proposed that cognitive vulnerability factors, such as intolerance 
of uncertainty, contribute to the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders 
through their impact on information processing. Following this theory, beliefs about 
uncertainty might be expected to result in a predilection to more readily attend to, 
negatively appraise, preferentially encode, and respond with maladaptive defensive 
strategies to perceived threats in ambiguous situations (Clark & Beck, 2010). Consistent 
with this prediction, individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty have demonstrated 
biased attention towards ambiguous situations (Heinecke, Koerner, & Dugas, 2006), a 
tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening (Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005; 
Koerner & Dugas, 2007a, 2008) and in particular to overestimate the probability and cost 
of perceived threats (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008), as well as preliminary evidence 
of biased recall for uncertain stimuli (Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005). As such, intolerance 
of uncertainty has been demonstrated to contribute to biases in information processing. 
Consistent with the predictions of cognitive theory, these biases in information 
processing have been shown to contribute to worry. Further, Koerner and Dugas (2008) 
demonstrated that the association between worry and intolerance of uncertainty was 
partially mediated by information processing (interpretive) biases, even when controlling 
for gender, GAD somatic symptoms, anxiety, and depression. In other words, a tendency 
to be high in intolerance of uncertainty, as opposed to low in intolerance of uncertainty, 
predicted negative appraisals of ambiguous situations, and this association accounted for 
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a significant portion of the variance in worry. These findings are consistent with the 
proposed role of intolerance of uncertainty as a cognitive vulnerability factor for worry 
and GAD. However, intolerance of uncertainty has also been shown to maladaptively 
impact cognition and behaviour in other ways.  
Intolerance of uncertainty may lead to impaired decision-making. Previous 
research on indecisiveness suggests it is associated with worry (Cantor, Gervais, & 
Dugas, 2008: Rassin & Muris, 2005; Rassin, Muris, Franken, Smit, & Wong, 2007) and 
contributes to threatening interpretations of ambiguous situations (Rassin & Muris, 
2005). Indecision has been defined as “the experience of decision problems (i.e., lack of 
information, valuation difficulty, and outcome uncertainty) resulting in overt choice-
related behaviours such as delay, tunnel vision, and post-decision dysfunctional 
behaviour (e.g., worry)” (Rassin, 2007, p. 11). Rassin has proposed that several different 
motivations may result in indecisiveness, via different pathways. Further, he suggests that 
intolerance of uncertainty may be one contributor. In support of this proposed pathway, 
indecisiveness has been shown to correlate highly with intolerance of uncertainty (Rassin 
& Muris, 2005). Further, Orellana-Damacela, Tindale, and Suarez-Balcazar (2000) have 
noted that self-discrepancies, or perceived deficiencies in how individuals perform 
compared to how they believe they ought to, predict indecision and decisional 
procrastination. As such, one hypothesis is that discrepancies between how individuals 
high in intolerance of uncertainty expect they should respond in uncertain situations and 
the behavioural difficulties that they do experience may result in indecision or decisional 
procrastination in ambiguous situations. This has yet to be tested. 
 Intolerance of uncertainty may lead to maladaptive delays, or 
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procrastination, when pursuing uncertain tasks. Procrastination, or the tendency to 
“voluntarily delay an intended course of action despite expecting to be worse off for the 
delay” (Steel, 2007), is one form of avoidance that can result from elevated levels of 
anxiety or worry. Its association with anxiety has been previously demonstrated (e.g., 
Stainton, Lay, & Flett, 2000), and it has similarly been shown to relate to higher levels of 
nonclinical worry (Stoeber & Joormann, 2001), though not pathological worry (Spada, 
Hiou, & Nikcevic, 2006; Stoeber & Joormann, 2001). Procrastination has also been 
linked to depression (Spada, Hiou, & Nikcevic, 2006), and on occasion contributes to a 
depressed mood (see Steel, 2007, for a review), perhaps due to the negative consequences 
to self-esteem that arise from having failed to complete important tasks. Consistent with 
this view, self-esteem has been shown to negatively correlate with procrastination (Steel, 
2007), and as a group procrastinators show relatively low self-esteem (e.g., Ferrari, 
1991). Alternatively, self-esteem may play a causal role, as low perceived self-efficacy to 
complete a task has been associated with more frequent procrastination (e.g., see Steel, 
2007, for a review). McKean (1994), for instance, noted that individuals with greater 
perceived self-helplessness and with global and stable internalized attributions for 
negative events reported higher levels of procrastination.  
There is also reason to suppose that intolerance of uncertainty plays a role in this 
association. Notably, intolerance of uncertainty has been proposed by several researchers 
to include or result in a tendency to delay or inhibit action in order to reduce anxiety (e.g., 
Berenbaum et al., 2008; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007; Dugas & Robichaud, 
2007). While no research to date has directly examined the contribution of intolerance of 
uncertainty to procrastination, it has been associated with low motivation to engage in 
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goal-directed actions (Aldao et al., 2010). However, the possibility that procrastination 
may be one pathway by which intolerance of uncertainty contributes to worry has not 
been tested. In addition, the direct association between specific negative beliefs about 
uncertainty and procrastination merits closer examination. 
 Intolerance of uncertainty may result in a low sense of mastery, self-doubt, 
and negative personal attributions for event outcomes. The association between low 
self-confidence and symptoms of worry or anxiety has also been explored previously. 
Worry has shown associations with low self-esteem (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and self-doubt (Davey & Levy, 1998, 1999). In 
addition, worry and GAD symptoms have been associated with low perceptions of 
controllability, including a low sense of self-mastery (Zalta & Chambless, 2008), greater 
perceived external constraints (Buhr & Dugas, 2006), and depressive predictive certainty 
(Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquin, 2008).  
The recent findings by Zalta and Chambless (2008) further suggest that a low 
sense of mastery contributes to, rather than resulting from, excessive and uncontrollable 
worry. These authors found support for a proposed structural equation model in which 
low mastery and high stress contribute to interpretive biases in ambiguous situations and 
partially mediate their effects on worry, as well as contributing to worry and ruminative 
thinking directly. Low perceived mastery also showed deleterious effects on coping.  
Low perceived personal mastery has also been found to relate to intolerance of 
uncertainty. For instance, intolerance of uncertainty has shown positive correlations with 
a low perceived sense of control over external events (Buhr & Dugas, 2006), with greater 
perceived constraints in the environment (Buhr & Dugas, 2006), with depressive 
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predictive certainty (Miranda et al., 2008), and with dysfunctional depressogenic attitudes 
more broadly (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004). Thus, intolerance of uncertainty has 
demonstrated associations with several markers of low perceived self-efficacy. 
Collectively, these findings suggest that one way in which intolerance of 
uncertainty may contribute to worry and maladaptive coping in threatening (e.g., 
uncertain) situations is through its effects on an individual’s sense of self-efficacy and 
control. Both perceived controllability and perceived self-efficacy have been shown to 
have substantial effects on coping effectiveness and distress in threatening situations, 
particularly among individuals high in anxiety (e.g., Ender, Speer, Johnson, & Flett, 
2000). Consistent with this view, Davey and Levy (1998, 1999) have suggested that 
doubts about self-efficacy may contribute to worry frequency or increase the length of a 
worry bout, by decreasing perceived ability to cope with a threat and by increasing the 
perceived negative valence of the threat. As intolerance of uncertainty is associated with 
these constructs, one possibility is that it may have a moderating impact on worry by 
fostering a low perceived ability to cope with negative outcomes. In other words, 
individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty may experience a low sense of self-efficacy 
about their ability to cope with uncertain threats, which may increase the perceived 
likelihood and severity of the threat and thereby lead to more worry. Thus, intolerance of 
uncertainty may render individuals vulnerable to excessive and uncontrollable worry by 
increasing their perceived vulnerability to uncontrollable stressors. However, it remains 
to be explored what role specific negative beliefs about uncertainty may have in these 
pathways to worry. 
Intolerance of uncertainty may be associated with unattainable standards for 
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one’s self and others: Evidence of its association with perfectionism. Perfectionism 
has been examined in relation to both symptoms of anxiety (e.g., Antony, Purdon, Huta, 
& Swinson, 1998; Kawamura, Hunt, Frost, & DiBartolo, 2001) and depression (e.g., 
Enns & Cox, 1999; Kawamura et al., 2001). Self-oriented perfectionism has also been 
found to correlate positively with worry (Blankstein & Lumley, 2008; Buhr & Dugas, 
2006; Slaney, Rice, Mobley, Trippi, & Ashby, 2001; Stoeber, Feast, & Hayward, 2009) 
as have other measures of heightened self-exigent standards (e.g., Berenbaum, 
Thompson, Bredemeier, 2007; Pomerantz, Saxon, Oishi, 2000) and maladaptive 
perfectionism (Kawamura, 2001), particularly concerns over mistakes and doubts 
(Santanello & Gardner, 2006; Stoeber & Joormann, 2001). The association between 
other-oriented perfectionism and worry, however, is less clear, with some studies 
showing no relationship (Blankstein & Lumley, 2008; Buhr & Dugas, 2006) and some 
showing a small positive correlation (Slaney, Rice, Mobley, Trippi, & Ashby, 2001).  
Intolerance of uncertainty also appears to be associated with these heightened 
self-exigent standards and with other expressions of elevated conscientiousness. For 
instance, intolerance of uncertainty has been associated with perceived responsibility to 
continue thinking (Sugiura, 2007) and to prevent harm to others (Dugas, Gosselin, & 
Ladouceur, 2001), as well as with elevated standards for personal behaviour (e.g., Buhr & 
Dugas, 2006). Yet while perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty have sometimes 
been considered to be highly overlapping constructs (e.g., Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2008; 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005; Wu & Carter, 2008), 
correlations between these measures are small to moderate. For instance, intolerance of 
uncertainty has shown small positive associations with self-oriented perfectionism (r = 
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.33; Buhr & Dugas, 2006) and moderate associations with concerns over mistakes (r = 
.53; Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009) and doubts (r = .55; Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). However, 
it has not as a whole evidenced a significant association with other-oriented perfectionism 
(r = .13; Buhr & Dugas, 2006). Nonetheless, the extent to which specific negative beliefs 
about uncertainty may be associated, perhaps differentially, with facets of perfectionism 
merits further investigation. 
Intolerance of uncertainty may result in unrealistic situational expectations: 
Its association with a need for closure. A construct initially proposed in the epistemic 
literature, a need for closure has been defined as “a dimension of individual differences 
related to persons’ motivation with respect to information processing and judgment” 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, pp.1049 - 1050). The most recent measure of this 
construct includes several related dimensions of a need for closure, including a 
preference for order, for predictability, and for decisiveness, a discomfort with ambiguity, 
and closed-mindedness (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Previous research on a need for 
closure, and on prior conceptualizations of this construct such as a need for structure, 
have shown it to be positively associated with worry (e.g., Cavazos & Campbell, 2008). 
Under certain conditions, a need for closure has also evidenced positive associations with 
other worry-related processes. These include low self-esteem (Cavazos & Campbell, 
2008), more global personal attributions for negative events (Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, & 
Tabak, 1997), indecisiveness or difficulties making decisions (Bar-Tal, 1994a; Cavazos 
& Campbell, 2008), and heightened information-seeking (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Spitzer, 
1999). Further, Ciarrcochi, Said, and Deane (2005) found that individuals high in a need 
for structure exhibited greater anxiety, depression, hopelessness, and stress following 
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stressful life events. Thus, strict expectations for the environment, in the form of a need 
for structure or closure, appear to amplify the negative impacts of stress. 
The construct of intolerance of uncertainty has been suggested to share 
similarities with this need for closure as well as with other measures of strong situational 
expectations. For instance, Grenier, Barrette, and Ladouceur (2005) have described the 
overlap between intolerance uncertainty and an intolerance of ambiguity. More recently, 
Berenbaum and colleagues (2008) have demonstrated that various facets of intolerance of 
uncertainty are associated with diverse dimensions of a need for closure, as they evidence 
moderate positive associations with a preference for predictability, a need for order, and a 
discomfort with ambiguity, small positive correlations with close-mindedness, and 
moderate negative correlations with a preference for decisiveness. It remains to be seen 
whether the newly proposed distinct beliefs about uncertainty contribute differentially to 
these inflexible situational expectations, or moderate their impact on worry. 
Intolerance of uncertainty leads to excessive and maladaptive information-
seeking: Evidence for its association with avoidant and monitoring dispositional 
coping styles. Previous research on the association between anxiety and information-
seeking or its counterpart, an avoidant coping style, suggests that the relationship 
between anxiety-related processes and the use of these coping strategies is not 
straightforward. GAD has been characterized as resulting from an approach-avoidance 
conflict (e.g., Dugas & Koerner, 2005; Dugas & Ladouceur, 1998; Koerner & Dugas, 
2006), and its related symptoms and processes might therefore be expected to show 
complex relationships with avoidant and vigilant information processing styles. As such, 
correlations between worry or GAD symptomatology and both avoidant (Sexton & 
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Dugas, 2008, 2009a; Dugas et al., 2007; Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003) and 
monitoring (Muris, van Zuuren, de Jong, de Beurs, Hanewald, 1994; Rosen & Knäuper, 
2009; Sexton & Dugas, 2008) behavioural coping responses have been documented.  
In regard to information-gathering responses, intolerance of uncertainty has been 
associated with greater information-seeking (e.g., Rosen & Knäuper, 2009; Rosen, 
Knäuper, & Sammut, 2007). It has also been shown to predict heightened evidence 
requirements in decision-making tasks (Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997), which have 
been observed among high worriers (Tallis, Eysenck & Mathews, 1991). These findings 
suggest that individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty seek safety by attempting to 
reduce the uncertainty in decisions, and need more information before they will accept 
that a reasonable level of certainty has been reached.  
Intolerance of uncertainty has also been associated with avoidant coping, 
including the use of thought suppression (Robichaud et al., 2003), other cognitive 
avoidance strategies (Dugas et al., 2007), and experiential avoidance more broadly (Lee, 
Orsillo, Roemer, & Allen, 2010). Thus, consistent with cognitive theory, intolerance of 
uncertainty is associated with other maladaptive coping responses, which may in turn 
function as more proximal influences on the tendency to worry excessively. 
 Intolerance of uncertainty may indeed moderate the effects of these maladaptive 
responses on worry. Rosen and Knäuper (2009) have shown that manipulation of both 
dispositional (trait) intolerance of uncertainty and state-induced discomfort in uncertain 
situations interacts to increase maladaptive information-seeking in response to a possible 
threat. This heightened information-seeking was also associated with more worry about 
the perceived threat, suggesting that the additional information acquired had not 
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facilitated appropriate coping or re-evaluation of the manageability of the threat. Instead, 
the additional information-seeking appeared to exacerbate individuals’ concerns, perhaps 
by heightening the sense of urgency to prevent future negative outcomes from occurring, 
and increased further maladaptive efforts to prepare for these outcomes. These findings 
thus suggest that intolerance of uncertainty contributes to excessive information-seeking 
and in so doing, may moderate the impact of this maladaptive coping on future worry. 
The relevance and scope of intolerance of uncertainty. Thus, consistent with 
cognitive theory, there is evidence to suggest that intolerance of uncertainty may function 
as a moderating cognitive vulnerability factor for worry, as it is associated with other 
proximal processes that influence the tendency to worry excessively. The effects of these 
other relevant constructs, however, afford an incomplete picture of cognitive 
vulnerabilities to worry, as a significant proportion of the variance in worry is still 
predicted by intolerance of uncertainty after controlling for many of these processes. For 
instance, intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to be a robust predictor of worry or 
GAD symptoms after accounting for negatively biased interpretations of ambiguous 
situations (Dugas, Hedayati et al., 2005; Koerner & Dugas, 2008), difficulties with goal-
directed behaviour (Aldao et al., 2010), cognitive avoidance (Dugas et al., 1998), low 
perceived sense of control over situations (Buhr & Dugas, 2006) or depressive predictive 
certainty (Miranda et al., 2008) as well as other meta-cognitive fears about losing control 
of cognitions and emotions (DeBruin et al., 2007; Dugas et al., 2001; Stapinski, Abbott, 
& Rapee, 2010), personality variables such as perfectionism (Buhr & Dugas, 2006), and 
other related processes such as perceived responsibility (Dugas et al., 2001). As such, 
intolerance of uncertainty repeatedly shows either unique or stronger associations with 
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worry and GAD symptoms than do other related constructs, suggesting it may either be 
more comprehensive, or possibly more precise, in its conceptualization of the relevant 
vulnerabilities that predispose individuals to worry. However, it remains unclear to what 
extent specific negative beliefs about uncertainty contribute to worry and to these 
associated worry-related processes. 
Goals of the Current Research 
In sum, intolerance of uncertainty can be conceptualized as resulting from a 
generalized negative attitude towards uncertainty, which contributes to the development 
of worry, anxiety, and symptoms of depressed mood. As we have seen, intolerance of 
uncertainty also has diverse negative behavioural and cognitive consequences, among 
these the tendency to perceive uncertain situations as threatening, the development of 
inflexible personal and situational expectations, and the maladaptive use of coping 
responses. Each of these associated processes has the potential to contribute to significant 
impairments in functioning. However, it is not known to what extent specific negative 
beliefs about uncertainty contribute to these worry- or anxiety-related impairments, or to 
the information processing biases that partially mediate intolerance of uncertainty’s 
association with worry. 
 As a whole, then, the purpose of these studies was to identify and validate a set of 
distinct negative beliefs about uncertainty. These underlying core beliefs were expected 
to be consistently differentiable, and hence replicable in independent samples. Further, 
they were expected to correlate meaningfully with the relevant symptom clusters for 
which they are proposed to confer vulnerability. Finally, they were hypothesized to show 
convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity, as well as specificity, with 
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behavioural and cognitive consequences of intolerance of uncertainty, and with biased 
appraisals of threat in ambiguous situations. This research thus sought to further establish 
the construct validity of intolerance of uncertainty by answering this question: what are 






This study examined the factor structure of the English version of the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; English 
version: Buhr & Dugas, 2002) using a substantially larger sample than has been used in 
previous studies. Nonclinical undergraduate students and adults from the community 
(mean age = 23.83 years, SD = 6.44; 72.4% female) who participated in 16 studies in the 
Anxiety Disorders Laboratory at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada, were 
randomly assigned to two datasets. Exploratory factor analysis with the first sample (n = 
1230) identified two factors: the beliefs that “uncertainty has negative behavioural and 
self-referent implications” and that “uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything.” This 
two-factor structure provided a good fit to the data (NNFI = .96, CFI = .97, SRMR = .05, 
RMSEA = .07) upon confirmatory factor analysis with the second sample (n = 1221). 
Both factors showed similarly high correlations with pathological worry, and Factor 1 
showed stronger correlations with generalized anxiety disorder analogue status, trait 
anxiety, somatic anxiety, and depressive symptomatology. 
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Defining Distinct Negative Beliefs About Uncertainty: Validating the Factor 
Structure of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
Intolerance of uncertainty has been defined as a “dispositional characteristic that 
results from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications” (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007, p. 24). Given the wealth of evidence on its relevance to worry, 
intolerance of uncertainty has been proposed as a cognitive vulnerability factor for worry 
and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Koerner & Dugas, 2008).  
Although intolerance of uncertainty is present across the anxiety disorders 
(Ladouceur et al., 1999), it has primarily been investigated in GAD. The specificity of 
this association has been demonstrated in two ways. First, higher levels of intolerance of 
uncertainty have been found in GAD populations as compared to nonclinical (Dugas, 
Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Ladouceur et al., 1999) and other anxiety disorder 
populations (Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Ladouceur et al., 1999), with the 
possible exception of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) samples (Holaway, 
Heimberg, & Coles, 2006). Similarly, when controlling for neuroticism/negative affect – 
a global vulnerability for anxiety and mood disorders (see Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 
1994; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996) – intolerance of uncertainty was specifically related to 
worry but not to symptoms of panic disorder, OCD, or health anxiety (Norton, Sexton, 
Walker, & Norton, 2005; Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003). Second, intolerance 
of uncertainty continues to be associated with worry when controlling for anxiety and 
depression (Buhr & Dugas, 2002), perfectionism and perceived sense of control (Buhr & 
Dugas, 2006), anxiety sensitivity and perceived responsibility (Dugas, Gosselin, & 
Ladouceur, 2001), dysfunctional attitudes (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004), positive 
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beliefs about worry, negative problem orientation, and cognitive avoidance (Dugas et al., 
1998). In addition, intolerance of uncertainty distinguishes mild vs. moderate to severe 
GAD in clinical populations (Dugas et al., 2007). 
Based on these findings, intolerance of uncertainty was proposed as a cognitive 
vulnerability factor for worry and GAD (Koerner & Dugas, 2008). Consistent with 
proposed criteria for establishing cognitive vulnerability (see Garber & Hollon, 1991; 
Ingram, 2003; Kraemer, Kazdin, & Offord, 1997; Riskind & Alloy, 2006), intolerance of 
uncertainty has shown preliminary evidence of manipulability (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & 
Dugas, 2000), temporal antecedence with respect to worry (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000), 
stability (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), 
and construct validity (see Koerner & Dugas, 2008; Koerner & Dugas, 2006, for a 
review). Nevertheless, the specific negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications 
that comprise this dispositional characteristic remain to be consistently discerned. 
One promising means by which to identify these beliefs would be to more closely 
examine measures of the intolerance of uncertainty construct to distinguish the composite 
factors. Intolerance of uncertainty has most commonly been assessed using the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston et al., 1994). 
Although it is employed as a unifactorial assessment tool, previous studies have pointed 
to an underlying multifactorial structure for the IUS (e.g., Berenbaum, Bredemeier, & 
Thompson, 2008; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007; Freeston 
et al., 1994; Norton, 2005). As such, closer examination of the factors which comprise 
the IUS may elucidate the specific negative beliefs about uncertainty that result in 
intolerance of uncertainty. 
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Previous factor analyses of the IUS have identified several potential distinct 
negative beliefs about uncertainty, or factors. Exploratory factor analysis of the original 
French version of the IUS identified five negative beliefs about uncertainty: 1) 
uncertainty is unacceptable and should be avoided; 2) being uncertain reflects badly on a 
person; 3) uncertainty is frustrating; 4) uncertainty causes stress; and 5) uncertainty 
prevents action (Freeston et al., 1994). Subsequent exploratory factor analysis with the 
English translation found a four-factor structure instead, comprising the beliefs that: 1) 
uncertainty leads to the inability to act; 2) uncertainty is stressful and upsetting; 3) 
unexpected events are negative and should be avoided; and 4) being uncertain about the 
future is unfair (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). Neither set of factors were proposed as subscales, 
but rather were intended to provide evidence of the content validity of the IUS. 
Despite these initial findings, the specific beliefs about uncertainty identified in 
the Freeston et al. (1994) and Buhr and Dugas (2002) exploratory factor analyses have 
not been consistently derived or confirmed. For instance, in a series of exploratory 
analyses in various ethnic groups, Norton (2005) was unable to replicate the item 
composition of either the four or five-factor solutions. Similarly, Berenbaum and 
colleagues (2008) arrived at a four-factor structure (Desire for Predictability, Uncertainty 
Paralysis, Uncertainty Distress, and Inflexible Uncertainty Beliefs) for the English 
version using exploratory factor analysis, but only two factors overlapped substantially 
with those identified by Buhr and Dugas (2002). Finally, Carleton and colleagues (2007) 
found that neither the original four factors nor the five factors provided an adequate fit to 
the data upon confirmatory factor analysis. Yet despite the poor support for either 
multifactorial solution, a unitary structure provided a similarly poor fit. Given this 
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finding, and the inconsistencies in previous studies, further analysis of the specific 
negative beliefs about uncertainty assessed by the IUS is warranted. 
An alternative approach was employed by Carleton and colleagues (2007) who 
proposed a 2-factor structure for a shortened version of the IUS composed of 12 of the 
original 27 items. To this end, two non-overlapping factors, one from each of the 
previously-identified five- and four-factor solutions, were selected and refined. The two 
ensuing subscales were labeled “prospective anxiety” and “inhibitory anxiety” and were 
comprised of 7 items from the “Uncertainty is unacceptable and should be avoided” 
Factor (Freeston et al., 1994) and 5 items from the “Uncertainty leads to the inability to 
act” Factor (Buhr & Dugas, 2002), respectively. Confirmatory factor analyses found that 
these two refined factors provided a superior fit to the data than did a single-factor 
solution or the originally-proposed four- and five-factor solutions. Carleton and 
colleagues, however, did not explore alternative full-scale factor solutions. Further, 
Carleton and colleagues’ two factors were not selected on the basis of content but rather 
were chosen with the aim of establishing non-overlapping factors, and much of the 
subsequent refinement of the two factors was based on the apparent face validity of the 
items rather than on theoretical grounds. Given these considerations, a more content-
driven analysis of the underlying factors of the IUS, and a re-examination of the full scale 
factor structure, are warranted in order to identify the set of negative beliefs about 
uncertainty that comprise the construct. 
The present study sought first to explore alternative factor solutions for the IUS 
full scale using exploratory factor analysis, and secondly to assess the goodness of fit of 
these newly-derived solutions using confirmatory factor analysis. To conduct these 
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analyses, a large nonclinical sample was extracted from archival IUS data. Specifically, 
data from 16 previous studies conducted in the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory at 
Concordia University and employing the English translation of the IUS, were compiled 
and subjected to a series of factor analyses. A secondary aim of this investigation was to 
assess the validity of the derived subscales, or specific beliefs about uncertainty, by 
examining their relative associations with symptoms of worry, anxiety, and depression, 
and with analogue GAD diagnostic status. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Archival data from 2451 individuals having participated in 16 studies conducted 
between 1998 and August 2006 in the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory at Concordia 
University in Montreal, Canada, which employed the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
(English translation), were used for this study. Participants were recruited from 
undergraduate classes at Concordia University and from the surrounding community. 
This nonclinical sample was recruited through sign-up sheets circulated in undergraduate 
university classes as well as through advertisements posted on the university campus and 
in the surrounding neighborhood. All participants provided written informed consent. As 
would be expected given that common recruitment methods were employed across 
studies all within the same geographic area, a survey of the demographic composition 
(e.g., age, gender ratios, ethnic background) of the 16 samples showed them to be highly 
similar. Participants were therefore pooled across the 16 samples and then randomly 
allocated to one of two groups; an exploratory factor analysis was conducted with the 
first group of participants (n = 1230) and the second group was retained for follow-up 
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confirmatory factor analyses (n = 1221). 
Participants in the exploratory sample ranged in age from 17 to 80 years. 
Approximately 72.4% of this sample (n = 890; one participant did not report gender) was 
female, and there was a significant albeit small gender difference in IUS scores (M = 
57.44; SD = 19.09 for females, M = 54.16; SD = 17.07 for males; F (1, 1227) = 7.674, p < 
.01, d = .18). Similarly, in the confirmatory dataset, participants were aged 17 to 68 years 
and 73.6% (n = 897) were female (three participants did not report gender). Again, there 
was a significant gender difference in IUS scores, but the effect size was small (M = 
56.17; SD = 18.07 for females, M = 53.69; SD = 17.31 for males; F (1, 1216) = 4.573, p < 
.05, d = .14). For participants who provided information on their ethnic background (self-
reported ethnicity was collected in many but not all of the included studies), a 
comparison of ethnic frequencies across samples is reported in Table 2.1. No significant 
differences in age, gender, or ethnicity were found between the two datasets (see Table 
2.1). 
Measures 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; French version: Freeston et al., 1994; 
English translation: Buhr & Dugas, 2002). The IUS is comprised of 27 items assessing 
negative beliefs about uncertainty and its perceived consequences. Higher scores on the 
IUS indicate greater intolerance of uncertainty. Similar to the original French measure, 
the English translation has shown excellent internal consistency (α =.94) and temporal 
stability (r =.74 over 5 weeks) and has demonstrated convergent, criterion, and 
discriminant validity (Buhr & Dugas, 2002, 2006) cross-culturally (Norton, 2005). In this 
study, the IUS showed excellent internal consistency (α = .95 in both samples), and the 
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average inter-item correlation was r = .40 (95% C.I. = .38 - .42) in the exploratory dataset 
and r = .39 (95% C.I. = .37 - .41) in the confirmatory dataset. 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ is composed of 16-items assessing the frequency and 
intensity of worry, with higher scores indicating higher levels of generalized worry. The 
PSWQ has evidenced excellent internal consistency in this (α = .94 in the exploratory and 
.93 in the confirmatory samples) and other studies (α = .86 to .95) as well as good 
stability (r = .92 for test-retest over 8 to 10 weeks, r = .74 to .93 over 4 weeks; Meyer et 
al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). Average inter-item correlations in this study were 
very good (r = .48, 95% C.I. = .45 - .50 in the exploratory, r = .47, 95% C.I. = .45 - .49 in 
the confirmatory datasets). The convergent, divergent, and discriminant validity of the 
PSWQ is evident in both clinical and nonclinical populations (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 
1992; Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). 
The Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ; Dugas, Freeston, Provencher, 
Lachance, Ladouceur, & Gosselin, 2001). The WAQ is an 11-item screening 
questionnaire for GAD as defined in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000). Individuals are asked to rate the 
frequency, controllability, and excessiveness of their worries and report on the frequency 
of GAD somatic symptoms. The WAQ has shown both sensitivity and specificity as a 
screening tool for GAD in nonclinical samples (Dugas et al., 2001). In the current study, 
the WAQ was used as a dichotomous measure (i.e., presence/absence) of analogue GAD 
diagnostic status, with analogue GAD coded as 1 and absence of full diagnostic criteria 
coded as 0. 
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State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) – Trait (STAI-T; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1977). The STAI-T is a 20-item measure of the 
“relatively stable individual differences in anxiety proneness” (Spielberger et al., 1977, p. 
5), or trait anxiety. Reviews of this construct suggest that there is considerable theoretical 
overlap between this construct and the constructs of neuroticism or negative affect 
(Barlow, 2002; Watson & Clark, 1984; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996). Higher scores on the 
STAI-T indicate higher levels of trait anxiety, or neuroticism. The STAI-T has 
demonstrated stability (r = .71 to .75 over 30-days, r = .65 to .68 over 60 days in a 
student sample; Spielberger et al., 1977) and good internal consistency in student (e.g.,  
= .81; Bernstein & Eveland, 1982) and anxiety disorder patient samples ( = .89; Beiling, 
Antony, & Swinson, 1998). High correlations between the STAI-T and other measures of 
anxiety attest to its construct validity (Beiling et al., 1998; Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 
1995). In this study, the STAI-T showed excellent internal consistency ( = .93 in the 
exploratory sample;  = .92 in the confirmatory sample) and good average inter-item 
correlations (r = .38, 95% C.I. = .34 - .43 in the exploratory sample; r = .36, 95% C.I. = 
.32 - .41 in the confirmatory sample).   
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The BAI 
is a 21-item measure of anxiety symptomatology, designed to have minimal overlap with 
depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1988). Higher scores are indicative of greater, mainly 
somatic anxiety (Cox, Cohen, Direnfeld, & Swinson, 1996). The BAI has shown 
excellent internal consistency in anxiety disorder patient ( = .85 to .92; Beck & Steer, 
1993) and undergraduate student samples ( = .90-.91; Creamer et al., 1995) as well as 
good test-retest reliability (r = .83 in a panic disorder patient sample over 5-weeks; de 
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Beurs, Wilson, Chambless, Goldstein, & Feske, 1997).  The BAI showed excellent 
internal consistency in this study ( = .90 in the exploratory and  = .91 in the 
confirmatory samples) and average inter-item correlations were adequate (r = .31, 95% 
C.I. = .27 - .34 in the exploratory sample; r = .33, 95% C.I. = .30 - .36 in the 
confirmatory sample). The BAI has shown convergent validity with anxiety measures 
(Beck et al., 1988) and, compared to the STAI-T, has evidenced superior discriminant 
validity with measures of depressive symptomatology (Creamer et al., 1995; Fydrich, 
Dowdall, & Chambless, 1992). 
Centre for Epidemiologic Studies – Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). 
The CES-D is a 20-item measure of depressive symptomatology intended for use in the 
general population. Higher scores indicate a higher frequency of depressive symptoms 
over the past week. The CES-D has shown very good to excellent internal consistency ( 
= .85 in community samples, and  = .90 in outpatient and inpatient samples) and test-
retest reliability (r = .51 to .67 over 2 to 8 weeks, r = .32 to .54 over 3 to 12 months; 
Radloff, 1977). In this study, the CES-D showed excellent internal consistency ( = .91 
in both samples) and good average inter-item correlations (r = .34, 95% C.I. = .30 - .37 in 
the exploratory sample; r = .33, 95% C.I. = .29 - .36 in the confirmatory sample). The 
CES-D has shown convergent validity with other measures of depressive symptoms 
(Radloff et al., 1977; Weissman, Prusoff, & Newberry, 1975, as cited in Radloff, 1977), 





Data screening and outlier analysis. Analysis of all study measures for 
multivariate outliers, univariate outliers, and distribution normality was performed in the 
exploratory factor analysis dataset and in the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) dataset 
separately. First, to identify multivariate outliers, Mahalanobis distance was computed 
and a conservative chi-square cut-off of p < .001 was employed, given the narrow 5-point 
range of individual IUS items. Second, univariate outliers for the total scale scores were 
defined as data points ± 3.29 standard deviations from the mean (p < .001, two-tailed; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). For the exploratory factor analysis, 89 multivariate IUS-item 
outliers and 5 univariate outliers on the IUS total score were identified and excluded. For 
the CFA dataset, 91 IUS-item multivariate outliers and an additional 5 univariate outliers 
were identified and removed from the dataset.  
All measures in both samples were then assessed for skewness and kurtosis in the 
distribution of total scale scores. The IUS was significantly positively skewed in both the 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis datasets (skew = .827 and .843, 
respectively).  Significant kurtosis in the IUS was not observed in either dataset (kurtosis 
= .235 and .389, respectively). All remaining total scale scores were also within skew 
tolerances (i.e., skew/SE < | 5 |, given N > 100) and within kurtosis tolerances (i.e., 
kurtosis/SE < | 5 |, given N > 100). We opted not to correct for the observed skewness in 
the IUS due to the nature of the population sampled. Specifically, as this study employed 
primarily clinical assessment tools in a nonclinical sample, some degree of positive skew 
was expected and was presumed to reflect the characteristics of the sample rather than a 
bias in the observed scores. 
For the IUS, normality of the distribution was also assessed at the item level. 
 30 
Significant positive skewness was observed for most individual IUS items. In particular, 
all but three IUS items (1, 8, and 10) were significant positively skewed in the 
exploratory sample, and all items save Items 1, 6, and 8 showed significant positive skew 
in the confirmatory sample. Significant kurtosis was also observed in several IUS item 
distributions (Items 2, 8, 9, 13, 23, and 25 in the exploratory sample; Items 1, 2, 9, 13, 19, 
23, 25, and 27 in the confirmatory sample). Rather than transforming items, which could 
reduce the ecological validity of our factor analytic findings, we opted to use polychoric 
correlations for the exploratory factor analysis, and employed an alternate method of 
extraction in the confirmatory factor analysis to adjust for the observed skewness and 
kurtosis in the IUS and guard against potential bias in the goodness-of-fit indices. 
Psychometric Properties of the IUS 
Exploratory factor analysis. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted using 
SPSS version 15 software. Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) was selected as the method of 
extraction. Polychoric correlations were computed using EQS version 6.1 software 
(Bentler, 1995; Bentler & Wu, 1995) and then imported into SPSS. Kaiser’s (1970) 
measure of sampling adequacy (the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA) indicated that this 
intercorrelation matrix was appropriate for factor analysis (MSA = 0.97). The Kaiser rule 
(minimum eigenvalue = 1; Kaiser, 1970) suggested a 3-factor solution (the first ten 
eigenvalues were 13.47, 1.76, 1.20, 0.98, 0.90, 0.73, 0.70, 0.58, 0.55, and 0.54). In 
contrast, the scree test (Cattell, 1966) suggested that a 2-factor solution may be more 
appropriate. Velicer’s Minimum Average Partial (MAP) test (Velicer, 1976) and Horn’s 
parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) were also conducted to determine the number of factors to 
be extracted. Zwick and Velicer (1986) have suggested that these two tests are the most 
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reliable in determining the appropriate number of components to retain. These tests were 
conducted in SPSS using the command syntax proposed by O’Connor (2000). The MAP 
test suggested a 2-factor solution (as the minimum average partial correlation 
corresponded to 2 principle components). In addition, in a parallel analysis, only the first 
two eigenvalues (13.47 and 1.76, as reported above) were found to be larger than the 
eigenvalues in the 95
th
 percentile (the first five randomly-generated eigenvalues derived 
from 1000 randomly-generated datasets with 27 variables and 1230 cases were 1.31, 
1.27, 1.24, 1.21, 1.18). Given the convergence of the scree plot, MAP test, and parallel 
analysis, the 2-factor solution was selected as the most appropriate.  
Because the factors assess facets of the same underlying intolerance of 
uncertainty construct, they were expected to correlate to some degree. Promax (oblique) 
rotation was therefore employed. The resulting 2-factor solution explained 52.9% of the 
variance (the two eigenvalues calculated after the re-scaling of factor coefficients 
following rotation were 11.94 and 11.40), and the factors showed a correlation of r = .77. 
In examining the individual items, a cut-off of > .40 was employed to identify 
significant factor coefficients. Factor 1 was found to be composed of 15 items denoting 
the beliefs that uncertainty impairs performance and reflects poorly on an individual’s 
character; this factor was labeled “Uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent 
implications.” Factor 2 was composed of 12 items which assessed the belief that future 
events ought to be predictable, and that uncertainty about the future is unfair and 
therefore frustrating or upsetting; this factor was labeled “Uncertainty is unfair and spoils 
everything.” There were no hyperplane and no complex items. Promax-rotated principal 
factor standardized regression coefficients from the pattern matrix are presented in Table 
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2.2. 
Confirmatory factor analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis of the proposed 2-
factor structure of the IUS was performed with the EQS structural equation program, 
version 6.1 (Bentler, 1995; Bentler & Wu, 1995). Given the high degree of skewness and 
kurtosis among the IUS items (Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis = 136.93, 
normalized estimate Z = 60.45), the elliptical (ERLS) method of estimation was 
employed. This method of extraction was chosen in preference to alternative approaches 
for non-normally distributed data as it has been suggested that elliptical estimation is less 
prone to error when employing small sample sizes or, as is more pertinent in this context, 
when testing complex models (Kline, 1998). As was done in the exploratory factor 
analysis, the two factors were allowed to covary, given that the proposed subscales 
comprise the same construct and were therefore expected to be highly correlated. 
Correlations between the observed variables, or IUS items, are presented in Table 2.3 
along with IUS item means, standard deviations, and corrected item-total correlations.  
All items loaded significantly on their respective factor, with the strength of 
association ranging from r
2 
= .22 to .66 (see Table 2.4 for CFA factor loadings of the 
IUS), and the factors were correlated at r = .87. As the χ2 measure of the goodness of fit 
can be unreliable, particularly in large samples (Brown, 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001), additional indices of model fit were assessed. The two-factor model generally met 
conventional standards for good model fit, though the model χ2 = 2479.477 for df = 323 
was significant (p < .001). This model produced a Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index 
(NNFI) of .96 (NNFI’s > .90 are indicative of good model fit; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001), a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .97 (CFI’s > .95 indicate good fit; Hu & Bentler, 
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1999; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), and a standardized root mean-square residual (SRMR) 
of .05 (SRMR’s < .08 are recommended; Hu & Bentler, 1999), although the root mean-
square error of approximation (RMSEA) was .07 (whereas RMSEA’s < .06 are 
recommended; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Thus, overall, the two factor model provided a good 
fit to the data. 
For comparative purposes, given the high observed correlation between the 
factors which can indicate poor factor differentiation, a unitary factor solution was 
assessed. This one-factor solution provided an adequate fit to the data (χ2 = 5390.164 for 
df = 324, p < .001; NNFI = .93; CFI = 93; SRMR = .06; RMSEA = .11), though not all 
measures of goodness-of-fit (e.g., χ2, CFI, RMSEA) were above conventional criteria as 
specified by Hu and Bentler (1999). In contrast, the two-factor solution provided a 
superior fit to the data (Δχ2 = 2910.687 for Δdf = 1, p < .001). 
Internal consistency. The IUS subscales showed excellent internal consistency in 
the exploratory ( = .92 for Factor 1,  = .91 for Factor 2) and confirmatory ( = .92 for 
Factor 1,  = .90 for Factor 2) datasets. 
Construct Validity of the IUS Items 
Assessing the overlap between IUS items and a measure of worry. Given the 
high correlations between the IUS and PSWQ observed in previous research (e.g., 
correlations ranging from r = .57 to r = .69 have been observed; e.g., Dugas et al., 2004; 
Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003), we sought to ensure that all IUS items were 
assessing the construct of intolerance of uncertainty rather than the phenomenon of 
worry. To this end, correlations between individual IUS items and the PSWQ and IUS 
total scores were computed and compared using Fisher’s Z test of non-independent 
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correlations (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992). All IUS items showed significantly 
stronger correlations with the IUS total score (jackknife correlations ranged from r = .42 
to r = .78 in the exploratory dataset) than with the PSWQ (correlations ranged from r = 
.20 to r = .60; Fisher’s Z ranged from Z = 2.52 to Z = 14.93, n = 1102, p < .05; similar 
correlations were observed in the confirmatory dataset).  The effect size of this difference 
between correlations was moderate (r
2
difference ranged from .06 to .33 in the exploratory 
sample). 
Construct Validity of the IUS Subscales 
Factor score correlations with worry, anxiety, and depression measures. As a 
preliminary examination of the construct validity of the two factors, correlations were 
computed between these factors and measures of excessive worry, analogue GAD status, 
trait anxiety (or neuroticism), somatic anxiety, and depressive symptomatology. For the 
analysis with GAD diagnostic status, biserial rather than point-biserial correlations were 
calculated (given that the symptoms of this disorder exist on a continuum, raising the 
potential that point-biserial correlations with this dichotomous variable may be 
attenuated; Fields, 2005). In the exploratory sample, factor scores were computed in 
SPSS as regression-based coefficients derived from PAF, so as to obtain a more “pure” 
measure of each factor. Factor score correlations were then compared using Fisher’s Z 
test of non-independent correlation coefficients (Meng et al., 1992). Analogue GAD 
diagnostic status as assessed by the WAQ, trait anxiety/neuroticism as assessed by the 
STAI-T, and depressed mood as assessed by the CES-D were more strongly correlated 
with the belief that uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent implications 
(Factor 1). There were no significant differences between the two factors in their 
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correlation with the PSWQ or BAI (see Table 2.5 for factor score correlations with all 
study measures). 
Subscale correlations with worry, anxiety, and depression measures. The IUS 
factors derived in this study are intended to be employed as subscales in future uses of 
this measure. A preliminary evaluation of the utility of these subscales, computed from 
the raw scores rather than weighted factor scores, was therefore conducted using the 
confirmatory factor analysis sample. Subscale scores were computed as the sum of the 
raw scores of all items comprising a subscale. Pearson correlations between the two 
subscales and the PSWQ, STAI-T, BAI, and CES-D, as well as biserial correlations with 
the WAQ, were subsequently computed (see Table 2.5) and compared using Fisher’s Z 
test of non-independent correlation coefficients (Meng et al., 1992). Similar to the results 
with the factor scores, the WAQ, STAI-T, and the CES-D were more highly related to the 
belief that uncertainty has negative implications (Subscale 1). In addition, the BAI was 
found to be more highly correlated with Subscale 1 than with Subscale 2. In contrast, the 
PSWQ showed a similarly high correlation with both subscales. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to identify and validate the set of negative beliefs 
about uncertainty that comprise the construct of intolerance of uncertainty, as assessed by 
the IUS. Two subscales were derived using exploratory factor analysis. Subsequent 
confirmatory factor analysis found that these two factors provide an adequate fit to the 
observed item inter-correlations on the IUS. A survey of the items which loaded on 
Factor 1 suggested that this factor encompasses the beliefs that being uncertain impairs 
behaviour and reflects badly on an individual’s character; accordingly, this factor was 
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labeled “uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent implications.” The second 
set of items reflected the belief that the future should be predictable, and that 
unpredictability is unfair and therefore distressing; accordingly, Factor 2 was labeled 
“uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything.” Both factor labels therefore showed face 
validity for the items they comprise. Nonetheless, Tracy (1990) has recommended that 
additional methods be employed to assess the validity of factor labels. 
As an initial step toward validating the two distinct IUS factors, this study found 
differential patterns of correlations for the subscales with measures of worry, analogue 
GAD diagnostic status, somatic anxiety, depression, and neuroticism. Factor 1 was more 
highly associated with measures of depression, trait anxiety/neuroticism, and analogue 
GAD diagnostic status in both samples, and with somatic anxiety in the confirmatory 
sample. Despite the high correlations of both subscales with all symptom measures, the 
effect sizes of the difference in these correlations were nonetheless moderate. Overall, 
these findings suggest that there is a meaningful distinction between the two subscales in 
their association with symptoms of emotional disorders. Worry, in contrast, showed a 
similar strength of association with both factors, providing support for the criterion-
related validity of these subscales.  
This study also found support for the validity of the proposed factor labels. The 
stronger association of Factor 1 with depression symptoms is consistent with the self-
referent nature of the perceived implications of uncertainty reflected in the Factor 1 items 
(e.g., “Being uncertain means that I am not first rate” or “that I lack confidence”). These 
negative self-appraisals are similar to the negative thinking patterns described in the 
literature on cognitive vulnerabilities to depression (e.g., Ingram, 2003). In addition, the 
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perceived behavioural implications of Factor 1 (e.g., “When it’s time to act, uncertainty 
paralyses me”; “When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well”) may lead to reduced 
confidence in one’s ability to cope with threat. This reduced confidence may contribute to 
more somatic anxiety in threatening situations, as suggested by the stronger correlation 
between the BAI and Factor 1 in the confirmatory sample. This finding was not, 
however, observed with the factor scores in the exploratory sample. To the extent that 
factor scores may be a more “pure” measure of a construct, there remains the possibility 
that this is a spurious finding. Alternatively, the greater strength of association between 
somatic anxiety and Factor 1 may not be as consistent or robust as the relationship 
between Factor 1 and trait anxiety/neuroticism or depression, or may depend on other 
worry-related processes at play. 
Finally, the stronger correlations of depression and anxiety with Factor 1 suggest 
this factor may be the more affectively-laden component of intolerance of uncertainty. 
This affectivity would account for the stronger correlation between the STAI-T and 
Factor 1 as compared to Factor 2. It may also be this same experience of distress or 
interference as a result of worrying, an integral part of DSM-IV-TR criteria (APA, 2000), 
which accounts for the higher correlation between Factor 1 and the WAQ. However, as 
this study’s subscale correlation analyses were exploratory in nature, further research 
examining correlates of these proposed subscales over time and in clinical contexts is 
needed to replicate and clarify these relationships. In addition, future studies should 
examine the incremental validity of the two IUS subscales to explore their relative utility 
in the prediction of these criterion variables. 
The factor solution arrived at in this study offers several advantages over previous 
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factor analytic findings for the IUS. First, it is likely that the factors inherent in the IUS 
have been over-sampled in previous factor analyses (e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston 
et al., 1994), given the high number of cross-loading items observed in these factor 
solutions and the use of a more liberal >.30 cut-off for factor coefficients. This study’s 
use of a substantially larger sample than previous studies may increase the reliability of 
the results obtained and reduce the possibility of over-sampling factors. Second, the use 
of a more stringent cut-off to establish the significance of factors loadings (i.e., > .40) 
ensured that only meaningfully-related items were retained in the factor solution; that all 
items were nonetheless significantly and highly related to their respective factors argues 
against the exclusion of individual items to shorten the IUS, which was the approach 
employed by Carleton and colleagues (2007). Third, the use of both exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analytic techniques employed on separate samples allowed for a 
more complete and nuanced re-examination of the factor structure of the IUS. Finally, the 
use of Principal Axis Factoring, which many have argued may more accurately derive the 
true latent factors (Brown, 2006; Conway & Huffcutt, 2003; Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 
1986), coupled with a more conceptually-driven approach to factor interpretation, 
afforded a more meaningful analysis of the component factors which underlie intolerance 
of uncertainty. 
Despite these advantages, a substantial amount of variance was not accounted for 
by the two common factors derived in this study. Although the 52.9% of variance 
explained by the 2-factor PAF solution is comparable to previous factor analyses of the 
English version of the IUS (e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Berenbaum et al., 2008), a 
considerable proportion of variance remains unexplained. The use of PAF, which 
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analyses common variance, as opposed to PCA, which analyses both common and 
specific variance, may have contributed to the moderate proportion of variance explained 
by our 2-factor solution. Further research is needed to assess to what extent the residual 
variance represents measurement error as opposed to unique but reliable variability 
captured by individual IUS items; the existence of substantial item-specific variance may 
have important implications for our conceptualization of the IUS subscales and for any 
future revisions to this measure. 
The results of this study are primarily limited by the use of a nonclinical sample 
of convenience. Although this nonclinical sample was necessary to obtain the required 
number of participants for the analyses conducted, it may limit the generalizability of the 
findings to the clinical populations in which the IUS is commonly employed. Previous 
research on the IUS employing the original French version has found comparable 
psychometric properties in clinical and nonclinical populations (Dugas & Robichaud, 
2007). Nonetheless, the proposed subscales should be validated in a clinical sample of 
GAD participants. Of further interest is the question of whether, and to what extent, these 
IUS factors may be relevant in other, often comorbid, anxiety and mood disorders. For 
instance, it has been theorized that high levels of worry may lead to symptoms of 
depression and demoralization in GAD (e.g., Dugas et al., 1998). It is conceivable that 
beliefs about the negative behavioural and self-referent implications of uncertainty 
captured in Factor 1 of the IUS may be particularly relevant in GAD patients who present 
with comorbid mood disorders. The use of a nonclinical sample, however, did not enable 
us to examine these questions. Finally, the clinical utility of the proposed subscales in 
both the diagnosis and treatment of worry and anxiety remains to be established. Future 
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research is therefore needed to validate the proposed two-subscale structure of the IUS in 
alternate populations, including clinical GAD and other anxiety disorder patient samples.  
Despite this limitation, a few tentative clinical implications may be drawn from 
this study. Given that Factor 1 was consistently more highly associated with neuroticism 
and depressive symptoms, individuals scoring high on this subscale may warrant 
assessment not only for GAD but for depression and other symptoms of negative affect. 
That Factor 2 was as highly predictive of worry, yet not more highly associated with any 
other criterion variable employed in this study, suggests that the role of this factor is not 
yet fully understood. Other clinical correlates of this belief about uncertainty, such as 
perhaps frustration, may not be captured by the symptom measures typically administered 
to GAD patients. The clinical presentation of these individuals therefore merits further 
research attention. Finally, an examination of the developmental trajectories of these 
beliefs may have important implications for prevention and treatment. 
Tracy (1990) noted that factor labels should be regarded as hypotheses to be 
subjected to further testing and scrutiny. Although the current study provided preliminary 
evidence of the construct validity of these factors, first by confirming the 2-factor 
structure of the IUS in an independent sample and secondly by assessing the factors’ 
correlations with symptom measures, the construct validity of the proposed subscales 
remains to be firmly established using additional experimental methods. Closer 
examination of the two proposed IUS subscales and their factor labels will be needed to 
justify their use in clinical research and practice. 
 41 
 Table 2.1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Frequencies on Demographic Variables in the 
Exploratory (n = 1230) and Confirmatory (n = 1221) Samples 
   Exploratory Confirmatory        df  F d p 
   sample  sample 
Measure  M (SD) M (SD) 
Age   23.83 (6.44) 23.65 (6.28)        1, 2430 0.508 .03 .48 
 
   Exploratory Confirmatory        df  χ2 φ p 
   sample  sample 
 
Gender  72.4% female 73.6% female        1, 2445 0.469 .01 .49 
Ethnic origin
 a
             7, 1856 4.726 .05 .69 
     White/European 67.2%  67.9% 
     Black  9.9%  9.1% 
     Asian  7.5%  7.4% 
     Hispanic  2.7%  2.3% 
     Middle Eastern 5.0%  3.8% 
     Native American 0.7%  1.3% 
     Multi-racial 4.1%  5.1% 
     Other  2.8%  3.1% 
 
a
 Frequencies are expressed as a percentage of participants who reported on their ethnic 




Promax-Rotated Principal Factor Standardized Regression Coefficients and Final 
Communality Estimates (h
2
) of the IUS (n = 1230) 
No. Item        I II h 
2
 
12. When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me.   .84 -.03 .65 
14. When I am uncertain, I can’t go forward.    .83 -.04 .64 
22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence.   .83 -.13 .54 
15.  When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well.   .80  .04 .69 
13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate.    .74  .07 .63 
1.  Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion.   .72 -.22 .32 
16. Unlike me, others seem to know where they are  
going with their lives.        .70 -.05 .44 
17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad.   .65  .24 .72 
2.  Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized.   .63 -.11 .31 
20. The smallest doubt can stop me from acting.    .63  .11 .51 
25. I must get away from all uncertain situations.   .51  .32 .61 
9. Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life.    .48  .40 .68 
24. Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly.   .47  .20 .41 
23. I think it’s unfair that other people seem to be sure  
 about their future.       .46  .25 .46 
3. Uncertainty makes life intolerable.     .44  .26 .44 
10. One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises. -.25  .84 .45 
18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me. -.18  .84 .50 
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5. My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will 
 happen tomorrow.               <-.01  .78 .60 
19. I can’t stand being taken by surprise.             < .01  .74 .55 
21. I should be able to organize everything in advance.   -.09  .73 .43 
8. It frustrates me not having all the information I need.         < .01  .71 .51 
7. Unforeseen events upset me greatly.     .12  .69 .61 
11. A small unforeseen event can spoil everything  
even with the best planning.      .17  .53 .45 
4. It’s unfair having no guarantees in life.    .20  .51 .45 
6.  Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious or stressed.   .33  .51 .63 
26. The ambiguities in life stress me.      .37  .44 .59 
27. I can’t stand being undecided about my future.    .31  .42 .47 
 Eigenvalues following rotation            11.94   11.40 
 
Note. Significant promax-rotated principal factor standardized regression coefficients 
from the pattern matrix are those > 0.40 and appear in boldface. The 2-factor rotated 
solution accounted for 52.9% of the variance. The two factors were correlated at r = .77. 
IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; Factor I = Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural 




Univariate Summary Statistics, Inter-Item and Item-Total Correlations of the IUS: Confirmatory Dataset (n = 1221) 
Item  M SD rcorr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1 2.7 1.1 .45 --                           
2 1.7 0.9 .43 .32 --                          
3 1.8 1.0 .57 .29 .40 --                         
4 2.0 1.1 .57 .24 .25 .51 --                        
5 2.0 1.1 .66 .26 .25 .42 .46 --                       
6 2.5 1.1 .73 .35 .28 .46 .46 .65 --                      
7 2.1 1.0 .66 .28 .25 .41 .40 .53 .59 --                     
8 2.8 1.1 .57 .25 .22 .37 .37 .47 .53 .48 --                    
9 1.8 2.0 .71 .35 .37 .50 .41 .53 .57 .50 .45 --                   
10 2.5 1.2 .47 .16 .18 .27 .21 .37 .38 .39 .41 .40 --                  
11 2.1 1.1 .52 .27 .23 .26 .30 .33 .35 .46 .33 .39 .42 --                 
12 1.8 0.9 .67 .41 .34 .38 .36 .38 .47 .46 .33 .54 .28 .40 --                 




   
 
14 1.8 0.9 .68 .38 .35 .41 .34 .41 .50 .44 .37 .54 .28 .34 .62 .58 --              
15 1.9 0.9 .71 .36 .33 .43 .39 .48 .56 .48 .39 .58 .28 .33 .59 .57 .75 --              
16 2.1 1.2 .57 .33 .26 .30 .35 .31 .40 .32 .26 .38 .17 .29 .43 .42 .44 .46 --            
17 2.0 1.0 .78 .38 .35 .48 .44 .50 .61 .54 .43 .61 .34 .42 .57 .53 .60 .63 .56 --           
18 2.5 1.2 .61 .24 .20 .33 .42 .50 .47 .41 .40 .37 .45 .35 .35 .30 .36 .39 .36 .48 --          
19 1.8 0.9 .62 .20 .27 .35 .36 .48 .44 .57 .40 .44 .44 .40 .41 .39 .37 .41 .28 .46 .49 --         
20 2.0 1.0 .47 .41 .24 .31 .32 .38 .47 .42 .35 .44 .28 .36 .54 .42 .52 .50 .39 .53 .40 .45 --        
21 2.5 1.1 .36 .16 .15 .23 .25 .38 .33 .37 .41 .29 .44 .33 .28 .29 .27 .29 .20 .31 .42 .42 .35 --       
22 2.0 1.1 .46 .39 .40 .37 .33 .33 .46 .36 .31 .49 .21 .27 .48 .52 .50 .48 .43 .55 .30 .33 .43 .29 --      
23 1.7 1.0 .49 .25 .26 .32 .47 .36 .38 .34 .24 .37 .20 .30 .40 .41 .39 .40 .60 .48 .38 .31 .34 .24 .41 --     
24 1.9 1.1 .42 .24 .24 .35 .33 .48 .51 .44 .37 .45 .26 .30 .41 .37 .42 .45 .36 .53 .33 .39 .38 .27 .33 .38 --    
25 1.6 0.9 .53 .29 .32 .41 .44 .44 .47 .44 .33 .52 .33 .39 .52 .49 .49 .52 .40 .56 .43 .50 .48 .35 .46 .47 .48 --   
26 2.1 1.0 .59 .31 .27 .45 .45 .52 .63 .50 .44 .55 .33 .38 .48 .48 .52 .53 .43 .63 .47 .44 .46 .35 .48 .47 .54 .58 --  
27 2.4 1.2 .47 .26 .23 .35 .43 .43 .48 .40 .41 .41 .30 .35 .38 .35 .40 .44 .50 .51 .51 .43 .43 .35 .39 .47 .38 .45 .51 -- 
Note. IUS item intercorrelations are polychoric correlations computed using EQS version 6.1 software (Bentler, 1995; Bentler & Wu, 






Factor Loadings for the Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the IUS (n = 1221) 
No. Item        I II E 
17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad.  .81  . 81 
15.  When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well.  .78  .62 
14. When I am uncertain, I can’t go forward.   .77  .64 
9. Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life.   .74  .68 
12. When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me.  .74  .68 
13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate.   .70  .71 
25. I must get away from all uncertain situations.  .70  .71 
22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence.  .66  .75 
20. The smallest doubt can stop me from acting.   .65  .76 
16. Unlike me, others seem to know where they are  
going with their lives.      .61  .79 
24. Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly.  .60  .80 
3. Uncertainty makes life intolerable.    .58  .81 
23. I think it’s unfair that other people seem to be sure  
 about their future.      .58  .81 
1.  Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion.  .49  .87 
2.  Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized.  .47  .88 
6.  Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious or stressed.   .78 .62 
26. The ambiguities in life stress me.      .75 .66 
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5. My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will 
 happen tomorrow.       .73 .69 
7. Unforeseen events upset me greatly.     .72 .70 
18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me.  .66 .75 
19. I can’t stand being taken by surprise.     .66 .75 
27. I can’t stand being undecided about my future.    .65 .76 
8. It frustrates me not having all the information I need.  .63 .77 
4. It’s unfair having no guarantees in life.    .59 .81 
10. One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises.  .53 .85 
11. A small unforeseen event can spoil everything  
even with the best planning.      .54 .84 
21. I should be able to organize everything in advance.    .52 .85 
 
Note. All factor loadings significant at p < .05. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; 
Factor I = Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications; Factor 
II = Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything; E = standardized error variance. 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .97, Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .96; 
Standardized Root Mean-square Residual (SRMR) = .05; Root Mean-square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) = .07.
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Table 2.5 
Factor Score and Subscale Correlations With the Study Measures and Descriptive 
Statistics for the Subscales of the IUS 
Exploratory dataset (n = 1230): Factor score correlations 
a
 
    Uncertainty has Negative       Uncertainty n          Fisher’s Z      r2difference 
 Behavioural and Self-Referent    is Unfair and 
  Implications    Spoils Everything 
PSWQ   .62   .65  469
 b
 -1.30  .04 
WAQ 
c
  .65   .55  559  4.90** .12 
STAI-T  .68   .58  264  3.69** .13 
BAI   .50   .47  426  1.00  .03 
CES-D   .63   .56  431  2.84** .08 
Mean          28.89          27.62 
(SD)        (10.45)          (9.31) 
 
Confirmatory dataset (n = 1221): Subscale correlations
 d
 
PSWQ   .59   .62  431 
e
 -1.31  .04 
WAQ 
c
  .65   .58  535  3.24** .09 
STAI-T  .66   .59  242  2.11*  .09 
BAI   .58   .51  413  2.69** .08 
CES-D   .58   .48  426  3.95** .11 
Mean          28.23          27.27 
(SD)         (10.06)          (8.94) 
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Note. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; 
WAQ = Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – 
Trait version; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; CES-D = Centre for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression Scale. 
a
 Factor scores were computed in SPSS from regression coefficients derived from PAF.  
b




 Biserial correlation; analogue GAD diagnostic status coded as 1, absence of full GAD 
diagnostic criteria coded as 0. 
d
 Subscale scores were computed as the raw sum of the items loading on their respective 
factors. 
e
 Participants were randomly selected from a sample of n = 1107 who completed the 
PSWQ.
 





Intolerance of uncertainty has been identified as a cognitive vulnerability for generalized 
anxiety disorder (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Koerner & Dugas, 2006, 
2008). Sexton and Dugas (2009b) proposed that intolerance of uncertainty is 
characterized by two beliefs about uncertainty: 1) Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural 
and Self-Referent Implications; and 2) Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything. This 
study further explored the construct validity of these beliefs by examining their 
convergent and discriminant validity with conceptually overlapping cognitive and 
behavioural processes, and assessed their concurrent criterion-related validity in relation 
to negative interpretations of ambiguous situations as assessed by a new self-report 
measure, the Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire (ASQ). A non-clinical sample of 292 
undergraduate students participated in this study conducted at Concordia University in 
Montreal and at Ryerson University in Toronto, Canada. The sample was 80.1% female 
and ranged in age from 18 to 59 years (M = 22.4, SD = 6.1). Consistent with its 
conceptualization, the belief that uncertainty has negative implications was more highly 
correlated with indecisiveness, procrastination, and the tendency to personalize negative 
situations, and showed criterion-related validity and specificity with perceptions of 
ambiguity as having negative personal implications. In contrast, the belief that 
uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything was more highly correlated with a preference 
for order and with self-oriented and other-oriented perfectionism. Further, this belief 
demonstrated criterion-related validity, but showed only partial evidence of a specific 
association, with perceptions of ambiguity as unfair and disruptive. These findings 
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support the construct and criterion-related validity of uncertainty intolerant beliefs.
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Uncertainty has Negative Implications and is Unfair: Construct and Criterion-
Related Validity of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale and Its Subscales 
Intolerance of uncertainty has been identified as a cognitive vulnerability factor 
for worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & 
Freeston, 1998; Koerner & Dugas, 2006, 2008). The most recent definition of this 
construct describes intolerance of uncertainty as a “dispositional characteristic that results 
from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications” (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007, p. 24). Following from this definition, there has been considerable 
interest of late in identifying the composite set of negative beliefs about uncertainty that 
comprise this construct (see, e.g., Berenbaum, Bredemeier, & Thompson, 2008; Boelen, 
Vrinssen, & van Tulder, 2010; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 
2007; Carleton, Sharpe, & Asmundson, 2007; DeBruin, Rassin, van der Heiden, & Muris, 
2006; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Norton, 2005). Recently, 
Sexton and Dugas (2009b) proposed that intolerance of uncertainty is characterized by 
two main beliefs about uncertainty: 1) the belief that uncertainty has negative behavioural 
and self-referent implications, and 2) the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils 
everything. The current study sought to further examine the construct validity, criterion-
related validity, and specificity of these two beliefs about uncertainty. As such, this study 
assessed the convergent and discriminant associations of these beliefs about uncertainty 
with other cognitive and behavioural processes that have some conceptual overlap. 
Subsequently, this study explored the extent to which these beliefs predict threat 
appraisals and self-reports of how people respond when faced with ambiguous, 
uncertainty-inducing situations. Finally, this study aimed to evaluate the utility of 
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conceptualizing two distinct beliefs about uncertainty by exploring the specificity of 
these beliefs in predicting distinct behavioural, cognitive, and emotional responses to 
perceived threat in ambiguous situations. 
The Search for Specific Negative Beliefs About Uncertainty That Result in 
Uncertainty Intolerance 
The question of what specific beliefs contribute to intolerance of uncertainty has 
recently become a topic of interest. This line of research has the potential to be profitable 
for several reasons. To begin with, identification of the specific negative beliefs about 
uncertainty that contribute to the tendency to experience uncertain states as aversive is 
necessary to establish the validity of the intolerance of uncertainty construct. In addition, 
a more complete understanding of the negative beliefs that individuals high in intolerance 
of uncertainty hold would afford a closer examination of the mechanisms by which 
intolerance of uncertainty confers vulnerability for worry and the aforementioned 
associated maladaptive cognitive and behavioural responses to perceived threat. This in 
turn could enhance our ability to identify the processes contributing to the development 
of intolerance of uncertainty. As such, identifying and establishing the validity of 
intolerance of uncertainty’s underlying beliefs may confer numerous benefits.  
To answer this important question, an empirically-derived two-factor structure of 
the most commonly used measure of intolerance of uncertainty, the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994), was proposed by Sexton and Dugas 
(2009b). The two uncertainty intolerant beliefs identified were labeled “Uncertainty has 
Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications” and “Uncertainty is Unfair and 
Spoils Everything” (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b). These findings thus suggest that 
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uncertainty is experienced as threatening because it threatens individuals’ perceived 
ability to cope and contravenes their assumptions about how events should unfold. Both 
these negative beliefs about uncertainty demonstrated good reliability and showed 
promising utility by accounting for different portions of the variance in worry and other 
GAD-related symptomatology (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b). 
It should be noted that several other studies to date have similarly examined the 
factor structure of intolerance of uncertainty, and the results of these independent 
investigations have converged to some extent. Similar item compositions to the two 
factors proposed by Sexton and Dugas (2009b) have been found in other investigations, 
though precise factor structures have differed somewhat across studies. Berenbaum and 
colleagues (2008), for instance, identified a four-factor structure incorporating most 
thought not all of the IUS items; two of these factors, “Uncertainty Paralysis” and 
“Desire for Predictability,” correspond closely to the beliefs that “Uncertainty has 
Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications” and “Uncertainty is Unfair and 
Spoils Everything,” respectively. In addition, these factor solutions show similarities with 
the two factors identified in Carleton, Norton, and colleagues’ (2007) short form of the 
IUS, which have been hypothesized to assess “inhibitory” anxiety generated by 
uncertainty (akin to the perceived negative behavioural implications of uncertainty 
assessed by Sexton & Dugas’ factor, or the “Uncertainty Paralysis” factor proposed by 
Berenbaum and colleagues) and “prospective” anxiety about uncertainty (also not unlike 
a “Desire for Predictability” (Berenbaum et al., 2008) and a perception that uncertainty 
“spoils everything” (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b). Formal reviews of these factor analyses of 
the intolerance of uncertainty construct (e.g., Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, & Freeston, 
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2011) have similarly noted that findings are converging on a two factor solution, which 
Birrell and colleagues have labeled “Uncertainty Paralysis” and “Desire for 
Predictability.” As such, it can be stated that the various proposed two-factor solutions 
for the intolerance of uncertainty construct have similarly identified perceived 
behavioural difficulties in the face of uncertainty, on the one hand, and a preference for a 
predictable, certain world on the other, as key component negative beliefs about 
uncertainty that comprise the intolerance of uncertainty construct. 
Despite their similarities, these somewhat divergent factor solutions for 
intolerance of uncertainty have evidenced different levels of empirical support. Important 
differences in the methodological rigor of these studies may have contributed to the 
observed discrepancies in the factor structure of this construct. For instance, the small 
sample size in Berenbaum and colleagues’ (2008) investigation and in other previous 
studies (e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston et al., 1994; Norton, 2005) may have 
contributed to the identification of a greater number of factors in these studies. This lack 
of methodological rigor is further suggested by discrepancies in the number and item 
composition of the factors derived across studies, and suggests that the number of factors 
was likely frequently oversampled in these exploratory factor analyses. Further, the 
strategies employed to ascertain the number of factors present in these studies, such as 
the scree plot (Cattell, 1966) and Kaiser rule (Kaiser, 1970), have been noted to 
frequently oversample factors (e.g., Zwick & Velicer, 1986). Alternative factor solutions, 
such as the short form two-factor structure proposed by Carleton, Norton, and colleagues 
(2007), did not employ exploratory factor analysis at all, but selected and refined 
previously identified factors from existing factor solutions (e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 2002; 
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Freeston et al., 1994), based primarily on the criteria that the selected factors not overlap. 
While the revised factors have evidenced good model fit (Carleton, Norton, et al, 2007; 
McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011), the content validity of these shorter subscales has yet to be 
demonstrated.  Finally, few confirmatory factor analyses have been conducted on the full 
scale, and the vast majority of proposed factor structures for the 27-item Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale have yet to be replicated.  
In contrast to previous IUS factor solutions, the proposed beliefs that “Uncertainty 
has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications” and “Uncertainty is Unfair and 
Spoils Everything” have evidenced good empirical support and consistency. Sexton and 
Dugas (2009b) employed separate large samples (N > 1200) to derive and confirm this 
proposed two-factor structure, and employed more rigorous statistical tests (such as 
Velicer’s Minimum Average Partial (MAP) test (Velicer, 1976) and Horn’s parallel 
analysis (Horn, 1965) to confirm the number of factors present. The excellent goodness 
of fit for this proposed two-factor structure of intolerance of uncertainty, as demonstrated 
in separate exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, has provided preliminary 
evidence of the construct validity of these two beliefs. In addition, this more inclusive 
item composition for the two-factor structure of intolerance of uncertainty is currently the 
only empirically-derived full-scale factor solution of the IUS to be replicated and show 
acceptable model fit in confirmatory factor analyses, in both nonclinical (Sexton & 
Dugas, 2009b) and clinical (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011; Donegan, Dugas, & Gosselin, 
2011) samples. This solution also shows convergence with the commonalities identified 
in the other proposed factor solutions (e.g., Birrell et al., 2011). 
In addition to differences in the statistical rigor of emerging factor solutions, there 
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remain some important differences in how variants of the two proposed intolerance of 
uncertainty factors have been conceptualized; these have yet to be examined empirically. 
Thus, questions remain as to the content validity of the different proposed factor 
solutions. Notably, the factor labels and item composition of the two factors proposed by 
Sexton and Dugas (2009b) represent a broader conceptualization of these uncertainty 
intolerant beliefs than those proposed by other two-factor structures (e.g., Berenbaum et 
al., 2008; Carleton, Norton et al., 2007). This broader conceptualization incorporates the 
aforementioned behavioural difficulties or preferences for predictability in uncertain 
situations identified in other factor solutions, but also considers meta-cognitive 
evaluations of these responses. For instance, the Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural 
and Self-Referent Implications factor includes not only the experience of behavioural 
paralysis in uncertain situations but also the tendency to personalize these difficulties 
(e.g., “Being uncertain means that I am not first rate”). Similarly, the broader 
conceptualization of the Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything factor incorporates 
not only a desire for predictability but also rigid expectations that this preference for 
certainty be met (e.g., “I can’t stand being taken by surprise”) and the perception that 
uncertainty in events is unfair (e.g., “It’s unfair having no guarantees in life”). While 
these two more broadly conceptualized factor labels thus possess face validity for their 
composite items (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b), validation by additional methods is 
nonetheless required in order to establish the validity of these factor conceptualizations 
(Tracy, 1990). To address this issue, further examination of the convergent and 
discriminant validity of these underlying uncertainty intolerant factors is required. 
Previous Findings on the Criterion-Related and Construct Validity of the IUS 
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Subscales  
Associations with worry and GAD-related symptomatology. Previous 
examinations of the set of specific negative beliefs about uncertainty proposed to result in 
intolerance of uncertainty have demonstrated preliminary evidence of criterion-related 
validity. In regard to symptomatology, the beliefs that Uncertainty has Negative 
Behavioural Self-Referent Implications and that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils 
Everything have demonstrated preliminary evidence of criterion-related validity and 
distinct associations with measures of anxious and depressive symptomatology. For 
instance, the belief that uncertainty has negative implications was shown to be more 
highly associated with analogue GAD diagnostic status, depressive symptoms, somatic 
anxiety, and trait anxiety (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b) than was the belief that Uncertainty is 
Unfair and Spoils Everything. Both uncertainty intolerant beliefs showed moderate 
correlations with the tendency to engage in frequent and excessive (pathological) worry 
(Sexton, Dugas, & Buhr, 2008; Sexton & Dugas, 2009b). As such, these two beliefs 
about uncertainty have demonstrated criterion-related validity with symptom measures as 
well as some evidence of specificity. 
Construct validity of uncertainty intolerant beliefs with personality variables 
and cognitive constructs. Even more relevant to establishing the construct validity of the 
proposed uncertainty intolerant beliefs is evidence of their associations with other 
conceptually overlapping cognitive constructs. Though less research has been done in this 
area, some preliminary findings have provided support for the convergent and 
discriminant validity of these beliefs. In a re-analysis of previously published data (see 
Buhr & Dugas 2006), the belief that uncertainty has negative implications was found to 
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correlate with a low perceived sense of personal control (Sexton et al., 2008), thus 
providing support for its conceptualization as a measure of perceived self-referent 
implications of uncertainty. Some additional findings with the roughly comparable 
“Uncertainty Paralysis” factor of the IUS proposed by Berenbaum and colleagues (2008) 
have also been informative. This subscale was significantly more highly negatively 
correlated with extraversion and with decisiveness related to a need for closure than was 
these authors’ proposed “Desire for Predictability” IUS subscale. Thus, this negative 
belief about uncertainty has shown some preliminary evidence of criterion-related 
validity and specificity with measures of behavioural paralysis and perceived self-referent 
consequences. 
In contrast, the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything has shown 
evidence of a specific association with more externalized cognitive constructs. For 
instance, consistent with the conceptualization of this IUS subscale as assessing 
uncertainty-related “shoulds,” this belief was more highly correlated with both self- and 
other-oriented perfectionistic standards than was the belief that uncertainty has negative 
implications (Sexton et al., 2008). This finding suggests that this uncertainty intolerant 
belief leads to demanding expectations that are pervasive and generalized to one’s own 
and others’ behaviours. These well-defined personal standards and other-oriented 
expectations may reflect a sense of urgency to counter the impacts of uncertainty that are 
deemed to be unfair. They may also reflect “shoulds” regarding how best to respond in 
uncertain situations in order to minimize the disruptive impact of uncertainty on the 
outcome of events. As such, the belief that uncertainty is unfair and disruptive has 
demonstrated convergent validity and specificity with measures of exigent performance 
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expectations for self and others. 
The uncertainty-related “shoulds” reflected in the belief that uncertainty is unfair 
and spoils events may also result in more rigid expectations about how events should 
unfold. Individuals high in the belief that uncertainty should not be present may likewise 
expect and prefer that events in their surrounding environment proceed in an organized 
and predictable fashion. Consistent with this hypothesis, Berenbaum and colleagues 
(2008) found evidence for the specificity of their proposed “Desire for Predictability” 
IUS subscale with several facets of a need for closure including a desire for 
predictability, a preference for order and structure, and discomfort with ambiguity related 
to a need for closure. In addition, this IUS subscale showed higher correlations with the 
personality trait of conscientiousness than did their proposed “Uncertainty Paralysis” IUS 
subscale, suggesting that this factor is also associated with greater efforts to maintain 
consistency and accountability in personal behaviour. Thus, this similar IUS factor has 
evidenced convergent and specific relationships with expectations of orderliness, 
predictability, and conscientiousness. 
While these preliminary findings are encouraging, important nuances in the more 
broadly proposed conceptualizations of the uncertainty intolerant beliefs remain to be 
examined. For instance, the construct validity of the belief that uncertainty has negative 
implications, conceptualized as incorporating beliefs about the behavioural implications 
of uncertainty and other perceived self-referent implications, has not been fully assessed. 
First, the association between this belief and additional behavioural implications of 
uncertainty has yet to be explored. Two behavioural consequences of being unable to “go 
forward” in the face of uncertainty might include a tendency to delay responding on 
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uncertain tasks and difficulty making decisions. As such, a propensity towards 
procrastination and indecisiveness might be expected to correlate with the belief that 
uncertainty has negative implications. Second, this IUS subscale is presumed to tap not 
only a perceived lack of personal control, as previously demonstrated (Sexton et al., 
2008), but the perceived self-referent implications of this lack of control. This IUS 
subscale might therefore be expected to correlate with the tendency to commit the 
cognitive error of personalizing negative outcomes in stressful situations (i.e., of inferring 
that a negative behavioural outcome implies something bad about my ability to function). 
We therefore examined this IUS subscale’s association with measures of indecisiveness, 
procrastination, and personalization. 
This study also sought to replicate previous findings on the association between 
the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything and perfectionistic “shoulds”, 
and extend previous findings on its possible relationship with “shoulds” related to a need 
for closure. In addition, we sought to further explore this uncertainty intolerant belief’s 
association with other behavioural responses that could result from these “shoulds.” One 
such behavioural response may be an exaggerated pervasive, or dispositional, tendency to 
monitor the environment for indications of how events are unfolding, so that threats or 
uncertainties may be dealt with more readily. Though previous research has also 
implicated intolerance of uncertainty in avoidance (e.g., Dugas et al., 2007; Robichaud, 
Dugas, & Conway, 2003) as well as in information-seeking (e.g., Rosen & Knäuper, 
2009; Rosen, Knäuper, & Sammut, 2007), we did not have a reason to expect that either 
subscale of the IUS would show a discriminant relationship with measures of avoidance 
or blunting. Both negative beliefs about uncertainty concern reasons why an uncertain 
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state may be perceived as threatening or aversive, and as such both subscales might be 
expected to produce an avoidant response to this threat, consistent with past research on 
the broader construct. However, it has also been hypothesized that intolerance of 
uncertainty generally may also activate a more ardent search for certainty (e.g., Krohne, 
1993). The more externally focused nature of the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and 
Spoils Everything, which comprises expectations about the general predictability of 
events, was expected to show particularly strong correlations with a monitoring or 
information-seeking coping style. Thus, this study examined the relationships between 
this negative belief about uncertainty and a dispositional monitoring coping style, as well 
as with measures of self- and other-oriented perfectionism and a need for closure (as 
manifested by a preference for order and predictability). 
Negative beliefs about uncertainty and information-processing: Further 
assessing the criterion-related validity and specificity of the IUS subscales. 
Armstrong and Soelberg (1968) have recommended that one method of establishing the 
validity of hypothesized factor conceptualizations is to “specify at least one dependent 
variable which the factor analysis was designed to help explain or predict” (p. 364). 
Similarly, cognitive theory (see Clark & Beck, 2010) would predict that distinct beliefs 
should lead to different appraisals and behaviours in response to situational stressors. As 
such, distinct specific beliefs about uncertainty may therefore be expected to lead to 
different interpretations of ambiguous situations, albeit both negative ones, and to 
different coping responses in these situations. In order to establish their criterion-related 
validity and specificity, the association between the proposed negative beliefs about 
uncertainty that comprise intolerance of uncertainty and specific threatening 
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interpretations and maladaptive coping responses in uncertain situations would need to be 
assessed.  
 In order to further examine the criterion-related validity and specificity of 
uncertainty intolerant beliefs, a new questionnaire was developed to assess distinct 
cognitive interpretations and behavioural responses in ambiguous situations. These 
responses were hypothesized to be specific to the belief that Uncertainty has Negative 
Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications or the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and 
Spoils Everything. In addition, this new questionnaire was designed to measure appraisal 
biases in ambiguous situations, for the purposes of exploring to what extent these specific 
beliefs about uncertainty contribute independently to negatively biased appraisals of 
ambiguity. For these purposes, we revised and extended an existing measure of appraisals 
in ambiguous situations (the Ambiguous / Unambiguous Situations Diary or AUSD; 
Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; extended version: Koerner & Dugas, 2008) 
to include subscales assessing intolerance of uncertainty-related behavioural, cognitive, 
and emotional reactions to ambiguity. This new adapted measure, the Ambiguous 
Situations Questionnaire (ASQ), is thus comprised of three subscales assessing: 1) 
appraisals of ambiguous situations; 2) perceptions of the ambiguous situation as having 
negative personal implications, and; 3) perceptions of the ambiguous situation as unfair 
and disruptive. This study sought to explore the relationship between these newly 
developed ASQ subscales and the component uncertainty intolerant negative beliefs. 
Study Goals and Hypotheses 
The purpose of this study was three-fold. First, we sought to replicate Sexton and 
Dugas’ (2009b) proposed factor solution for the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale by re-
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assessing its goodness of fit in a confirmatory factor analysis. Second, we further 
explored the construct validity of the two previously identified beliefs about uncertainty, 
namely the beliefs that: 1) Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent 
Implications, and 2) Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything (Sexton & Dugas, 
2009b), by examining their convergent and discriminant validity with measures of similar 
cognitive processes. Third, we further assessed the concurrent criterion-related validity 
and specificity of these proposed IUS subscales by examining their relationship with 
hypothesized specific manifestations of uncertainty intolerant beliefs in ambiguous 
situations, as assessed by the newly developed ASQ. As a whole, the aim of this study 
was therefore to further establish the validity and utility of conceptualizing distinct 
negative beliefs about uncertainty as components of the intolerance of uncertainty 
construct. 
 This study had several hypotheses regarding the construct validity of the IUS 
subscales (see Figure 3.1). First, we expected that the belief that Uncertainty has 
Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications would correlate more highly than 
would the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything with measures of 
indecision, procrastination, and the tendency to personalize negative situations. Second, 
we expected that the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything would 
correlate more highly than would the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Implications 
with measures of self- and other-oriented perfectionism, need for closure (in particular a 
preference for order and predictability), and a monitoring coping style. 
 In addition, this study tested three hypotheses regarding the criterion-related 
validity and specificity of the IUS subscales in relation to appraisal biases as well as to 
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unique behavioural, cognitive, and emotional responses in ambiguous situations. First, we 
expected both beliefs about uncertainty to show moderate associations with negative 
appraisals of ambiguous situations as assessed by the ASQ. Given the lack of previous 
findings in this area, and the absence of theory-driven predictions regarding whether 
either of the IUS subscales would show stronger associations with the tendency to 
appraise ambiguous situations as generally “bad”, no a priori predictions were made 
regarding whether either of these beliefs would show unique associations with appraisals 
of ambiguous situations when controlling for the other specific negative belief about 
uncertainty.  
Second, we expected that the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural 
and Self-Referent Implications would correlate significantly with perceptions of 
ambiguous situations as having negative personal implications. In addition, we expected 
this belief to correlate more highly with these perceptions of ambiguous situations as 
having negative personal implications than with perceptions of ambiguous situations as 
unfair and disruptive. Relatedly, we expected that the belief that uncertainty has negative 
implications would make a unique contribution to the prediction of perceptions of 
ambiguous situations as having negative personal implications, after controlling for the 
belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything.  
Third, we expected that the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils 
Everything would correlate significantly with perceptions of specific ambiguous 
situations as unfair and disruptive. Further, we expected this belief to correlate more 
highly with perceptions of ambiguous situations as unfair and disruptive than with 
perceptions of ambiguity as having negative personal implications. Similarly, we 
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expected that the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything would 
demonstrate a unique association with the perception that ambiguity is unfair and 
disruptive, when controlling for the belief that uncertainty has negative implications. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 A non-clinical sample of 292 undergraduate students participated in this study, 
which was conducted at Concordia University in Montreal, and at Ryerson University in 
Toronto. The combined sample was 80.1% female and 19.9% male and ranged in age 
from 18 to 59 years (M = 22.4, SD = 6.1). There were no significant differences in age or 
sex distribution between the samples (see Table 3.1). There were, however, small but 
significant differences across the two samples in the proportion of participants from 
various self-reported ethnic backgrounds (see Table 3.1). Pairwise comparisons found a 
higher proportion of White participants in the Concordia sample (χ2 = 8.39, df = 1, p = 
.004), and a higher proportion of Black and Asian participants in the Ryerson sample (χ2 
= 6.82, df = 1, p = .009, and χ2 = 22.51, df = 1, p < .001). Across the two samples, there 
also were significant differences in the proportion of participants reporting English, 
French, or other first languages (see Table 3.1). Pairwise comparisons found a higher 
proportion of participants in the Concordia sample reporting French as their first 
language (χ2 = 15.86, df = 1, p < .001), and a higher proportion of English first language 
participants in the Ryerson sample (χ2 = 4.24, df = 1, p = .040). Demographic 
characteristics for each sample are presented in Table 3.1. Given that there were some 
differences in ethnic background and first spoken language between the two samples, 
means and correlations for the study measures in the Concordia University and Ryerson 
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University samples were compared in order to ascertain whether it would be appropriate 
to combine these samples. Significant mean differences were observed between the 
samples in the belief that uncertainty has negative implications, in overall negative 
appraisals of ambiguous situations, in perceptions of ambiguity as having negative 
implications, and in perceptions of ambiguity as unfair and disruptive, as well as in a 
tendency towards indecisiveness, a preference for predictability, self-oriented 
perfectionism, and a monitoring coping style, with the Ryerson sample scoring higher on 
all of these measures except for self-oriented perfectionism. However, an examination of 
the correlations between study measures, compared using Fisher’s Z test of independent 
correlations, found few significant differences within the Concordia University and 
Ryerson University samples. Given the overall consistency in the associations between 
study measures across samples, the sole exceptions pertaining to self- and other-oriented 
perfectionism which showed stronger correlations in the Concordia University sample, 
the data was collapsed across the two samples for all subsequent analyses. 
Measures 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994; English 
translation: Buhr & Dugas, 2002). Intolerance of uncertainty was assessed using the 
27-item IUS, which assesses the tendency to experience uncertain situations as aversive 
as a result of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications. Recently, two 
subscales, or beliefs about uncertainty, have been identified for the IUS: 1) the belief that 
uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent implications; and 2) the belief that 
uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b). Examples of items 
on the IUS include “When I am uncertain, I can't go forward” (Subscale 1) and “A small 
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unforeseen event can spoil everything even with the best planning” (Subscale 2). Items 
are rated on a 5-point Likert scale which ranges from 1 = “not at all characteristic of me” 
to 5 = “entirely characteristic of me”. While initially developed in French, both the 
original French version and the English translation have shown excellent internal 
consistency and temporal stability as well as evidence of criterion, convergent, and 
discriminant validity (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; 
Freeston et al., 1994). The IUS has also demonstrated comparably strong reliability and 
validity across Caucasian, African American, Hispanic/Latino, and Southeast Asian 
ethnic samples in a student population (Norton, 2005). In addition, the subscales of the 
IUS have shown excellent internal consistency ( = .92 for Subscale 1,  = .90 - .91 for 
Subscale 2; Sexton & Dugas, 2009b), and stability across diverse ethnic samples (Sexton 
& Dugas, 2007). Confirmatory factor analysis of the IUS has attested to the construct 
validity of these two subscales (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b). Both IUS subscales have also 
evidenced criterion-related validity with measures of worry and GAD symptoms (Sexton 
& Dugas, 2009b). In this study, the two subscales of the IUS also showed very good to 
excellent internal consistency (for IUS-NI, α = .89; for IUS-US, α = .90) and high 
average inter-item correlations (r = .35, 95% C.I. = .31 - .40 for IUS-NI, and r = .42, 95% 
C.I. = .37 - .46 for IUS-US). 
The Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire (ASQ). The ASQ was developed for 
the purposes of the present study, and was partially based on an existing measure, the 
Ambiguous/Unambiguous Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey et al., 1992) and its extended 
version (Koerner & Dugas, 2008). Incorporating 22 of the 33 ambiguous situations from 
the extended AUSD, in revised form, the ASQ presents a set of vignettes describing 
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ambiguous scenarios across a broad range of common worry themes. These themes 
include relationships with parents/family, friendships, romantic relationships, academic 
performance, work competence, finances, threat of physical harm/danger, one’s own 
health, the health of loved ones, the future, and one’s confidence/self-concept. Questions 
assess respondents’ appraisal of the potential threat posed by each ambiguous situation. 
Additional questions were added to assess respondents’ tendency to elaborate upon 
possible negative behavioural and self-referent implications of each situation, and their 
tendency to perceive these situations as unfair and disruptive. As such, the ASQ 
comprises three subscales: 1) appraisals of ambiguous situations (Appraisal of Ambiguity 
subscale; ASQ-A); 2) perceptions of ambiguous situations as having negative personal 
implications (Ambiguity has Negative Implications subscale; ASQ-NI); and 3) 
perceptions of ambiguous situations as unfair and disruptive (Ambiguity is Unfair and 
Disruptive subscale; ASQ-UD). 
For the ASQ-A subscale, changes were made to the rating scale and response 
options initially employed by the AUSD. First, in order to more narrowly assess 
appraisals of the threat rather than worry, appraisals of ambiguous situations were 
assessed by asking participants to rate the perceived aversiveness (or “badness”) of each 
situation, as opposed to rating their “concern” about the outcome. This alternative form 
of rating scale has been commonly employed in previous studies assessing negative 
interpretative biases in worry and GAD (e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 
2007; Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; Butler & Mathews, 1983). Second, 
the rating scale was altered from a 5-point to a 9-point Likert scale, in order to increase 
variability. Finally, some changes were made to the nature of the situational vignettes 
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being appraised. Several of the original scenarios were ambiguous due to information that 
was lacking but that would ordinarily be available, therefore rendering it potentially 
difficult for participants to imagine themselves being faced with such situations and 
responding to them as described. As such, particularly problematic items from the 
original 33 scenarios were not retained, and additional ambiguous situations were 
generated as necessary. Several of the remaining scenarios were also revised so that the 
ambiguity was a result of uncertainty inherent in the meaning of the situation and its 
potential outcomes. 
Subsequent additions to the measure consisted of the development of the ASQ-NI 
and ASQ-UD subscales. Following the assessment of threat appraisals (ASQ-A subscale) 
for each ambiguous situation, hypothetical situation-specific behavioural, cognitive, or 
emotional responses, hypothesized to be consistent with the two negative beliefs about 
uncertainty assessed by the IUS, were then presented for each vignette. Subsequent 
questions then assessed the typicality of these responses for the respondent.  
To develop these additional questions for each vignette, the first author generated 
potential responses to the scenarios that could be consistent with either the tendency to 
perceive negative behavioural or self-referent implications of these ambiguous situations, 
or the tendency to perceive the situational ambiguity as unfair, avoidable, and 
unnecessarily disruptive. These potential items were then reviewed by research 
colleagues with expertise in intolerance of uncertainty who provided additional 
suggestions and comments; the items were subsequently revised by the first and second 
author based on this feedback. A proposed set of items was then pilot-tested with 
additional research colleagues and other graduate students in psychology, in order to 
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assess the accessibility and credibility of these items; revisions were made accordingly by 
the primary and secondary author. Subsequently, the final set of items comprising the two 
newly-generated subscales were reviewed by five experts on anxiety disorders (including 
the third author), blind to the development of these items, who were asked to categorize 
the items according to descriptions of their respective IUS subscale. Ninety-nine percent 
of the responses were correctly categorized. The items of the ASQ-NI and ASQ-UD were 
therefore shown to possess face validity for the negative beliefs about uncertainty whose 
consequences they were intended to assess. 
The following is an example of a vignette presented on the ASQ, assessing 
concerns related to the personal health worry theme. Participants were asked to imagine: 
“After my check-up, the doctor told me he/she would call if there was a problem. It's a 
week later and I have not heard anything.”. Appraisals of ambiguous situations were 
assessed by asking participants to rate “How good or bad does this situation seem to 
you?”. Ratings ranged from 0 = very good to 8 = very bad. Subsequently, to assess 
perceived negative behavioural and self-reference implications (on the ASQ-NI 
subscale), participants were asked, “In this situation, how likely would you be to react in 
the following way?”: “I am disappointed with myself for being distracted while waiting to 
see if my doctor might phone”. Ratings ranged from 0 = not at all likely to 8 = very likely. 
To assess the belief that ambiguity is unfair and disruptive, and the expectation that the 
world should therefore be less uncertain and that others should make efforts to provide 
clarity and predictability in ambiguous situations (ASQ-UD subscale), participants were 
asked, “To what extent do you agree with the following statement?”: “Doctors’ offices 
should call you one way or another; it’s too much to expect that I should go about my life 
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as usual while dealing with this suspense.”. Ratings ranged from 0 = completely disagree 
to 8 = completely agree. For all subscales, higher scores are reflective of more negative 
interpretations of the ambiguous situations and their implications. 
The ASQ-Appraisals subscale showed acceptable internal consistency ( = .70), 
and the ASQ-NI and ASQ-UD subscales both demonstrated very good internal 
consistency ( = .86 and  = .81, respectively). In addition, average inter-item 
correlations for the three subscales showed small but acceptable effect sizes. The average 
inter-item correlations were r = .10 (95% C.I. = .08 - .12) for the ASQ-A, r = .22 (95% 
C.I. = .19 - .26) for ASQ-NI, and r = .16 (95% C.I. = .14 - .19) for ASQ-UD. 
 Frost’s Indecisiveness Scale (FIS, Frost & Shows, 1993). The tendency to be 
indecisive or to delay decisions was assessed using the FIS, which is comprised of 15 
items. A sample item is: “It seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes me a long 
time.” Respondents rate the extent to which they disagree or agree on a 5-point Likert 
scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree; several items are reverse 
scored. This measure has shown excellent internal consistency (α = .87 - .90; Frost & 
Shows, 1993), as well as evidence of convergent and criterion-related validity (Frost & 
Shows, 1993; Gayton, Clavin, Clavin, & Broida, 1994). In this study, α = .87 and the 
average inter-item correlation was r = .31 (95% C.I. = .27 - .35). 
Lay’s General Procrastination Scale (LGP; Lay, 1986). Procrastination, or “the 
tendency to postpone that which is necessary to reach some goal” (p. 475), was assessed 
using the 20-item scale developed by Lay (1986). The LGP measures procrastination 
across a wide variety of situations, including work, leisure activities, daily tasks, 
communications, event planning, and other deadlines. A sample item is: “I often find 
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myself performing tasks that I had intended to do days before”. Statements are rated on a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = false of me to 5 = true of me; 10 items are reversed 
scored. The LGP has demonstrated very good internal consistency (ranging from α = .82-
.83; Lay, 1986), test-retest reliability (r = .80 over a 1 month period; Ferrari, 1989), and 
evidence of convergent, discriminant (Ferrari, 1992; Lay, 1986), and criterion-related 
validity (Ferrari, 1992; Lay, 1986; Stainton, Lay, & Flett (2000). In this study, α = 86 and 
the average inter-item correlation was r = .23 (95% C.I. = .20 - .27). 
The Cognitive Error Questionnaire - General version, Personalization 
subscale (CEQ-P; Lefebvre, 1981). The CEQ was designed to measure the tendency to 
make cognitive errors when processing information in either back pain related or general 
situations (at work, at home or with family, or when engaging in leisure activities). The 
CEQ is comprised of four subscales which assess the tendency to make biased 
interpretations when appraising situations, consistent with any of four cognitive errors 
including the tendencies: 1) to catastrophize when anticipating the situation’s outcome; 2) 
to overgeneralize the implications of the situation; 3) to personalize or take responsibility 
for the situation; and 4) to selectively abstract negative information. In the General 
version of the CEQ, 24 vignettes are presented, each followed by a negative 
interpretation of the situation. Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which the 
dysphoric cognition is typical of the way they might appraise the situation, on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 0 = “almost exactly like I would think” to 4 = “not at all like I 
would think”. There ratings are summed and the total scores are then inverted, such that 
higher scores reflect a greater tendency to personalize implications of negative events. 
Overall, the CEQ has shown excellent internal consistency (α = .89 to .92 for General and 
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Low Back Pain versions) and very good test-retest reliability (r = .80 to .85; Lefebvre, 
1981). The subscales of the CEQ have also shown good to excellent internal consistency 
(α = .62 to .94) and acceptable alternate forms reliability (r = .55 to .79). Further, as a 
whole this measure of cognitive errors has demonstrated evidence of convergent and 
discriminant validity (Neimeyer & Feixas, 1992) and distinguishes depressed or anxious 
and non-clinical groups (Muran & Motta, 1993; Neimeyer & Feixas, 1992). Only the 
General form Personalization subscale, composed of 6 items, was employed in the 
current study. This subscale has similarly demonstrated convergent and discriminant 
validity (Neimeyer & Feixas, 1992). In this study, α = .53 and the average inter-item 
correlation was r = .16 (95% C.I. = .11 - .20) for the CEQ-P. 
The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale – Self-Oriented & Other-Oriented 
Perfectionism subscales (MPS; Hewitt & Flett, 1991). Perfectionist personal standards 
and expectations for others were assessed with two subscales from the MPS: Self-
Oriented Perfectionism (MPS-SOP) and Other-Oriented Perfectionism (MPS-OOP). 
Sample items include: “I do not have very high standards for myself” (MPS-SOP, reverse 
scored) and “I cannot stand to see people close to me make mistakes” (MPS-OOP). These 
subscales each comprise 15 items rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; several items are reverse scored. Both subscales 
have demonstrated very good internal consistency (ranging from α = .86 to 89 for self-
oriented perfectionism, and α =.72 to .82 for other-oriented perfectionism; Hewitt & 
Flett, 1991) and test-retest reliability (ranging from r = .69 to .88 for self-oriented 
perfectionism, and r = .66 to .85 for other-oriented perfectionism, over a 3-month period, 
in clinical (Hewitt, Flett, Turnbull-Donovan, & Mikail, 1991) and non-clinical 
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populations (Hewitt & Flett, 1991), respectively). These two subscales have also shown 
evidence of convergent and discriminant validity in clinical (Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Hewitt 
et al., 1991) and nonclinical (Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Frost, Heimberg, Holt, Mattia, & 
Neubauer, 1993) samples. In this study, α = .88 for MPS-SOP and α = 59 for MPS-OOP, 
and average inter-item correlations for the two subscales were r = .33 (95% C.I. = .29 - 
.38) for MPS-SOP and r = .09 (95% C.I. = .07 - .11) for MPS-OOP.  
The Need for Closure Scale – Preference for Order & Preference for 
Predictability subscales (NFCS; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). The NFCS 
assesses individual differences in the need for closure, which has been defined as the 
desire for “an answer on a given topic, any answer, compared to confusion and 
ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 1986, p. 337). The NFCS is composed of 42 items in total. 
Subscales were subsequently developed using exploratory factor analysis, and subsequent 
confirmatory factor analyses validated the 5-factor hierarchical structure (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). Two of the five subscales were employed in the current study: a 
Preference for Order or Structure (NFCS-PO), composed of 10 items, and a Preference 
for Predictability (NFCS-PP) composed of 8 items. Sample items for these subscales 
include: “I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life” (NFCS-PO) and “I dislike 
unpredictable situations” (NFCS-PP). These two subscales have demonstrated good to 
very good internal consistency (Preference for Order subscale  = .77 to .82, Preference 
for Predictability subscale  = .72 to .79; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Respondents are 
asked to rate the extent to which they identify with these descriptions of personal 
characteristics on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = 
strongly agree; several items are reverse scored. In this study, α = .76 for NFCS-PO and 
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α = .81 for NFCS-PP, and average inter-item correlations for the two subscales were r = 
.22 (95% C.I. = .18 - .26) for NFCS-PO and r = .35 (95% C.I. = .30 - .40) for NFCS-PP. 
The NFCS has demonstrated evidence of convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related 
validity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
The Miller Behavioral Style Scale – Monitoring subscale (MBSS-M; Miller, 
1987). The MBSS is a 32-item self-report measure of information-seeking and avoidant 
behavioural and cognitive coping styles in uncontrollable threatening situations. For the 
purposes of this study, the Monitoring subscale was used. Four vignettes, asking 
participants to imagine themselves waiting to undergo a dental procedure despite being 
fearful, being held hostage by a group of armed terrorists, waiting for the announcement 
of company layoffs following an annual work performance review, and experiencing an 
abrupt change in altitude during a flight, are presented along with 16 items describing a 
range of possible information-seeking responses. Sample monitoring responses include: 
(at the dentist) “I would want the dentist to tell me when I would feel pain”; (in a hostage 
situation) “I would make sure I knew where every possible exit was”; (waiting for 
layoffs) “I would talk to my fellow workers to see if they knew anything about what the 
supervisor's evaluation of me said”; and (on a turbulent flight) “I would call for the flight 
attendant and ask her exactly what the problem was.” Van Zuuren and Wolfs (1991) 
noted that employing a 5-point Likert scale improved the reliability of this measure (e.g., 
 = 78, compared to  = .66 using the original dichotomous rating scale); as such, a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 = not at all applicable to 5 = very much applicable was 
used in the current study. In this study, α = .76, and the average inter-item correlation was 




Data screening and outlier analysis. Questionnaire data were provided by 311 
participants. Three participants were subsequently excluded due to missing data (e.g., 
more than one third of questions left incomplete) on at least one of the relevant measures. 
The data were also initially examined for multivariate and univariate outliers as well as 
distribution normality. To assess for multivariate outliers, Mahalanobis distance was 
calculated by entering all measures into a multiple regression with an arbitrary numerical 
subject code as the dependent variable. Sixteen multivariate outliers were identified (p < 
.01, two-tailed test) and excluded from subsequent analyses. All total scale and relevant 
subscale scores were then examined for univariate outliers (identified as data points 
falling either 3.29 standard deviations (p < .001, two-tailed test) above or below the 
mean; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). No univariate outliers remained after the multivariate 
outliers were removed from the dataset. Finally, the normality of the distribution was 
assessed for all study measures. All total scale and subscale scores were within skew 
tolerances (i.e., skew/SE < | 5 |, given N > 100) and within kurtosis tolerances (i.e., 
kurtosis/SE < | 5 |, given N > 100). The final sample thus consisted of 292 participants. 
Means and standard deviations for all study measures are presented in Table 3.2, along 
with inter-correlations for these measures and correlations with demographic variables. 
For the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the IUS, individual items were also 
screened for univariate and multivariate outliers and distribution normality. Of the 311 
participants who provided data on the IUS, 10 were missing data on individual items and 
were excluded from the CFA. Subsequently, 11 multivariate outliers were identified and 
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excluded. One further univariate outlier was also excluded from the CFA. A final sample 
consisting of 289 participants was therefore employed. In this sample, seven of the 
individual IUS items evidenced significant distribution skew (IUS items #9, 12, 13, 19, 
23, 24, and 25) and one item (IUS item # 25) showed significant kurtosis. Rather than 
transforming these variables, alternate methods of estimation, described below, were 
employed in the CFA to accommodate this non-normality in the distribution of individual 
items. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the IUS 
In order to assess the replicability of previous findings on the factor structure of 
the IUS (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b), a confirmatory factor analysis of the proposed two-
factor structure was performed with the EQS structural equation program, version 6.1 
(Bentler, 1995; Bentler & Wu, 1995). Given the significant skewness evidenced by some 
of the individual IUS items and the presence of significant multivariate kurtosis among 
the IUS items (Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis = 68.82, normalized estimate 
Z = 14.79), and in order to be consistent with previous confirmatory factor analyses of the 
IUS (e.g., Sexton & Dugas, 2009b), the elliptical (ERLS) method of estimation was 
employed. This method of extraction has also been suggested to be less prone to error 
when testing complex models (Kline, 1998). As the two factors of the IUS comprise the 
same overarching construct, these factors were allowed to covary in the identified two-
factor model. IUS item means, standard deviations, corrected item-total correlations, and 
the intercorrelations among these observed variables are presented in Table 3.3. CFA 
factor loadings and error estimates for the replicated two-factor model of the IUS are 
presented in Table 3.4. All IUS items were shown to load significantly on their respective 
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factor, and the strength of association ranged from small to large effect sizes (r
2 
= .13 to 
.64). Also as expected, the two factors were found to correlate significantly (r = .85).  
Though the two-factor model generally met conventional standards for good 
model fit, the model χ2 = 868.53 for df = 323 was significant (p < .001) and the χ2 /df 
ratio = 2.69, whereas χ2 /df ratios of less than 2 are recommended. Nonetheless, the 
Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index (BBNFI) suggested good model fit (BBNFI = .94, > 
.90 as recommended; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), as did the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
(CFI = .96, > .95 as recommended; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Standardized root mean-square residuals (SRMR) were low and thus also indicative of 
good fit (SRMR = .06, < .08 as recommended; Hu & Bentler, 1999), although the root 
mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) was .08 (90% C.I. = .07-.08) whereas 
RMSEA’s < .06 are recommended (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Thus, overall the two factor 
model provided a good fit to the data, comparable to previous CFA’s of the IUS factor 
structure (e.g., Carleton, Norton et al., 2007; Sexton & Dugas, 2009b). In addition, this 
two-factor model of the IUS was shown to provide a significantly better fit to the data 
than a one-factor model (Δχ2 = 249.77 for Δdf = 1, p < .001). While providing an 
adequate fit to the data, this one-factor model did not meet the aforementioned criteria for 
goodness-of-fit on many indices, which were also comparatively poorer than those of the 
two-factor model (χ2 = 1118.30 for df = 324, p < .001; χ2/df ratio = 3.45; BBNFI = .94; 
CFI = 94; SRMR = .07; RMSEA = .09, 90% C.I. = .09-.10). 
Construct Validity of the IUS Subscales 
 Correlational analyses with the study measures. To assess the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the IUS subscales, correlations were computed between these 
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subscales and measures of overlapping cognitive constructs (see Table 3.5). Consistent 
with hypotheses, the IUS-NI was significantly more highly correlated with indecisiveness 
(FIS), procrastination (LGP), and the tendency to personalize negative situations (CEQ-
P) than was the IUS-US. Further, the LGP and IUS-US did not show a significant 
association. 
 By comparison, and also consistent with hypotheses, the IUS-US was more highly 
correlated with a preference for order (NFCS-PO) and with self-oriented (MPS-SOP) and 
other-oriented (MPS-OOP) perfectionism, than was the IUS-NI. Contrary to expectations, 
however, a preference for predictability (NFCS-PP) and a monitoring copying style 
(MBSS-M) were significantly correlated with both IUS subscales to a comparable extent. 
Criterion-Related Concurrent Validity and Specificity of the IUS Subscales 
 Correlational analyses with the ASQ. To further evaluate the criterion-related 
validity of the IUS subscales, correlations were computed between the IUS subscales and 
the ASQ subscales; these were then compared using Fisher’s r to Z transformation for 
non-independent correlations (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992). First, correlations 
between the IUS subscales and the ASQ Appraisals of Ambiguity subscale (ASQ-A) 
were examined. The belief that uncertainty has negative self-referent and behavioural 
implications (IUS-NI) was significantly and positively correlated with the ASQ-A (r = 
.46, p < .001). The belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything (IUS-US) 
similarly showed a significant positive correlation with the ASQ-A (r = .43 p < .001). 
There were no significant differences in the magnitude of these correlations (Z = 0.90, p 
= .368, r
2
difference = .03). 
To further examine the criterion-related validity of the IUS subscales, and to 
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assess their specificity, correlations were computed between the IUS-NI and IUS-US and 
the ASQ-NI and ASQ-UD. Consistent with the conceptualization of the IUS subscales, 
the IUS-NI was significantly and positively correlated with both the ASQ-NI and ASQ-
UD, but was more highly correlated with the ASQ-NI than with the ASQ-UD (see Table 
3.6). Thus, the IUS-NI demonstrated both criterion-related validity and specificity. In 
contrast, the IUS-US did not show a significant difference in correlations between the 
ASQ-UD and ASQ-NI, and was significantly positively correlated with both subscales 
(see Table 3.6). As such, the IUS-US demonstrated criterion-related validity but not 
specificity. 
Regression analyses predicting the ASQ subscales. Hierarchical multiple 
regressions were conducted predicting scores on the three ASQ subscales. Given the high 
observed correlation between the two IUS subscales (r = .77, r
2
 = .59 or 59% of the 
variance overlapping, p < .001), collinearity diagnostics were examined. In these 
regressions, the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance indices of multicollinearity 
were within acceptable limits (VIF = 2.46, tolerance = .41; see Cohen, Cohen, West, & 
Aiken, 2003).  
To test the study hypotheses that both IUS subscales would be associated with 
appraisals of ambiguity, two regressions were computed predicting scores on the ASQ-A. 
In the first regression, the IUS-US was entered on the first step, followed by IUS-NI on 
the second step (see Table 3.7). In the second regression, this order was reversed (see the 
alternate Step 1 in Table 3.7). When entered in the first step of the regressions, each IUS 
subscale showed a moderate positive association with a tendency to appraise the 
ambiguous situations of the ASQ negatively (see Table 3.7). Further, both made a unique 
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contribution to the prediction of the ASQ-A with both IUS subscales in the equation. As 
such, both IUS subscales evidenced criterion-related validity. 
Subsequently, two separate regressions were conducted to assess whether the 
IUS-NI would make a unique contribution to the prediction of ASQ-NI after accounting 
for the contribution of IUS-US, and similarly to assess whether the IUS-US would show 
a unique association with ASQ-UD after controlling for IUS-NI. In the first regression, 
consistent with the hypotheses, the IUS-NI was found to significantly predict scores on 
the ASQ-NI after controlling for IUS-US (see Table 3.8). In contrast, though the IUS-US 
was a significant predictor of ASQ-NI scores on the first step of the equation, it did not 
significantly contribute to the prediction of ASQ-NI when accounting for IUS-NI. As 
such, the IUS-NI demonstrated both criterion-related validity and specificity by 
predicting a significant unique proportion of the variance in appraisals of ambiguity as 
having negative implications. 
In the second regression, and also consistent with expectations, the IUS-US 
significantly predicted scores on the ASQ-UD after controlling for the IUS-NI (see Table 
3.9). In contrast, the IUS-NI significantly predicted ASQ-UD scores on the first step of 
the equation, but no longer contributed significantly to the prediction of the ASQ-UD 
when accounting for IUS-US. As such, the IUS-US demonstrated criterion-related 
validity and specificity in the prediction of appraisals of ambiguity as being unfair and 
disruptive. 
Given that ethnic origin showed significant correlations with both the ASQ-A and 
ASQ-NI (see Table 3.2), and that the two samples differed significantly in the proportion 
of participants originating from different ethnic backgrounds (see Table 3.1), the 
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aforementioned hierarchical regressions for these two ASQ subscales were re-run 
controlling for ethnicity. While ethnic origin was a significant predictor of the ASQ-A 
and the ASQ-NI in these regressions (as both a Black or Asian origin was more highly 
positively associated with these interpretive biases than was a White ethnic background), 
there were no changes in the overall findings on the unique associations between the 
subscales of the IUS and ASQ. 
Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to further explore the construct validity of two 
negative beliefs about uncertainty, measured by subscales of the IUS, against measures of 
overlapping behavioural and cognitive constructs, and to explore the criterion-related 
validity of these negative beliefs about uncertainty in relation to self-reported responses 
to perceived threats in ambiguous situations. First, the belief that being in a state of 
uncertainty has negative personal implications, for both behavioural functioning and a 
person’s self-concept, was expected to be associated with measures of behavioural 
paralysis (e.g., indecision and procrastination) and with a tendency to make personalized 
attributions about the causes of negative events. Second, this IUS subscale was expected 
to predict perceptions of specific ambiguous situations as more likely to have negative 
personal consequences. In contrast, the belief that uncertainty should not normally occur, 
and that its presence and unsettling impact on the unfolding of events is therefore unfair, 
was hypothesized to be related to more demanding or perfectionistic expectations for 
one’s self and others, to a preference for an ordered, structured, and predictable 
environment, and to a tendency to engage in hypervigilant monitoring in threatening 
situations. Further, this belief was expected to result in more externalized attributions for 
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the difficulties encountered in ambiguous situations, and as such was predicted to relate 
to perceptions of ambiguous situations as unfair and disruptive. Therefore, as a whole this 
study sought to establish the validity of conceptualizing two distinct composite negative 
beliefs about uncertainty that result in intolerance to uncertainty, and to assess the utility 
of these separate beliefs when explaining differences in how individuals respond to 
perceived threats.  
This study extended prior findings on the criterion-related validity and specificity 
of the IUS subscales. Previously, the IUS subscales have been examined in relation to the 
symptoms of GAD, including worry, trait anxiety, and concomitant somatic anxiety 
symptoms and depressed mood. Both negative beliefs about uncertainty have shown 
comparable moderate positive correlations with excessive, generalized worry in both 
non-clinical (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b) and clinical samples (Donegan, 2010), thereby 
demonstrating criterion-related validity. Further, the belief that uncertainty has negative 
implications has demonstrated specificity, as it evidenced stronger associations with 
depression symptoms, somatic anxiety, trait anxiety, and analogue GAD diagnostic status 
than has the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything (Sexton & Dugas, 
2009b). This study sought to extend these findings by instead examining the IUS 
subscales’ associations with cognitive and behavioural processes.  
Construct Validity of the Belief That Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and 
Self-Referent Implications 
 As evidence of the construct validity of the proposed IUS subscales, and 
consistent with expectations, the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Self-Referent 
Implications demonstrated convergent validity with measures of behavioural impairments 
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and with perceived negative self-referent consequences of these difficulties in 
functioning, as the subscale label describes. The belief that uncertainty has negative 
implications showed a high correlation with the propensity to be indecisive, a small but 
significant correlation with the tendency to procrastinate across a range of situations, and 
a moderate association with the inclination to perceive negative outcomes as attributable 
to personal failings. Further, this IUS subscale evidenced discriminant validity, as 
correlations with these measures of maladaptive behavioural tendencies and self-referent 
cognitive errors were significantly higher with this subscale than they were with the 
belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything. 
 These findings confirm that the belief that uncertainty has negative implications is 
specifically associated with several behavioural difficulties observed among high 
worriers. Decision-making difficulties, such as self-reported indecisiveness (e.g., Cantor, 
Gervais, & Dugas, 2008: Rassin & Muris, 2005) and more information-seeking in order 
to meet heightened evidence requirements prior to making a decision (e.g., Ladouceur, 
Talbot, & Dugas, 1997; Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1991) have been reported among 
high worriers. In addition, worry has been associated with a tendency to delay action, or 
procrastinate (Stoeber & Joormann, 2001), albeit not consistently (Spada, Hiou, & 
Nikcevic, 2006). While no research had yet explored the association between intolerance 
of uncertainty and procrastination directly, difficulties implementing actions in order to 
engage successfully in goal-directed behaviour have previously been found to correlate 
with intolerance of uncertainty (Aldao et al., 2010). As this study shows, these 
behavioural difficulties (i.e., indecision and procrastination) are correlated with the 
tendency to believe uncertain situations pose a difficult challenge for moving forward. In 
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other words, the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent 
implications is indeed associated with difficulties implementing actions.  
It is also not surprising that low perceived self-efficacy is experienced in 
uncertain situations by individuals high in uncertainty intolerance, as is suggested by the 
observed correlation between the belief that uncertainty has negative implications and 
personalizing attributions of the causes of negative outcomes. Correlations between low 
self-esteem and worry have been previously noted in the literature (e.g. Boelen & 
Reijntjes, 2009; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), and self-doubt has been 
shown to be particularly prominent in GAD as opposed to other anxiety disorders such as 
panic disorder (Breitholtz, Johansson, & Ost, 1999). Worry has also been associated with 
low sense of mastery (Zalta & Chambless, 2008) or personal control (Buhr & Dugas, 
2006). Further, some researchers (e.g., Berenbaum, 2010; Davey & Levy, 1998, 1999; 
Kendall & Ingram, 1987) have postulated that low perceived self competence may play a 
causal role in initiating worry. These authors suggest that a low sense of personal 
adequacy to cope with problems or stressors may increase the potential for ambiguous 
situations to be perceived as threatening, which in turn may initiate worry about 
hypothetical negative outcomes. Consistent with this view, Davey and Levy have noted 
that the nature of the internal statements generated while worrying is frequently 
characterized by doubts about personal adequacy (1999). These authors further 
demonstrated that catastrophic worrying is indeed associated with these self-doubts 
(1998, 1999). The results of the current study provide support for the hypothesis that the 
belief that Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications taps 
some of this self-blame and doubt about personal abilities to cope with uncertain 
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situations, as this belief was correlated with a tendency to commit personalizing cognitive 
errors. Further, these doubts about self-efficacy were shown to contribute to a bias 
towards perceiving ambiguous situations as threatening. The significance of the self-
blaming attributions for these perceived coping deficiencies in uncertain situations, made 
evident by this IUS subscale’s correlation with personalizing tendencies, warrants further 
research attention. It should be noted, however, that this perceived self-referential 
implication of the behavioural difficulties experienced in uncertain situations is not 
explicitly included in the conceptualization of alternate factor solutions that have been 
proposed. Thus, these results support the broader conceptualization of this proposed IUS 
factor, and suggest that there are important aspects of intolerance of uncertainty that 
alternatively proposed factor solutions fail to capture. 
Construct Validity of the Belief That Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything 
 This study also found partial support for hypotheses regarding the construct 
validity of the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything. Consistent with 
expectations and extending upon prior findings (e.g., Berenbaum et al., 2008; Sexton et 
al., 2008), this IUS subscale showed moderate correlations with a need for closure (both a 
preference for order and a preference for predictability), small to moderate correlations 
with self-oriented and other-oriented perfectionism, and a moderate correlation with a 
monitoring coping style. As such, the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils 
Everything demonstrated convergent validity. Contrary to expectations, however, the 
magnitude of the correlations with a preference for predictability and a monitoring coping 
style did not differ between the two IUS subscales, as the belief that uncertainty has 
negative implications also showed small to moderate correlations with these measures. 
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Nonetheless, hypotheses regarding the discriminant validity of this belief about 
uncertainty were partially supported, as this IUS subscale demonstrated significantly 
higher correlations with a preference for order and with self- and other-oriented 
perfectionism than did the belief that uncertainty has negative implications. 
The heightened personal standards and more rigid expectations for others that 
comprise the perfectionism measures employed in this study were hypothesized to be a 
reflection of pro-active efforts to preserve certainty, stemming from the belief that events 
should be predictable and that it is unfair and unnecessarily disorderly when they are not 
so. Consistent with this hypothesis, this belief about uncertainty was associated with the 
expectation, both self-imposed and other-directed, that individuals should not make 
mistakes (e.g., “The people who matter to me should never let me down”), but should 
instead take concrete steps to prevent situational disturbances and seek to maintain or re-
establish certainty. 
It also follows that the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils events would be 
associated with strong preferences for orderliness and predictability in the external 
environment. To the extent that it would be possible to satisfy a need for order and a 
desire for predictability, two components of a broader need for cognitive closure, 
uncertainty in events would conceivably be minimized. However, in this study the belief 
that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything showed convergent validity but not 
discriminant validity with a preference for predictability in the external environment, 
only partially consistent with previous research on Berenbaum and colleagues’ (2008) 
similar “Desire for Predictability” factor. What was unexpected in the present study was 
the comparably strong correlation observed between a preference for predictability and 
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the belief that uncertainty has negative implications, as both negative beliefs about 
uncertainty were comparably associated with a preference for predictability. One reason 
for this discrepancy in findings may be that the Uncertainty has Negative and Self-
Referent Implications subscale is a somewhat broader factor than Berenbaum and 
colleagues’ “Uncertainty Paralysis” factor, comprising several additional items that in 
Berenbaum and colleagues’ study loaded on an “Uncertainty Distress” factor, which did 
show a small to moderate correlation with a preference for predictability. These 
additional items assess perceived personal consequences of uncertainty (such as 
“Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad”), coping preferences in the face of 
uncertainty (e.g., “I must get away from all uncertain situations”), and items reflecting 
negative upward comparisons to others who are perceived as managing the uncertainty in 
their lives more effectively (e.g., “Unlike me, others seem to know where they are going 
with their lives”). Thus, it may be that both negative beliefs about the unfair and spoiling 
impact of uncertainty as well as self-referent doubts about the ability to cope with this 
uncertainty are associated with a preference for predictability. 
Similarly, this study failed to support the hypothesis that the belief that the 
spoiling impact of uncertainty is unfair would be associated with a greater tendency to 
monitor the environment for perceived threats to certainty than would the belief that 
uncertainty has negative personal implications. Again, this lack of specificity was a result 
of both IUS subscales showing significant correlations with a monitoring copying style, 
as the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything nonetheless demonstrated 
convergent validity with the measure of information seeking. However, the fear of 
behavioural paralysis which characterizes the belief that uncertainty has negative 
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implications appears also to show a moderate but significant relationship with vigilance, 
though the nature of this association is unclear. As this study is cross-sectional in nature, 
the direction of this association cannot be directly inferred. The observed correlation 
might suggest that the belief that uncertainty has negative implications can lead to 
hypervigilant monitoring of the environment, or this belief might instead evolve as a 
consequence of it. For instance, it may be the case that this negative belief about 
uncertainty as likely to inhibit behaviour could potentially result from the previous use of 
inefficient information-seeking strategies in uncertain situations which may have delayed 
or “inhibited” an appropriate response. Krohne (1996) has noted that the stressful 
situations employed on the MBSS are generally uncontrollable in nature; this would 
render an information-seeking coping style likely ineffective and therefore maladaptive. 
As such, it is probable that information-seeking in these situations would not succeed in 
facilitating problem-solving efforts or successful resolution of the situation. Without 
successful resolution, but with the perpetual drive to attain certainty fostered by 
intolerance of uncertainty, information-seeking efforts would also likely be prolonged. 
Further, these ineffective and excessive efforts to increase preparedness in uncertain 
situations could lead either to frustration or to a loss of confidence about personal 
abilities to cope, or both, when attempts to achieve this certainty fail. Thus, over time 
uncertain situations may come to be viewed as “paralyzing”, and this behavioural 
paralysis may lead to further self-doubts. Such speculations would need to be examined 
in prospective studies to ascertain the directionality of these associations between 
information-seeking efforts and negative beliefs about uncertainty, and their interactions 
as events unfold over time. Nonetheless, though the precise mechanism is unclear, this 
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study suggests that both negative beliefs about uncertainty are associated with a 
disposition to employ a monitoring coping style in stressful situations. 
Criterion-Related Validity of the IUS Subscales 
 The contribution of negative beliefs about uncertainty to the proclivity to 
readily perceive threat. This study also sought to explore the criterion-related validity of 
the IUS subscales with appraisals in ambiguous situations. A large body of research has 
established that worry and anxiety are associated with more threatening appraisals of 
ambiguous situations (see, e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; 
Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; Butler & Mathews, 1983). A smaller but 
consistent literature has also demonstrated that intolerance of uncertainty is predictive of 
these biased appraisals, even after controlling for worry as well as anxious and depressive 
symptomatology (Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005; Koerner & Dugas, 2008). However, the 
question of whether distinct negative beliefs about uncertainty result in specific negative 
interpretations of ambiguity and specific behavioural responses in these ambiguous 
situations had not yet been explored. This question was examined in the current study.  
 As expected, both IUS subscales were positively associated with negative 
appraisals of ambiguous situations as assessed by the ASQ. Further, both the belief that 
Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications and the belief that 
Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything predicted unique variance in appraisals when 
both subscales were in the equation. As such, both IUS subscales demonstrated criterion-
related validity with negatively biased appraisals of ambiguity, and both appeared to be 
independent contributors to this heightened tendency to perceive threats in ambiguous 
situations.  
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 Do uncertainty intolerant beliefs predict whether ambiguity is perceived as 
having negative implications? While the two IUS subscales have demonstrated 
evidence of their validity, questions remain as to the utility of conceptualizing distinct 
negative uncertainty intolerant beliefs. These questions are perhaps best addressed by 
examining the specificity of these negative beliefs about uncertainty. In this study, the 
specificity of the IUS subscales was assessed in two ways: first, by comparing their 
correlations with interpretations of ambiguity proposed to be specific to each uncertainty 
intolerant belief; and second, by evaluating the extent to which each IUS subscale 
predicted unique variance in these hypothesized manifestations of intolerance of 
uncertainty in ambiguous situations. 
 Consistent with this study’s hypotheses, the belief that Uncertainty has Negative 
Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications showed strong evidence of specificity. This 
subscale was significantly more highly and positively correlated with perceptions of 
ambiguity as having negative personal implications than with perceptions of ambiguity as 
unfair and disruptive, and likewise showed a stronger association with perceptions of 
ambiguous situations as having negative personal implications than did the belief that 
Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything. Further, this belief predicted unique 
variance in perceived negative implications of ambiguous situations after controlling for 
the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything. As such, the belief that 
uncertainty has negative implications showed a specific relationship with the self-
reported tendency to experience behavioural paralysis and to endorse negative personal 
attributions for perceived poor performance in hypothetical ambiguous situations. 
 Do uncertainty intolerant beliefs predict whether ambiguity is perceived as 
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unfair and disruptive? The belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything 
demonstrated only partial but nonetheless substantial evidence of specificity in relation to 
the hypothesized behavioural manifestations of this belief in ambiguous situations. 
Despite the observed moderate to large correlation between the belief that Uncertainty is 
Unfair and Spoils Everything and perceptions of ambiguity as unfair and disruptive, no 
significant difference in correlations was observed between this correlation and the 
observed association of this IUS subscale and the ASQ subscale assessing perceptions of 
ambiguity as having negative personal implications. In other words, this IUS subscale 
was associated with both perceptions of ambiguity as unfair and disruptive, and with 
perceptions of ambiguity as having negative personal implications, to a comparable 
extent. Nonetheless, the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything was more 
specifically related to perceptions of ambiguity as unfair and disruptive than was the 
belief that uncertainty has negative implications. Also consistent with hypotheses, the 
belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything predicted a unique proportion of the 
variance in perceptions of ambiguity as unfair and disruptive after controlling for the 
belief that uncertainty has negative implications, thereby demonstrating some degree of 
specificity relative to the other IUS subscale. 
 The reason for this discrepancy in the observed specificity of the belief that 
Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything is unclear. One reason for this discrepancy 
may be that we have not fully conceptualized this negative belief about uncertainty’s 
unique ramifications in ambiguous situations and have therefore not entirely described its 
behavioural correlates. This subscale of the ASQ may thus not adequately capture the full 
range of consequences of this negative belief about uncertainty. This could explain the 
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finding that the IUS subscale assessing the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils 
Everything predicted unique variance in the ASQ Ambiguity is Unfair and Disruptive 
subscale not predicted by the other IUS subscale, yet showed similarly strong correlations 
with both ASQ subscales. While this IUS subscale is tapping unique interpretations of 
ambiguous situations not accounted for by the belief that uncertainty has negative 
implications, its association with the two ASQ subscales could conceivably not be 
notably different if the ASQ subscale assessing perceptions of ambiguity as unfair and 
disruptive is missing some additional relevant implications specific to this negative belief 
about uncertainty in ambiguous situations. The causes and consequences of the belief that 
Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything may therefore require further research 
attention, particularly as it may be that this belief captures more novel aspects of 
intolerance of uncertainty and its association with worry.  
Historically, research and clinical interventions have focused on maladaptive self-
oriented expectations and evaluative judgments, as well as on maladaptive personal and 
behavioural consequences associated with the anxiety or worry. For instance, 
personalizing cognitive errors (i.e., the attribution of negative events to stable and global 
perceived internal failings) and their depressogenic consequences (such as perceived 
helplessness, reduced motivation, behavioural avoidance, or depressed affect) are well 
documented (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & Baeyer, 1979) and are frequently the 
focus of cognitive interventions. In addition, behavioural difficulties such as avoidance or 
difficulties with decision-making have previously been identified as likely consequences 
of intolerance of uncertainty, and are better understood. Further, these behavioural 
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consequences and are often the focus of exposure exercises designed to target intolerance 
of uncertainty (see Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). In contrast, a worldview that demands 
certainty and leads to unrealistic expectations for self and others can be potentially more 
difficult to address. Further, the emotional consequences of the failure to meet these 
expectations, such as perhaps self-directed frustration or other-oriented anger, have been 
less frequently studied and are often not the direct targets of our intervention strategies. 
More research into the origins of this strict need for certainty or structure may offer new 
insights into how to render the belief that uncertainty is unfair and unnecessary more 
flexible and responsive to external feedback that the world does not necessarily function 
in this manner. This negative belief about uncertainty may therefore have the potential to 
make an important and novel contribution to our understanding of intolerance of 
uncertainty and its role as a cognitive vulnerability factor for worry/GAD.  
 Taken together, these results suggest that the two proposed negative beliefs about 
uncertainty are associated with negative interpretations of ambiguity, yet contribute to 
different behavioural, cognitive, and emotional reactions in these situations. The beliefs 
that uncertainty has negative implications and that uncertainty is unfair and spoils 
everything have thus demonstrated construct and criterion-related validity, and have also 
shown evidence of specificity. 
Limitations 
This study nonetheless had several limitations which should be considered when 
evaluating the validity and generalizability of its findings. To begin with, this study made 
use of a non-clinical sample of convenience. These results therefore require replication in 
samples of individuals with GAD and other anxiety disorders. However, existing 
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evidence suggests that worry is a dimensional construct, rather than a discrete taxon at 
high levels of worry, and that it evidences similar relationships with worry-related 
processes such as intolerance of uncertainty, as well as related symptomatology such as 
depression and anxiety symptoms, at all levels of worry (Olatunji, Broman-Fulks, 
Bergman, Green, & Zlomke, 2010). Thus, there is good reason to expect that the 
associations between worry-related processes observed in this study will be informative 
in GAD patient samples as well as in samples of individuals with non-clinical levels of 
worry. Nonetheless, this hypothesis requires validation in a clinical sample. 
Secondly, this study required the development of a new measure for the 
assessment of appraisal biases and responses to perceived threats in ambiguous situations. 
The development of this new measure may provide a new tool for the assessment of the 
consequences of intolerance of uncertainty in clinical populations. However, as this is the 
first study to use the ASQ, and as a non-clinical sample was employed, there are limited 
inferences to be drawn about the ASQ’s potential utility in the assessment and treatment 
of anxiety in clinical samples. While the ASQ subscales demonstrated acceptable levels 
of reliability for the purposes of this study, as well as specificity to the distinct 
implications of the uncertainty intolerant beliefs they were designed to expand upon, their 
stability and construct validity remain to be assessed more fully. As such, further 
validation of the ASQ is required. Future research should also examine the clinical utility 
of the ASQ subscales for the assessment and treatment of GAD and other anxiety 
disorders in clinical practice. 
In sum, it is hoped that the more precise understanding of the composite negative 
beliefs about uncertainty that result in uncertainty tolerance, as well as the manifestations 
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of these specific beliefs in ambiguous situations, may facilitate future research into these 
characteristics of GAD-related cognitions and affect. Further, a better understanding of 
the possible mechanisms by which these negative beliefs about uncertainty and their 
consequences contribute to the etiology or maintenance of worry/GAD could enable 
prevention efforts to curb the development of these symptoms. Finally, these findings 
may facilitate the development of interventions to directly target the consequences of 
intolerance of uncertainty as well as the specific negative beliefs about uncertainty that 




Note. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; ASQ = Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire. 
 







Means, Standard Deviations, and Frequencies on Demographic Variables in the 
Concordia University (n = 142) and Ryerson University (n = 150) Samples 
   Concordia Ryerson  df   F   d   p 
   sample  sample 
Measure  M (SD) M (SD) 
Age
 a
   23.01 (6.37) 21.89 (5.89)  1, 288   2.40   .18   .12 
 
   Concordia Ryerson  df   χ2   φ   p 




   81.7% female 78.5% female  1, 289    0.46   .04   .50 
Ethnic origin
 c
       7, 280  45.51   .40 <.001 
     White/European 67.4%  42.2% 
     Black    3.5%  12.2% 
     Asian   7.8%  33.3% 
     Hispanic   3.5%    0.7% 
     Middle Eastern  5.0%    5.4% 
     Native American  1.4%    0.0% 
     Multi-racial  7.1%    4.8% 
     Other   4.3%    1.4% 
First language 
d
      2, 287  23.62   .29 <.001 
     English  63.1%  83.9% 
     French  10.6%    0.0% 




 n = 142 in Concordia sample, n = 148 in Ryerson sample. 
b
 Frequencies are expressed 
as a percentage of participants who reported on their sex (n = 142 in the Concordia 
sample, n = 149 in the Ryerson sample). 
c
 Frequencies are expressed as a percentage of 
participants who reported on their ethnic origin (n = 141 participants in the Concordia 
University sample and n = 147 participants in the Ryerson University sample). 
d
 
Frequencies are expressed as a percentage of participants who reported on their first 
language (n = 141 in the Concordia sample, n = 149 in the Ryerson sample). 
  
Table 3.2 
Inter-Correlations and Univariate Summary Statistics for Study Measures (N = 292). 


















IUS   --            
ASQ-A  .47***  --           
ASQ-NI  .57*** .61***  --          
ASQ-UD  .53*** .50*** .68***   --         
FIS  .50*** .38*** .53***  .37***  --        
LGP  .09 .13* .16**  .08 .51***   --       
CEQ-P  .38*** .30*** .45***  .30*** .30***   .17**  --      
NFCS-PO  .34*** .25*** .23***  .28*** <-.01 -.35*** .08   --     
NFCS-PP  .54*** .46*** .47***  .41*** .30*** -.03 .17**  .53***  --    
MPS-SOP  .27*** .13* .15*  .19** -.03 -.13* .21***  .28*** .11  --   
MPS-OOP  .26*** .11 .19**  .18* .05  <.01 .28***  .11 .06 .50***  --  








  -.13* -.07 -.18** -.17** -.14* -.09 -.25*** -.03 -.04  <-.01 -.08 -.20** 
Sex
 b
  -.01 -.05 -.10 -.05 -.09   .02 .01 -.12* -.13* -.06 .05 -.08 
Ethnicity
 c
   .21 .26** .25* .19 .19 .18 .20 .12 .22 .13 .14 .16 
Language
 d
 -.09 -.08 -.06 -.06 -.11 -.05 -.09   .07 -.03 .05 .01 -.11 
M  64.34 111.52  91.74  129.99  41.24  57.31  4.76 39.77 25.83 71.23 58.40 61.08 
(SD) (18.10) (13.12) (26.21) (21.79) (10.38) (11.15) (3.08) (6.90) (6.72) (14.38) (8.47) (8.66) 
 
Note. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; ASQ = Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire; FIS = Frost’s Indecisiveness Scale; LGP = 
Lay’s General Procrastination Scale; CEQ-P = Cognitive Error Questionnaire - General version, Personalization subscale; NFCS-PO 
= Need for Closure Scale – Preference for Order subscale; NFCS-PP = Need for Closure Scale – Preference for Predictability 
subscale; MPS-SOP = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale – Self-Oriented Perfectionism subscale; MPS-OOP = Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale – Other-Oriented Perfectionism subscale; MBSS-M = Miller Behavioral Style Scale – Monitoring subscale. 
a
 n = 290.  
b
 n = 291; Female sex coded as 0, male sex coded as 1.  
c
 n = 288; correlation computed as the composite R of seven ethnic 
origin dummy codes regressed on each study variable, with White/European ethnic origin coded as the reference group (see Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) for comparison with Black, Asian, Hispanic, Middle Eastern, Native American/Canadian, Multi-racial 
ethnic origin, and Other ethnic origin groups.  
d






regressed on each study variable, with English first language coded as the reference group (see Cohen et al., 2003) for comparison 
with French as first language and Other first language groups. 







Univariate Summary Statistics, Inter-Item and Item-Total Correlations of the IUS (n = 289) 
Item  M SD rcorr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11   12  13   14   15   16  17   18 19  20  21 22  23  24  25  26  27 
1 3.1 1.1 .33  --                           
2 2.1 1.0 .41 .30  --                          
3 2.1 1.1 .60 .22 .44  --                         
4 2.4 1.2 .53 .06 .21 .48  --                        
5 2.2 1.2 .71 .27 .28 .44 .49  --                       
6 2.9 1.2 .74 .26 .21 .46 .38 .63  --                      
7 2.4 1.1 .68 .24 .33 .50 .43 .62 .65  --                     
8 3.3 1.1 .63 .19 .19 .39 .45 .56 .58 .55  --                    
9 1.9 1.0 .65 .19 .33 .49 .26 .48 .50 .48 .42  --                   
10 2.8 1.1 .45 .14 .17 .31 .19 .39 .39 .37 .45 .38  --                  
11 2.4 1.1 .59 .19 .24 .34 .43 .45 .47 .45 .44 .39 .30   --                 
12 2.0 1.0 .58 .31 .28 .32 .31 .38 .44 .39 .30 .39 .10
ns
.36   --                 






14 2.1 0.9 .67 .26 .36 .42 .35 .47 .51 .43 .39 .45 .24  .39  .53  .48   --             
15 2.2 1.0 .70 .28 .37 .50 .38 .46 .52 .47 .40 .51 .26  .40  .55  .47  .73   --            
16 2.3 1.2 .45 .21 .24 .17 .30 .24 .34 .26 .20 .32 .08
ns
.28  .41  .32  .32  .34 --           
17 2.2 1.1 .74 .24 .28 .47 .37 .49 .62 .51 .41 .53 .25  .48  .48  .43  .55  .62  .45   --          
18 3.0 1.2 .58 .19 .20 .36 .34 .47 .44 .38 .51 .45 .46  .39  .28  .27  .33  .35  .23  .41   --         
19 2.1 1.0 .620 .19 .31 .44 .36 .47 .42 .53 .41 .46 .39  .38  .33  .35  .41  .44  .19  .44  .44  --        
20 2.3 1.1 .57 .39 .20 .24 .25 .35 .43 .36 .35 .33 .20  .35  .41  .33  .48  .44  .31  .48  .28 .42  --       
21 3.0 1.1 .49 .20 .21 .28 .23 .42 .40 .34 .38 .33 .35  .36  .23  .26  .33  .28  .11
ns
.29  .46 .29 .34  --      
22 2.4 1.2 .59 .31 .29 .25 .24 .39 .48 .36 .32 .34 .24  .34  .41  .42  .47  .45  .42  .51  .32 .33 .55 .34 --     
23 2.1 1.2 .50 .09 .16 .26 .43 .36 .38 .29 .23 .30 .14  .34  .37  .27  .33  .36  .59  .41  .26 .25 .33 .17 .35  --    
24 2.1 1.2 .55 .14 .16 .35 .26 .47 .48 .42 .37 .39 .21  .30  .33  .31  .42  .45  .18  .57  .23 .30 .28 .27 .35 .26  --   
25 1.8 0.9 .61 .12 .32 .47 .32 .43 .43 .43 .33 .49 .33  .40  .36  .42  .41  .42  .22  .52  .39 .45 .33 .30 .34 .33 .45  --  
26 2.4 1.0 .71 .20 .27 .44 .37 .52 .65 .52 .47 .48 .34  .45  .37  .36  .48  .48  .30  .60  .44 .40 .41 .38 .45 .40 .60 .54  -- 
27 2.8 1.3 .62 .16 .14 .31 .40 .46 .46 .35 .53 .40 .37  .38  .29  .26  .37  .39  .36  .46  .51 .40 .40 .36 .38 .43 .43 .39 .51 -- 
Note. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; rcorr = corrected item-total correlation; ns = p > .05. Otherwise, all correlations are 







Factor Loadings for the Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the IUS (n = 289) 
No. Item        I II E 
17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad.  .79  .61 
15.  When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well.  .78  .62 
14. When I am uncertain, I can’t go forward.   .75  .67 
9. Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life.   .67  .74 
12. When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me.  .64  .77 
25. I must get away from all uncertain situations.  .63  .78 
3. Uncertainty makes life intolerable.    .62  .79 
13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate.   .62  .79 
22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence.  .62  .78 
20. The smallest doubt can stop me from acting.   .59  .81 
24. Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly.  .59  .81 
23. I think it’s unfair that other people seem to be sure  
 about their future.      .51  .86 
16. Unlike me, others seem to know where they are  
going with their lives.       .49  .87 
2.  Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized. .45  .89 
1.  Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion.  .36  .93 
6.  Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious or stressed.   .80 .60 
5. My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will 
 happen tomorrow.       .77 .64 
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26. The ambiguities in life stress me.      .74 .68 
7. Unforeseen events upset me greatly.     .74 .67 
8. It frustrates me not having all the information I need.  .71 .70 
27. I can’t stand being undecided about my future.    .64 .77 
18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me.  .63 .78 
11. A small unforeseen event can spoil everything  
even with the best planning.      .62 .79 
19. I can’t stand being taken by surprise.     .62 .78 
4. It’s unfair having no guarantees in life.    .56 .83 
21. I should be able to organize everything in advance.    .53 .85 
10. One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises.  .51 .86 
 
Note. All factor loadings significant at p < .05. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; 
Factor I = Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications; Factor 
II = Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything; E = standardized error variance. 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .96, Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .94; 
Standardized Root Mean-square Residual (SRMR) = .06; Root Mean-square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) = .08, 90% C.I. = .07-.08. 
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Table 3.5 
IUS Subscale Correlations With Study Measures (N = 292) 
   IUS-NI  IUS-US  Fisher’s Z      r2difference 
FIS    .56***   .37***   5.49*** .18 
LGP    .18**   -.02    4.75*** .03 
CEQ-P    .39***    .32**    1.95*  .05 
NFCS-PO   .23***   .40***  -4.55*** .11 
NFCS-PP   .48***   .53***  -1.38  .05 
MPS-SOP   .17**    .33***  -4.20*** .08 
MPS-OOP   .19***   .23***  -1.78*  .03 
MBSS-M   .28***   .30***  -0.34  .01 
M   32.60   31.74 
(SD)            (10.04)   (9.22) 
 
Note. IUS-NI = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale - Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural 
and Self-Referent Implications subscale; IUS-US = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale - 
Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything subscale; FIS = Frost’s Indecisiveness Scale; 
LGP = Lay’s General Procrastination Scale; CEQ-P = Cognitive Error Questionnaire - 
General version, Personalization subscale; NFCS-PO = Need for Closure Scale – 
Preference for Order subscale; NFCS-PP = Need for Closure Scale – Preference for 
Predictability subscale; MPS-SOP = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale – Self-
Oriented Perfectionism subscale; MPS-OOP = Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale – 
Other-Oriented Perfectionism subscale; MBSS-M = Miller Behavioral Style Scale – 
Monitoring subscale. 
* p < .05, 1-tailed test; ** p < .01, 1-tailed test; *** p < .001, 1-tailed test.
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Table 3.6 
IUS Subscale Correlations With the ASQ Subscales (N = 292) 
 
       ASQ     ASQ  Fisher’s Z      r2difference 
        Ambiguity has        Ambiguity is 
            Negative Implications  Unfair and Disruptive 
       
IUS-NI   .60***†    .46***†    3.43
≠ ≠ ≠
     .14 
IUS-US   .48***††    .53***††   -1.26   .05 
 
Note. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; IUS-NI = Uncertainty has Negative 
Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications subscale; IUS-US = Uncertainty is Unfair 
and Spoils Everything subscale; ASQ = Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire. 
Correlations in the same column with different subscripts († and ††) differ significantly at p 
< .05, 1-tailed test, by Fisher’s Z test of correlated correlation coefficients (see Meng, 
Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992). 
≠
 p < .05, 1-tailed test; *** p < .001, 2-tailed test. 
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Table 3.7 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Scores on the 
ASQ Appraisals of Ambiguity Subscale (N = 292). 
Variables  ∆R2  ∆F  B SE B      β  pr 
Step 1   .18  64.41*** 
 IUS-US      0.61 0.08         .43*** .43 
Step 1   .21  76.97*** 
 IUS-NI      0.60 0.07         .46*** .46 
Step 2 
 IUS-US .01  5.16*   0.26 0.12         .18*  .13 † 
 IUS-NI .04  15.58***  0.42 0.11         .32*** .23 †† 
 
Note. Results for two separate hierarchical regressions predicting ASQ-A, with first IUS-
US entered on the first step (first regression) and subsequently IUS-NI entered on the first 
step (second regression), are presented in each alternate Step 1, respectively. Step 2 
summarizes the final beta-coefficients with both predictors in the equation, for both 
regressions. ∆R2 and ∆F for the two separate regressions are presented next to each added 
variable in Step2. ASQ = Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire; IUS-US = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale - Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything subscale; IUS-NI = 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale - Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-
Referent Implications subscale. Correlations in the same column with different subscripts 
(† and ††) differ significantly at p < .05, 2-tailed test, by Fisher’s Z test of correlated 
correlation coefficients (Z = 2.13, pr
2
difference = .03; see Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992; 
Steiger, 1980; Steiger & Browne, 1984). 
* p < .05; *** p < .001.
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Table 3.8 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Scores on the 
ASQ Ambiguity has Negative Implications Subscale (N = 292). 
Variables  ∆R2  ∆F  B SE B     β  pr 
Step 1   .23  85.95*** 
 IUS-US      1.36 0.15         .48*** .48 
Step 2   .13  57.61*** 
 IUS-US      0.15 0.21         .05  .04 † 
 IUS-NI      1.45 0.19         .56*** .41 †† 
 
Note. ASQ = Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire; IUS-US = Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale - Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything subscale; IUS-NI = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale - Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications 
subscale. Correlations in the same column with different subscripts († and ††) differ 
significantly at p < .001, 1-tailed test, by Fisher’s Z test of correlated correlation 
coefficients (Z = 8.03; pr
2
difference = .16; see Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992; Steiger, 
1980; Steiger & Browne, 1984). 




Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Scores on the 
ASQ Ambiguity is Unfair and Disruptive Subscale (N = 292). 
Variables  ∆R2  ∆F  B SE B     β  pr 
Step 1   .21  78.94*** 
 IUS-NI      1.00 0.11         .46*** .46 
Step 2   .07  29.49*** 
 IUS-NI      0.31 0.17         .14  .11 † 
 IUS-US      0.99 0.18         .42*** .30 †† 
 
Note. ASQ = Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire; IUS-NI = Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale - Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications subscale; 
IUS-US = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale - Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils Everything 
subscale. Partial correlations in the same column with the same subscripts († and ††) differ 
significantly at p < .001, 1-tailed test, by Fisher’s Z test of correlated correlation 
coefficients (Z = -4.37; pr
2
difference = .08; see Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992; Steiger, 
1980; Steiger & Browne, 1984). 





 The results of this set of studies suggest that uncertainty is experienced as 
intolerable largely for two reasons: it follows from the belief that the occurrence of 
uncertainty in events spoils everything and is unfair, and it arises from the belief that 
personal abilities to cope are diminished by uncertainty. Consistent with the current 
definition, these two enduring negative beliefs about uncertainty, proposed to result in the 
“dispositional characteristic” of intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007), 
showed replicability and good fit upon confirmatory factor analysis in two independent 
samples, and hence evidenced both stability and construct validity. Support for the 
distinctiveness of these two negative beliefs was evident in their different convergent 
associations: while one belief showed specificity to perceived behavioural and personal 
implications of specific ambiguous situations, the other was associated with a sensitivity 
to experience specific ambiguous situations as disruptive and unacceptable. Specificity 
was also observed in the different cognitive and behavioural processes associated with 
these beliefs. In addition, evidence of criterion-related validity was observed in these core 
beliefs’ associations with worry, trait anxiety, somatic anxiety, depressed mood, and 
information-processing biases in specific ambiguous situations. These findings extend 
our conceptualization of intolerance of uncertainty, and provide support for its construct 
validity. 
The factor analytic results obtained in these studies have some similarities to other 
recent findings. For instance, Berenbaum and colleagues (2008) have conceptualized the 
two central factors of intolerance of uncertainty as Uncertainty Paralysis and Desire for 
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Predictability. These concepts are notably similar to the proposed beliefs that Uncertainty 
has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications and that Uncertainty is Unfair 
and Spoils Everything, respectively. Further, many of the items comprising these two sets 
of factors are indeed overlapping. However, the current findings support a broader 
conceptualization of these factors. To being with, the convergent validity findings 
presented here suggest that the factor capturing behavioural paralysis in the face of 
uncertainty is also marked by self-criticism for this inability to move forward and 
function in the face of uncertainty. Similarly, the Desire for Predictability appears to be 
more than a preference as it also encapsulates an evaluative component, capturing the 
expectation that events should be certain and that it is unfair that they are not so. The 
observed pattern of correlations further suggests that this factor taps exigent expectations 
for one’s self, for others, and for the environment. For personal expectations, this factor 
appears to be associated with high performance standards and low tolerance for mistakes. 
For others, this factor’s correlation with other-oriented perfectionism suggests it includes 
the expectation that others in some manner accommodate this need for certainty, perhaps 
by not contributing to it with “mistakes” that contribute to disorder, or by helping to 
prevent or manage the impact of uncertainty. Finally, this factor also includes strong 
expectations for the surrounding environment, in the form of a need for structure and 
order in external circumstances. In addition, this study found that a preference for 
predictability does not distinguish between the two negative beliefs about uncertainty, 
further suggesting that a preference for predictability is not the distinctive characteristic 
of this factor. Thus, uncertainty intolerant beliefs are characterized by self-judgments 
about the behavioural difficulties experienced under uncertain circumstances, and by 
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rigid expectations or “shoulds” about the need for certainty and its fairness.  
Criterion-Related Validity and Specificity of the Association Between Uncertainty 
Intolerant Beliefs and Worry/GAD Symptoms and Processes. 
The above-mentioned findings are also consistent with the predictions of 
cognitive theory, which posits that “increased susceptibility to anxiety is a result of 
enduring core beliefs (schemas) about personal vulnerability or helplessness and the 
salience of threat” (Clark & Beck, 2010, p. 36). These findings confirm that individuals 
high in trait intolerance of uncertainty are primed to see uncertain threats as salient 
because they believe themselves to be vulnerable to uncertainty and view it as 
unacceptable. Further, both negative beliefs demonstrated common consequences for 
psychopathology as well as unique impacts on behaviour, cognition, and information-
processing, in support of their criterion-related validity and utility. 
 Common correlates of intolerance of uncertainty. While the two negative 
beliefs about uncertainty evidenced notable distinct features, both nonetheless contributed 
to common impairments including deleterious effects on symptom frequency and 
severity, detrimental impacts on information-processing, and maladaptive coping. Both 
the belief that uncertainty has negative personal implications and the belief that 
uncertainty is spoiling and unfair showed strong correlations with pathological worry. 
Both beliefs predicted variance in the tendency to perceive uncertain situations as 
threatening. Finally, though contrary to our expectations, both negative beliefs about 
uncertainty were associated with higher levels of information-seeking, and maladaptively 
so since the situations presented in this measure are uncontrollable. Whether this 
association reflects the previously-established impact of state or trait intolerance of 
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uncertainty on information-seeking (e.g., Rosen & Knäuper, 2009; Rosen et al., 2007), or 
whether separate mechanisms driven by these distinct negative beliefs about uncertainty 
contribute independently to monitoring, will need to be explored further. Nonetheless, 
both negative beliefs about uncertainly evidenced criterion-related validity. 
Criterion-related and convergent validity of the belief that Uncertainty has 
Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent Implications. In these studies, the belief that 
uncertainty holds negative personal implications demonstrated 1) criterion-related 
validity and specificity with symptomatology, 2) criterion-related validity and specificity 
with specific information-processing biases, and 3) convergent validity and specificity 
with relevant cognitive and behavioural constructs. In terms of symptomatology, this 
belief was differentially associated with anxious and depressive symptomatology. With 
respect to information-processing, it was predictive of distinct interpretations and 
responses in specific ambiguous situations. Finally, it was associated with altogether 
different cognitive and behavioural processes, such as indecision, procrastination, and 
personalization, than was the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils events. As such, 
this negative belief about uncertainty demonstrated not only strong evidence of 
convergent and criterion-related validity, in support of the validity of this construct, but 
also convincingly evidenced specificity. Importantly, this evidence of convergent validity 
and specificity provides support for the proposed conceptualization of this factor of the 
IUS as assessing both behavioural implications of uncertainty (e.g., being “stuck”, as 
evidenced by delayed responding in the form of either indecision or procrastination) and 
self-referent meaning attached to these behavioural difficulties (e.g., personalizing these 
failures to cope as attributable to stable personal weakness). Thus, the belief that 
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uncertainty impairs personal functioning and represents a personal shortcoming was 
associated with self-reported difficulties in decision-making and task adherence, and with 
self-blame for these coping difficulties. However, these findings raise questions about the 
nature of this uncertainty intolerant belief’s relationship with impaired functioning.  
An important question that arises concerns the direction of this association 
between perceived behavioural difficulties in uncertain situations and difficulties 
implementing actions. Stated differently, the origins and mechanism of this association 
are unknown. For instance, it is not clear if this belief about personal inadequacy in 
uncertain contexts is the cause of the observed behavioural difficulties, or a consequence 
of previous failure experiences in uncertain situations, or whether the behavioural 
difficulties and beliefs about personal inadequacies are bi-directionally related as part of a 
self-perpetuating cycle. It is conceivable that believing that uncertainty poses a threat to 
personal coping resources may lead to further behavioural difficulties when uncertain 
situations are encountered, perhaps by leading to high levels of anxiety that result in 
impaired coping efforts, perhaps by shifting the attentional focus away from the task or 
decision at hand and therefore interfering with appropriate responding, or perhaps by 
delaying the implementation of actions that would resolve a given situation. Thus, it is 
possible that individuals who hold the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural 
and Self-Referent Implications are not necessarily less capable of responding 
appropriately to uncertain situations, despite their difficulties implementing these 
responses effectively and in a timely fashion.  
As such, it remains to be seen whether individuals endorsing this negative belief 
about their ability to perform in uncertain situations are accurately perceiving their own 
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competency in these situations, or merely lacking in confidence. While high worriers 
have demonstrated delays in their responses to decision-making or behavioural 
performance tasks when the level of ambiguity is elevated (e.g., Metzger, Miller, Cohen, 
Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990; Pratt, Tallis, & Eysenck, 1997), they do not demonstrate 
differences relative to non-worriers in performance accuracy on unambiguous tasks, 
regardless of task difficulty (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 1997). As such, high worriers may not 
necessarily be less capable in their coping responses.  
Subjectively, however, they may experience uncertain situations as difficult and 
anxiety provoking and may as a result tend to perceive their performance as inadequate. 
Koerner and Dugas (2007b) found that emotional reasoning, for instance, was employed 
among individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty, regardless of the presence or 
absence of more objective information. As such, similar to previous findings on the 
problem solving abilities of high worriers, which do not differ from those of non-anxious 
individuals despite their greater tendency to hold negative perceptions of their own 
problem-solving capacity (e.g., Davey, 1994; Dugas, Letarte, Rhéaume, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1995; Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 1998), individuals endorsing the 
belief that uncertainty has negative implications may in fact not possess diminished 
abilities to cope with uncertain situations. However, they may nonetheless view 
themselves as poorer at coping with uncertainty. This may in turn contribute to their 
tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as more of a threat. These possibilities remain 
to be investigated.  
Thus, it may be that individuals high in intolerance of uncertainty are more likely 
to experience a low sense of personal mastery following a negative outcome, and to 
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exhibit behavioural difficulties in uncertain situations when their self-confidence is 
shaken. As such, behavioural difficulties may result from, rather than promote, a low 
sense of self-efficacy in uncertain situations. Consistent with this view, Steel (2007), in 
his meta-analytic review of the literature on procrastination, noted that several studies to 
date have shown that individuals experiencing a negative mood are more likely to report 
having engaged in more procrastination, regardless of the level of objectively observed 
procrastinatory behaviour. This is consistent with the demonstrated association between 
procrastination and a personalizing attributional style (e.g., McKean, 1994), and with the 
broader literature on perceived helplessness and self-handicapping behaviour as 
contributors to procrastination (see Steel, 2007, for a review). Similarly, Mikulincer, 
Yinon, and Kabili (1991) found that following failure feedback, performance deficits and 
low expectancies of control were experienced on subsequent tasks, but only among 
individuals high in the need for structure, not individuals low in the need for structure. As 
such, maladaptive responses may follow from, rather than precede, negative beliefs about 
personal efficacy. Further, given the above findings, it is also conceivable that the two 
negative beliefs about uncertainty may have interactive effects on individuals’ response 
to stressors.  
Finally, the close and potentially causal relationship between behavioural 
difficulties and low self-efficacy is also suggested by these studies’ findings that 
perceived behavioural and self-referent implications of uncertainty load together on the 
same factor, rather than comprising distinct components of uncertainty intolerance. This 
further suggests that conceptualizing this factor as “Uncertainty Paralysis” does not 
afford a complete and nuanced understanding of this negative belief about uncertainty. 
 120 
Rather, the perceived self-referent consequences of uncertainty and the personalization of 
these behavioural difficulties may play a particularly important role. Further examination 
of the direction of these associations, by other experimental or prospective methods, is 
therefore required.  
What is clear from the current studies, however, is that this negative belief about 
uncertainty is associated with greater distress and internalizing symptoms, with 
behavioural difficulties related to delaying actions, and with a more negative self-concept 
as reflected by more frequent personalizing cognitive errors. In sum, individuals 
endorsing this belief feel more personally vulnerable in the face of uncertainty. 
Criterion-related and convergent validity of the belief that Uncertainty is 
Unfair and Spoils Everything. In contrast to the more internally-focused nature of the 
belief that uncertainty has negative personal implications, the findings of the studies 
presented here suggest that the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoiling is more 
externally-oriented. This belief was differentially associated with measures of demanding 
personal standards and with strong expectations for others and the environment. This was 
evident in its convergent associations with self- and other-oriented perfectionism and 
with a need for closure as manifested by a preference for order, though not a preference 
for predictability. As such, this negative belief about uncertainty suggests that 
orderliness, predictability, and controllability have come to be seen not just as a preferred 
state of the environment, but as an inflexible “must” or “should”. Thus, uncertainty has 
been deemed unfair. Further, this demand for certainty is likely too stringent to be 
accommodated without undue personal hardship or exigent demands on others. Thus, 
disappointment in the event of deviations from these unrealistic situational expectations, 
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and at one’s own and others inevitable failures to conform to such demands, is likely to 
result.  
While this negative belief about uncertainty showed criterion-related validity with 
appraisal biases and pathological worry, it did not evidence specificity, compared to the 
belief that uncertainty has negative implications, with the measures of symptomatology 
assessed in these studies. In addition, there were mixed findings on its specificity with 
those interpretations and responses hypothesized to be unique consequences of this belief 
about uncertainty in specific ambiguous situations. However, given that this negative 
belief about uncertainty nonetheless demonstrated construct validity and specificity with 
other overlapping measures, these mixed findings might not speak to the validity of this 
factor as much as they suggest that we have not yet precisely captured the consequences 
of this negative belief about uncertainty. The lack of specificity with symptom measures 
further suggests this interpretation. While this belief did not show stronger associations 
with any of the commonly-assessed internalizing symptoms of GAD assessed in this 
study, the externalized nature of this belief about uncertainty may instead have other 
affective consequences. For instance, recent findings (Deschenes, Dugas, Fracalanza, & 
Koerner, 2011) have identified anger as a prevalent but poorly studied emotional 
experience associated with worry and GAD, and found that internalized expressions of 
anger and hostility contribute to GAD symptom severity. The possibility that this 
negative belief about uncertainty may account for unique variance in anger has yet to be 
investigated. To facilitate the identification of these and other potentially unique 
consequences of this belief, future research may also benefit from controlling for 
common factors or global vulnerabilities for anxiety disorder symptoms, such as negative 
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affect, when comparing the contribution of the two negative beliefs about uncertainty to 
information-processing and symptom outcomes. 
Preliminary findings in clinical samples of individuals undergoing treatment for 
GAD further suggest that changes in the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils 
Everything does indeed play a specific role in reducing worry. For instance, Donegan 
(2010) observed significant decreases in the endorsement of this negative belief about 
uncertainty from pre- to mid-treatment and again from mid- to post-treatment, whereas 
the belief that uncertainty has negative implications changed following the mid-point of 
treatment. These changes in the belief that uncertainty is unfair partially mediated 
decreases in GAD symptoms over the course of treatment. Further, this mediational 
relationship between changes in the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils 
Everything and decreases in GAD symptoms appeared to be present in both directions 
and at similar magnitudes, suggesting a strong bi-directional relationship. In contrast, a 
more substantial portion of changes in the belief that uncertainty has negative 
implications was mediated by decreases in GAD symptoms during treatment, rather than 
the reverse. As such, it may be the case that the negative belief about uncertainty as being 
unfair and disorderly has some unique and relevant contributions to make in furthering 
our understanding of GAD symptoms and processes, and how best to intervene. 
Examining the Predictions of Cognitive Theory: Do the Distinct Negative Beliefs 
About Uncertainty Have a Moderating or Mediated Role When Interacting With 
Other Processes to Contribute to Worry/GAD Symptoms? 
Clark & Beck (2010) hypothesized that individuals vulnerable to anxiety can be 
distinguished from non-vulnerable persons by preexisting maladaptive schemas (i.e., 
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beliefs) about particular threats or dangers and associated personal vulnerability that 
remain inactive until triggered by relevant life experiences or stressors” (p. 116). Thus, 
these authors postulate a moderating role for the effects of cognitive vulnerabilities such 
as intolerance of uncertainty in the development of symptomatology and the perception 
of threat. Some recent findings support this view, and highlight the importance of 
identifying specific negative beliefs about uncertainty and deciphering the role each 
specific negative beliefs about uncertainty may play in filtering individuals’ experience 
and biasing their response to stressors.  
 Intolerance of uncertainty moderates the response to negative life events. 
Consistent with the predictions of cognitive theory (Clark & Beck, 2010), intolerance of 
uncertainty has been shown to moderate the relationship between negative life events and 
subsequent increases in anxiety (Chen & Hong, 2010). Of particular interest, individuals 
high in the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent 
Implications were shown to experience increased worry in response to negative life 
events, whereas those low in this negative belief about uncertainty do not (Chen & Hong, 
2010). As these findings suggest, these distinct core negative beliefs about uncertainty 
may thus have unique moderating effects on individual responses to external events. 
Heightened sensitivity to potential threats in ambiguous situations mediates 
the association between intolerance of uncertainty and worry. According to cognitive 
theory, more proximal cognitive processes are hypothesized to mediate the association 
between these distal cognitive vulnerabilities (beliefs), negative life events or stress, and 
the onset of symptoms (see Baron & Kenny, 1986; Clark & Beck, 2010; Riskind & 
Alloy, 2006). As previously mentioned, Koerner and Dugas (2008) have demonstrated 
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that more negative appraisals of ambiguous situations partially mediate the association 
between intolerance of uncertainty and worry. Extending these findings, Bredemeier and 
Berenbaum (2008) found that more negative estimates of the perceived probability and 
perceived cost of negative outcomes partially mediated the association between 
Uncertainty Paralysis and worry, when covarying Desire for Predictability. Similarly, 
more negative cost estimates of perceived threats partially mediated the association 
between Desire for Predictability and worry, when covarying Uncertainty Paralysis. 
Thus, consistent with cognitive theory, intolerance of uncertainty functions as a cognitive 
vulnerability factor for worry, as evidenced by its association with these more proximal 
influences that partially mediate its effects on the tendency to worry excessively. Further, 
these findings suggest that the two negative beliefs about uncertainty may lead to 
different biases in information processing, and therefore may lead to worry through 
different mediating pathways. Nonetheless, in both instances, intolerance of uncertainty 
remained a significant predictor of worry, indicating that there may be other mechanisms 
through which intolerance of uncertainty contributes to worry, directly or indirectly.  
Implications for Transdiagnostic Conceptualizations of Vulnerability Across the 
Anxiety and Mood Disorders.  
These findings on specific negative beliefs about uncertainty have the potential to 
inform current research and debate on the potential transdiagnostic utility of intolerance 
of uncertainty. While some researchers have suggested that intolerance of uncertainty is a 
common component of fear and anxiety (Carleton, Sharpe, et al., 2007) and intolerance 
of uncertainty has indeed repeatedly been shown to be elevated in anxiety disorders 
populations relative to non-anxious populations (Ladouceur et al., 1999), it has primarily 
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been demonstrated to confer risk for worry/GAD. The specificity of this association 
between intolerance of uncertainty and worry has been demonstrated in several clinical 
populations, as several studies have compared the levels of intolerance of uncertainty 
observed in GAD populations to those found in non-clinical and other anxiety disorder 
populations. GAD populations appear to be more intolerant of uncertainty than are 
nonclinical populations (Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Ladouceur et al., 1999), 
other anxiety disorder patients (Ladouceur et al., 1999), and panic disorder patients 
specifically (Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005). Further, when controlling for 
neuroticism/negative affect – a global vulnerability factor for anxiety and mood disorders 
(see Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996) – intolerance of 
uncertainty has been shown to be specifically related to worry but not to symptoms of 
panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), or health anxiety (Norton et al., 
2005; Sexton et al.). Thus, intolerance of uncertainty has generally been shown to be 
more specifically related to worry than to other anxiety disorder symptoms. 
Nonetheless, the prevalence of intolerance of uncertainty is now beginning to be 
investigated more broadly across anxiety and mood disorders. In contrast to the 
aforementioned findings, a few recent studies have suggested that intolerance of 
uncertainty may have an important role in OCD, though it remains to be seen what that 
role is and what overlap it may have with the mechanisms of intolerance of uncertainty’s 
involvement in worry/GAD. The levels of intolerance of uncertainty observed in GAD 
populations may be comparably elevated in OCD populations and in patients with 
comorbid GAD and OCD (Holaway et al., 2006), though a study by Tolin, Abramowitz, 
Brigidi, and Foa (2003) suggests this may apply primarily to checking compulsions. 
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However, this observed prominence of intolerance of uncertainty in OCD stands in 
contrast to prior findings. For instance, previous studies that have controlled for shared 
global vulnerabilities (e.g., negative affect), along with shared symptom variance, have 
shown mixed results; some have found that intolerance of uncertainty no longer predicts 
unique variance in OCD symptoms, yet continues to contribute to worry (Norton et al., 
2005; Sexton et al., 2003), while others have demonstrated unique contributions of 
intolerance of uncertainty to OCD symptoms (e.g., Norton & Mehta, 2007). Thus, the 
extent of intolerance of uncertainty’s role in OCD symptomatology is unclear. 
In a parallel line of investigation, some findings have suggested that intolerance 
of uncertainty may similarly be relevant to social anxiety, as it predicted unique variance 
in social anxiety symptoms after accounting for neuroticism and other social anxiety 
disorder processes such as anxiety sensitivity and fear of negative evaluation (Boelen & 
Reijntjes, 2009), and after accounting for global vulnerabilities such as negative and 
positive affect (Norton & Mehta, 2007). However, much of the research comparing the 
contribution of intolerance of uncertainty to GAD and to social anxiety disorder 
symptoms thus far has solely employed non-clinical samples (e.g., Boelen & Reijntjes, 
2009; Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Norton & Mehta, 2007). In addition, 
some studies (e.g., Carleton et al., 2010) have used the short 12-item version of the IUS, 
whose content validity has yet to be examined empirically. Notably, this short form does 
not include items assessing the personalization of the behavioural difficulties experienced 
under uncertainty, and does not conceptualize a need for structure in the environment or 
associated heightened performance standards as relevant consequences of expectations of 
certainty and predictability in prospective events. As such, this measure may not afford a 
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complete examination of the specificity of intolerance of uncertainty to worry or to social 
anxiety. Thus, the prevalence of intolerance of uncertainty in social anxiety disorder, as 
well as in OCD, remains to be explored further. Notwithstanding these possible 
exceptions, overall intolerance of uncertainty has shown evidence of being specific to 
worry and ubiquitous in GAD populations.  
Similarly, a developing area of research has begun to investigate the possible 
relevance of intolerance of uncertainty in the context of mood disorders. While 
intolerance of uncertainty was initially suggested to be more specifically related to worry 
than to depressive symptomatology (Dugas et al., 2004), more recent studies suggest it 
may nonetheless be relevant to mood disorders symptoms. For instance, several studies to 
date have found that it predicts a unique and substantial portion of the variance in 
depression symptoms after accounting for global vulnerabilities such as negative and 
positive affect (Norton et al., 2005; Norton & Mehta, 2007; van der Heiden, et al., 2010). 
Thus, intolerance of uncertainty may be relevant to depressive symptomatology as well. 
However, evidence of intolerance of uncertainty’s bearing on OCD, social 
anxiety, or depression symptoms does not confirm its status as a cognitive vulnerability 
for the development of these symptoms, nor does evidence of its specificity to 
worry/GAD negate the possibility that intolerance of uncertainty plays a significant role 
in other anxiety and mood disorders. Indeed, findings on the prevalence and specificity of 
intolerance of uncertainty across the anxiety and mood disorders do not necessarily speak 
to the nature of its particular role in each disorder.  As such, it should not be assumed that 
the mechanism by which intolerance of uncertainty confers vulnerability is necessarily 
the same for each set of symptoms. There is clearly a possibility that the distinct negative 
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beliefs about uncertainty convey risk by different mechanisms and to different extents 
across diverse anxiety and mood disorder symptoms. 
For instance, in the context of mood disorders where the effects of intolerance of 
uncertainty have also recently been explored, preliminary findings suggest that the 
mechanism by which intolerance of uncertainty confers risk may not be the same as for 
anxiety disorders such as GAD. Several studies have now shown that intolerance of 
uncertainty’s impact on depression symptoms is fully mediated by other depression-
related cognitive processes such as rumination (e.g., De Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 
2009; Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010), and that it exerts its impact through other 
mechanisms altogether, such as depressive predictive certainty, a construct linked to 
hopelessness (Miranda et al., 2008). These findings stand in sharp contrast to parallel 
investigations with worry/GAD symptoms, in which intolerance of uncertainty continued 
to contribute directly to anxiety or worry and was only partially mediated by other 
processes (De Jong-Meyer et al., 2009; Miranda et al., 2008). As such, intolerance of 
uncertainty continues to play a unique and direct role in worry and anxiety, whereas in 
depression its role appears to be primarily indirect and mediated by different processes. 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, questions remain as to the specificity of this cognitive 
vulnerability across anxiety and mood disorders, and the precise role of intolerance of 
uncertainty within each disorder is largely still unexplained. 
The identification of two distinct negative beliefs about uncertainty has the 
potential to clarify and inform further research into the mechanisms of action of 
intolerance of uncertainty within different anxiety and mood disorders. Some preliminary 
findings suggest that these beliefs may make unique contributions to different symptoms, 
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suggesting some degree of specificity in terms of the mechanisms by which risk is 
conferred. For instance, Sexton, Norton, Dugas, and Walker (2010) found that in a mixed 
clinical sample, the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and Self-Referent 
Implications predicted unique variance in symptoms of anxiety and depression after 
accounting for negative affect, whereas the belief that Uncertainty is Unfair and Spoils 
Everything accounted for unique variance in worry. Khawaja and Lu (2010) have also 
demonstrated that both these negative beliefs about uncertainty distinguish between GAD 
and non-clinical populations in their own right. However, further research is needed to 
examine the impact of these negative beliefs on other associated processes that contribute 
to specific anxiety and mood disorder symptoms. Further, the strength of association of 
these symptoms with the negative beliefs about uncertainty has yet to be compared across 
clinical samples of individuals with different anxiety and mood disorders. 
 Alternatively, the association between intolerance of uncertainty and other anxiety 
and mood disorder symptoms may reflect or account for comorbidity, or it may suggest 
that these beliefs have a possible moderating influence through these other comorbid 
symptoms. For instance, another possible mechanism by which intolerance of uncertainty 
may contribute to worry/GAD symptomatology is through the comorbid symptoms it 
engenders, such as a negative mood. As noted in previous research (Sexton & Dugas, 
2009b; Sexton et al., 2010), the belief that Uncertainty has Negative Behavioural and 
Self-Referent Implications appears to explain more of the variance in comorbid 
symptoms of depressed mood than does its counterpart IUS subscale. These depression 
symptoms are frequently comorbid with a tendency to worry excessively and 
uncontrollably (e.g., Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001; Brown, 
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Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Hunt, Issakidis, & Andrews, 2002; Khan, Jacobson, Gardner, 
Prescott, & Kendler, 2005; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998). Moreover, negative mood 
has been found to be exacerbated over the course of a worry bout (Davey, Eldridge, 
Drost, & MacDonald, 2007). This low mood has its own important implications for the 
frequency and severity of worry. For instance, several researchers have suggested that a 
diminished sense of personal competency, which frequently accompanies and contributes 
to depressed mood (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & Baeyer, 1979), may contribute directly 
to perceptions of threat, such that they become over-represented in cognitive structures 
and are thus perceived as more likely to occur (Berenbaum, 2010). Thus, a depressed 
mood may play a role in initiating bouts of catastrophic worry about these perceived 
threats (e.g., Berenbaum, 2010; Davey & Levy, 1998, 1999). Further, Startup and Davey 
(2001) have found that a depressed mood lengthens the duration of a worry bout by 
exacerbating the number of catastrophizing steps generated while worrying and by 
increasing perseverative processing of the threat, thus delaying termination of the worry 
bout and increasing efforts aimed at threat prevention or preparedness. Thus, the belief 
that uncertainty has negative implications and its association with negative mood states 
may have important contributions for both the initiation and termination of worry. 
Directions for Future Research 
The development of intolerance of uncertainty. These findings have potential 
implications for our understanding of the etiology of intolerance of uncertainty. 
Furthering our understanding of specific beliefs that lead to intolerance of uncertainty 
will allow for a closer examination of how these beliefs develop. To date, there has been 
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very limited research done in this area. Zlomke and Young (2009) conducted a 
preliminary retrospective investigation of the role of parental rearing behaviours on the 
development of intolerance of uncertainty, and found evidence of a mediating role of 
intolerance of uncertainty on the association between a perceived anxious parenting style 
and symptoms of worry and anxiety. Further prospective studies are needed. In addition, 
Zlomke and Young, among others (e.g., McLeod, Wood, & Weisz, 2007), have noted 
that the identification of specific childhood experiences and parental rearing behaviours 
has facilitated the identification of learning and modeling experiences in childhood that 
precipitate the later development of anxiety and worry. It is hoped that the current study’s 
findings which speak to the validity of these specific beliefs about uncertainty, along with 
the identification of specific correlates of these distinct beliefs, may likewise facilitate 
research into the etiology of intolerance of uncertainty.  
It is similarly hoped that the identification of specific uncertainty intolerant 
beliefs will refine future explorations of the mechanisms by which intolerance of 
uncertainty has an impact on other proximal contributors to worry and also on the 
mechanisms by which it contributes directly to the propensity to engage in excessive and 
uncontrollable worry about future events. Future research should investigate the 
mechanisms by which intolerance of uncertainty and its composite beliefs alter the 
information processing of challenging life experiences and result in excessive and 
uncontrollable worry as well as concomitant anxiety and depression symptoms. 
Pathways to intolerance of uncertainty: Independent or interactive effects of 
the beliefs that uncertainty has negative personal implications and is unfair? 
Further, the pathways to uncertainty intolerant beliefs, whether they are common or 
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idiosyncratic, remain to be identified. It may be the case that it is not consistently the 
same beliefs about uncertainty that operate to predict who will experience uncertainty as 
aversive. If, however, our interventions are to be effective in helping individuals who 
have become “stuck” in the use of maladaptive coping strategies, such as excessive 
worry, in response to uncertain situations, our treatments will need to address the specific 
beliefs that have contributed to this inflexibility in responding that results from 
intolerance of uncertainty. As it is not clear to what extent different developmental 
antecedents to intolerance of uncertainty exist, or to what extent these uncertainty 
intolerance beliefs may overlap, it will be important to determine which beliefs are 
necessary or sufficient to the development of intolerance of uncertainty, and which 
pathways interact to result in the inflexible or maladaptive responses to uncertain 
situations which have been observed among individuals high in intolerance of 
uncertainty. 
It is conceivable that holding one of these negative beliefs about uncertainty may 
make an individual more susceptible to developing the other belief about uncertainty’s 
implications. This is strongly suggested by the high correlation observed between the two 
negative beliefs about uncertainty in both studies presented here. Van den Bos (2001) has 
noted that threats to perceived fairness are viewed as more threatening to an individual’s 
worldview when self-esteem is threatened than when it has been bolstered by self-
affirming actions. This suggests one possible mechanism by which the two identified 
negative beliefs about uncertainty may interact, as they concern perceived vulnerabilities 
to self-esteem on the one hand and unfair threats to the expected reliable environmental 
structure on the other. For instance, since the belief that uncertainty has negative personal 
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implications is not self-affirming (the opposite in fact), it may render the perceived 
unfairness of uncertainty more salient. As such, individuals who hold the belief that 
uncertainty has negative personal implications may more readily form the expectation 
that the external world should be structured and that uncertainty is unfair. This may prove 
to be one means by which these two beliefs about uncertainty could interact.  
Alternatively, a strong need for cognitive structure, in the form of a view of the 
world as reliable and certain, accompanied by higher personal standards that demand 
these expectations be met, may become particularly problematic when this need cannot 
be fulfilled. In these situations, it may lead to the perception that personal abilities to 
achieve and maintain this clear structure, or to cope with uncertain threats, are poor. In 
other words, individuals who expect more of themselves and of the situation are more 
likely to be disappointed. As such, another possible means by which beliefs about 
uncertainty may interact is as a result of repeated failed attempts to fulfill a strong need 
for cognitive structure, which may contribute to perceived helplessness in uncertain 
situations, particularly among individuals with a tendency to personalize such failures. 
Thus, individuals high in the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoiling may be more 
prone to perceive uncertainty as also having negative personal implications. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Webster (1993) has demonstrated that individuals 
high in the need for closure will seize on the first most salient explanation for a given 
outcome and will be reluctant to re-evaluate this attribution, as to do so would require 
abandoning the sense of closure they have attained. Webster further noted that when 
personal failings are salient, a need for cognitive certainty can result in overestimation of 
the contribution of personal failings to a negative outcome, and underestimation of the 
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effects of situational contributors. Thus, beliefs about personal weakness, such as the 
belief that personal coping abilities are diminished by uncertainty, may be more readily 
formed in threatening (i.e., uncertain) situations, and may subsequently be particularly 
difficult to revise, among individuals who have a strong need for closure or certainty. 
 Alternatively, it may be that either negative belief about uncertainty has the 
necessary and sufficient capacity to foster vulnerability to excessive and uncontrollable 
worry. These studies’ findings are consistent with this possibility, as information 
processing biases were predicted by both the belief that uncertainty has personal 
implications and the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoiling, independently. 
Potential treatment implications. With the identification of these distinct 
negative beliefs about uncertainty, several additional questions arise regarding the 
manifestations and implications of these different beliefs in a treatment context. For 
instance, it is conceivable that individuals who hold one or other of these beliefs more 
strongly may as a result present differently in a treatment context. Given past findings 
that have identified depression symptoms as a stronger correlate of the belief that 
uncertainty has negative implications (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b), a vulnerability to low 
mood may be a particular manifestation of individuals endorsing this particular belief 
about uncertainty. As we have noted, this low mood or the diminished sense of personal 
competency which can accompany depressed mood may itself further exacerbate existing 
worry symptoms (e.g., Berenbaum, 2010; Davey & Levy, 1998, 1999; Startup & Davey, 
2001). The current findings are consistent with this proposed mechanism. In this study, 
the belief that uncertainty has negative implications, which was associated with a 
personalizing cognitive error bias, predicted more threatening appraisals of ambiguous 
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situations, and perceptions of these situations as having more negative personal 
implications. As such, GAD patients who present with strong beliefs about the personal 
implications of uncertainty may benefit additionally from interventions to address any 
concomitant depressive symptoms and to challenge negative views of the self regarding 
their personal ability to cope with uncertain situations. These may assist with 
interventions to address worry and associated information-processing biases. 
In contrast, individuals presenting with particularly strong beliefs about the unfair 
and spoiling nature of uncertainty may be more prone to form externalized attributions 
for perceived difficulties in uncertain situations, which in turn may render them 
susceptible to different emotional responses. Some authors have speculated that 
frustration (Sexton & Dugas, 2009b) or anger (Donegan, 2010) may result as a 
consequence of this uncertainty intolerant belief. Though it has been understudied across 
the anxiety disorders, some preliminary evidence suggests that anger may be elevated 
relative to healthy populations in the context of some anxiety disorders (Moscovitch, 
McCabe, Antony, Rocca, & Swinson, 2008). In the context of GAD, Erden, Celik, 
Yelkin, and Ozgen (2008) found that trait anger and anger expression were elevated, and 
anger control was reduced, in a group of individuals diagnosed with GAD relative to a 
group of non-anxious participants. Further, preliminary findings have demonstrated that 
anger has effects similar to, and independent of, those of anxiety in fostering negative 
interpretive biases in ambiguous situations (Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Wenzel & 
Lystad, 2005). Further research is needed to assess whether the belief that Uncertainty is 
Unfair and Spoils Everything, and its association with appraisals of ambiguous situations 
as threatening and as being unfair and disruptive, may explain the more frequent 
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occurrence of anger in GAD.  
Further research is also needed to assess whether this putative association with 
anger might perhaps account for the information processing biases observed among high 
worriers in ambiguous situations. The association between the belief that Uncertainty is 
Unfair and Spoils Everything and perfectionistic standards for other people, as observed 
in this study, may suggest one potential source of this anger, which may occur when 
others fail to reach these standards and uncertainty inevitably occurs. The possibility that 
anger may mediate the observed association between the belief that uncertainty is unfair 
and spoils everything and threat appraisal biases might also warrant investigation. 
Alternatively, the possibility that threat appraisal biases may mediate the observed 
association between the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything and anger 
should also be considered. In parallel fashion, Koerner and Dugas (2008) found that 
appraisal biases partially mediated the association between intolerance of uncertainty and 
worry, but that the reverse was also true and worry partially mediated the association 
between intolerance of uncertainty and appraisal biases, suggesting some degree of 
bidirectionality in the association between appraisal biases and worry; the same may be 
true of appraisal biases and anger.  
Nonetheless, addressing unrealistic expectations about the level of certainty 
attainable in ambiguous situations, and relaxing demanding standards for the self and 
others that may result from this elevated need for certainty, would likely promote more 
realistic appraisals of threat. If anger is indeed present, altering these unrealistic 
expectations may reduce associated anger and its effects on appraisal biases as well. A 
preliminary investigation has demonstrated that negative beliefs about uncertainty can be 
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manipulated, with impacts on appraisal biases and the accessibility of threat schemata 
(Deschenes, Dugas, Radomsky, & Buhr, 2010); this type of intervention could prove to 
be of benefit in the treatment of GAD. There are also now promising interventions which 
directly target negative appraisal biases (e.g., Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009) or 
related attentional biases toward perceived threats (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & 
Mathews, 2010) in GAD, which may similarly be effective as adjuncts to existing 
treatments. These types of interventions might also, in turn, promote more realistic 
beliefs about the unfair and spoiling nature of the threat posed by uncertainty. Thus, it is 
hoped that the results of these to studies will better inform our interventions to address 
the underlying or core beliefs that contribute to excessive and uncontrollable worry as 
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Standard Consent Form to Participate in Research 
(Template for the consent forms used in the archival studies included in Study 1) 
 
This is to state that I, __________________________, agree to participate in a program 
of research conducted by (student’s name) in the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory under the 
supervision of Dr. Michel J. Dugas, both of whom may be reached at 848-2424 ext. 2246.  
 
A.  PURPOSE 
 
I have been informed that the purpose of this research is to investigate 
___________________________ (e.g., the cognitive and behavioural processes which 
contribute to worry and anxiety). 
 
B.  PROCEDURE 
 
I have been informed that the study involves the following procedures: I will be asked 
to sign a consent form, and fill out a general information sheet. Then, I will be asked to 
complete _#_ questionnaires: one measuring _______; another measuring _________, a 
third measuring _______, a fourth measuring __________, and a fifth measuring 
_________ (etc.). These questionnaires should take approximately ___ minutes to 
complete. There is no deception in this experiment and I will not be required to do any 
task other than those described above. My name will only appear on the consent form, 
and code numbers alone will be used to identify the questionnaires. The signed consent 
form will be stored separately from my responses to the questionnaires; all these 
documents will be kept under lock and key. I understand that my participation in the 
experiment, and the information I provide, are strictly confidential. (If applicable: As 
compensation for either participating in or observing this study, I will receive one 
course credit as outlined on the Psychology Department’s Participant Pool website: 
http://www-psychology.concordia.ca/Participants/index.html.) 
 
CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION:  
  I understand that I am free to decline to participate in the experiment without 
negative consequences. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my 
participation at any time without negative consequences.  
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researcher 
will know, but will not disclose my identity). 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published. 
I understand the purpose of this study and know that there is no hidden motive of 




I HAVE CURRENTLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 




NAME (please print)    ____________________________________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE    __________________________________________________________ 
 
WITNESS SIGNATURE    ________________________________________________ 
 
DATE    ________________________________________________________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please 
contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 
514-848-2424, ext. 7481, or by email at Adela.Reid@Concordia.ca . 
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Consent Form to Participate in Research 
(Study 2) 
 
This is to state that I, __________________________, agree to participate in a program of 
research conducted by Kathryn Sexton, M.A., in the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory under the 
supervision of Dr. Michel J. Dugas, Ph.D., both of whom may be reached at 848-2424 ext. 2246 
(or by e-mail at kasexton@alcor.concordia.ca).  
 
A.  PURPOSE 
 
I have been informed that the purpose of this research is to investigate attitudes, beliefs, 
and experiences people have in uncertain situations. 
 
B.  PROCEDURE 
 
I have been informed that the study involves the following procedures: I will be asked to sign a 
consent form, and fill out a general information sheet. Then, I will be asked to complete 8 
questionnaires: one measuring attitudes towards uncertain situations, another measuring 
behavioural reactions and beliefs in ambiguous situations, a third measuring behavioural 
responses when faced with decisions, a fourth measuring behavioural responses when faced with 
specific tasks, a fifth measuring ways of thinking when in ambiguous situations, a sixth 
measuring personal standards, a seventh measuring desire for closure, and an eighth measuring 
individual differences in the extent to which people seek out information. These questionnaires 
should take approximately 45 - 60 minutes to complete. There is no deception in this experiment 
and I will not be required to do any task other than those described above. My name will only 
appear on the consent form, and code numbers alone will be used to identify the questionnaires. 
The signed consent form will be stored separately from my responses to the questionnaires; all 
these documents will be kept under lock and key. I understand that my participation in the 
experiment, and the information I provide, are strictly confidential.  
 
C.  RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
Participation in this study has no known risks and no costs other than the time it takes to complete 
the questionnaires. As compensation for either participating in or observing this study, I will 
receive one course credit as outlined on the Psychology Department’s Participant Pool website:  
http://www-psychology.concordia.ca/Participants/index.html.) 
 
D.  CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION:  
  I understand that I am free to decline to participate in the experiment without negative 
consequences. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at 
any time without negative consequences.  
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researcher will 
know, but will not disclose my identity). 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published. 
I understand the purpose of this study and know that there is no hidden motive of which I 
have not been fully informed. 
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I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print)    ____________________________________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE    __________________________________________________________ 
 
WITNESS SIGNATURE    ________________________________________________ 
 
DATE    ________________________________________________________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 514-848-2424, 







Uncertainty has negative implications and is unfair: 
Construct validity of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale and its factors 
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the attitudes, beliefs, and experiences 
people have in uncertain situations. This survey study included questionnaires and 
vignettes assessing attitudes towards uncertain and ambiguous situations, behavioural 
responses when faced with decisions, behavioural responses when faced with specific 
uncertain tasks, ways of thinking when in ambiguous situations, personal standards, 
desire for closure, and individual differences in the extent to which people seek out 
information. Using these measures, this study sought to refine our understanding of 
specific beliefs about uncertainty that are associated with high levels of worry, and to 
examine the behaviours, thoughts, and feelings that are associated with these beliefs. In 
other words, this study examined how specific beliefs about uncertainty that individuals 
hold may relate to how they react in actual situations that people face everyday, situations 
that are either ambiguous or unpredictable in terms of their outcome. 
 
This study sought to validate two new measures of beliefs about uncertainty and reactions 
in uncertain situations, measures which will be used in future research and which will also 
be applied in clinical settings with individuals who suffer from worry and anxiety. The 
results of this study therefore have several possible advantages for the assessment and 
treatment of processes that contribute to worry and anxiety. First, by better understanding 
the nature of the beliefs regarding uncertainty that individuals hold, we may be better able 
to reduce intolerance of uncertainty, which is a risk factor for the development and 
maintenance of high levels of worry and anxiety. Second, by identifying the particular 
behaviours, thoughts, and feelings that these beliefs are thought to generate when 
individuals are faced with uncertainty, we will be better able to tailor our treatment 
strategies to address those reactions that are less helpful to individuals when they cope 
with uncertain situations. 
 
This research was conducted by Kathryn Sexton from the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory, 
under the supervision of Dr. Michel Dugas.  If you have any questions or concerns, we 
can be reached at: 
 The Anxiety Disorders Laboratory 
Concordia University 
Department of Psychology 
L-SP-319.00 






If you have any concerns regarding the way in which this study was conducted or if you 
have any questions regarding the ethics of this research, please contact the Psychology 
Department Ethics Committee, chaired by Dr. Virginia Penhune, whose office is located 
in L-SP-253-7. 
 
If you have any further interest in this subject, we have provided the following reference 
for your information: 
 
Dugas, M. J., & Robichaud, M. (2007). Cognitive-behavioral treatment for generalized 
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Study advertisement for the Department of Psychology’s Participant Pool webpage 
 
To be listed under “Surveys” 
at http://psychology.concordia.ca/Participants/index.html 
 




Faculty supervisor: Dr. Michel J. Dugas  
 
Duration of testing: 45-60 minutes. 
 
Contact: 514-848-2424 ext: 2246; adlab@alcor.concordia.ca 
Description: For this study, you will be asked to fill out a survey consisting of questionnaires and 
vignettes. This survey package can be completed in our lab in one sitting. The questionnaires are designed 
to examine different beliefs and attitudes that you might hold about the uncertain or ambiguous situations 
that each of us encounter everyday. Our aim is to gain a better understanding of how these beliefs are 
related to a variety of behavioural, cognitive, & emotional reactions in unpredictable situations. 
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Age:   _____ 
 
Sex:      Male _____  Female _____  
 
Education: 
University year:       1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ other ___________ 
 
Field of study:    Psychology ______   
                Other (Please specify) _____________________________ 
 
Status:  full-time ______  part-time ______ 
 
First Language:         English ______    
   French______ 
   Other (please specify) ______ 
___________________________________________________________ 
Race / Ethnicity: (check one) 
African-American / Black / Caribbean Origin ______ 
Asian-American / Asian Origin / Pacific Islander ______ 
Latino-a / Hispanic ______ 
American Indian / Alaska Native / Aboriginal Canadian ______ 
European Origin / White  ______ 
Bi-racial / Multi-racial ______ 
Middle Eastern  ______  
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Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) 
 
You will find below a series of statements which describe how people may react to the 
uncertainties of life. Please use the scale below to describe to what extent each item is 
characteristic of you. Please circle a number (1 to 5) that describes you best. 
 
       Not at all    Somewhat      Entirely 
    characteristic  characteristic  characteristic 
         of me        of me       of me 
 
1. Uncertainty stops me from  
 having a firm opinion.  .........1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
2. Being uncertain means that a  
 person is disorganized.  ........1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
3. Uncertainty makes life  
 Intolerable.  .……….............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
4. It's unfair not having any  
 guarantees in life.  ................1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
5. My mind can't be relaxed if I 
 don't know what will happen  
 tomorrow.  ..………..............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
6. Uncertainty makes me uneasy,  
 anxious, or stressed.  ............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
7. Unforeseen events upset me  
 greatly.  ….………...............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
8. It frustrates me not having all  
 the information I need.  ........1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
9. Uncertainty keeps me from  
 living a full life.  ...................1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
10. One should always look ahead  
 so as to avoid surprises.  ......1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
11. A small unforeseen event can  
 spoil everything, even with the  
 best of planning.  .….............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
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       Not at all    Somewhat      Entirely 
    characteristic  characteristic  characteristic 
         of me        of me       of me 
 
12. When it's time to act  
 uncertainty paralyses me.  ....1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
13. Being uncertain means that I am  
 not first rate.  .……...............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
14. When I am uncertain, I can't go  
 forward.  .…………..............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
15. When I am uncertain I can't  
 function very well.  ..............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
16. Unlike me, others always seem  
 to know where they are going  
 with their lives.  ..…..............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
17. Uncertainty makes me  
 vulnerable, unhappy, or sad. 1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
18. I always want to know what the  
 future has in store for me.  ...1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
19. I can't stand being taken by  
 surprise.  ….……….............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
20. The smallest doubt can stop me  
 from acting.  .………............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
21. I should be able to organize  
 everything in advance.  ........1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
22. Being uncertain means that I  
 lack confidence.  .….............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
23. I think it's unfair that other  
 people seem sure about their  
 future.  .…………….............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
24. Uncertainty keeps me from  




       Not at all    Somewhat      Entirely 
    characteristic  characteristic  characteristic 
         of me        of me       of me 
 
25. I must get away from all  
 uncertain situations.  ............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
26. The ambiguities in life  
stress me.  ..………...............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
27. I can't stand being undecided  
 about my future.  .….............1................2................3.................4...............5............... 
 
 
Original French Version:  Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M.J., & 
Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why do people worry? Personality and Individual 
Differences, 17(6), 791-802. 
English Version: Buhr, K., Dugas, M. J. (2002). The intolerance of uncertainty scale: 
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Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
Please circle a number (1 to 5) that best describes how typical or characteristic each item 
is of you. 
        Not at all  Somewhat      Very 
          typical     typical   typical 
1. If I don't have enough time to do 
 everything, I don't worry about it.   ………... 1   2     3        4         5 
  
2. My worries overwhelm me.   ……………… 1   2     3        4         5 
  
3. I don't tend to worry about things.   ……….. 1   2     3        4         5 
  
4. Many situations make me worry.   ………… 1   2     3        4         5 
  
5. I know I shouldn't worry about  
 things but I just can't help it.   ……………... 1   2     3        4         5 
  
6. When I'm under pressure, I worry a lot.   …. 1   2     3        4         5 
  
7. I am always worrying about something.   …. 1   2     3        4         5 
  
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 1   2     3        4         5 
  
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to  
 worry about everything else I have to do.   ... 1   2     3        4         5 
  
10. I never worry about anything.   ……………. 1   2     3        4         5 
  
11. When there is nothing more that  
 I can do about a concern, I don't  
 worry about it anymore.   ………………….. 1   2     3        4         5 
  
12. I've been a worrier all my life.   …………… 1   2     3        4         5 
  
13. I notice that I have been  
 worrying about things.   …………………… 1   2     3        4         5 
  
14. Once I start worrying, I can't stop.   ……….. 1   2     3        4         5 
  
15. I worry all the time.   ………………………. 1   2     3        4         5 
  
16. I worry about projects until they are all done.1   2     3        4         5 
 
 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development and 
validation of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and 
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Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ) 
 
1. What subjects do you worry about most often? 
  a)  ________________________ d)  _________________________ 
  b)  ________________________ e)  _________________________ 
  c)  ________________________ f)  _________________________ 
 
 
For the following items, please circle the corresponding number (0-8). 
 
2. Do your worries seem excessive or exaggerated?  
 
  Not at all    Moderately    Totally 
  excessive    excessive    excessive 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
3. Over the past six months, how many days have you been bothered by excessive 
worry?  
 
  Never    1 day out of 2    Everyday 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
4. Do you have difficulty controlling your worries?  For example, when you start 
worrying about something, do you have difficulty stopping?   
 
  No    Moderate    Extreme 
  difficulty    difficulty    difficulty 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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5. Over the past six months, to what extent have you been disturbed by the following 
sensations when you were worried or anxious?   
 
Not at all     Moderately    Very severely 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
a) Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge. 
Not at all     Moderately    Very severely 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
b) Being easily fatigued. 
Not at all     Moderately    Very severely 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
c) Difficulty concentrating or mind going blank. 
Not at all     Moderately    Very severely 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
d) Irritability. 
Not at all     Moderately    Very severely 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
e) Muscle tension. 
Not at all     Moderately    Very severely 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
f) Sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless unsatisfying 
sleep). 
Not at all     Moderately    Very severely 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
6. To what extent does worry or anxiety interfere with your life, for example, your 
work, social activities, family life, etc.?   
 
Not at all     Moderately    Very severely 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
 
Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., Provencher, M. D., Lachance, S., Ladouceur, R., & 
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State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) – Trait (STAI-T) 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below.  
Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to 
indicate how you generally feel.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too 
much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you 
generally feel. 
 
     Almost  Sometimes Often  Almost 
Never                 Always 
 
1. I feel pleasant.  …………............1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
2. I feel nervous and restless.  .........1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
3. I feel satisfied with myself.  ........1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
4. I wish I could be as happy  
 as others seem to be.  ……..........1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
5. I feel like a failure.  ……….........1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
6. I feel rested.  ……………...........1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
7. I am "calm, cool, and collected". 1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
8. I feel that difficulties are piling  
 up so that I cannot overcome  
 them.  ……………………..........1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
9. I worry too much over something      




     Almost  Sometimes Often  Almost 
Never                 Always 
 
10. I am happy.  ……………............1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
11. I have disturbing thoughts.  ........1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
12. I lack self-confidence.  …............1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
13. I feel secure.  ...............................1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
14. I make decisions easily.  .............1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
15. I feel inadequate.  ........................1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
16. I am content.  ...............................1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
17. Some unimportant thought runs  
 through my mind and bothers  
me.  …………………………….1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
18. I take disappointments so keenly  
 that I can't put them out of my  
 mind.  ...........................................1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
19. I am a steady person.  ..................1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
20. I get in a state of tension or  
 turmoil as I think over my recent  
 concerns and interests.  ...............1.......................2.......................3.......................4..... 
 
 
Spielberger, C. D. Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1977). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults: Self-Evaluation Questionnaire (STAI 






















Appendix H  
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) 
 
 186 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) 
This questionnaire consists of a list of 21 symptoms associated with anxiety. Please read 
each symptom carefully. Then indicate, by circling a number (0, 1, 2, 3), to what degree 
you have been affected by each of these symptoms over the past week, including today. 
 
       Not at all A little Somewhat A lot 
 
1) Numbness or tingling            0      1          2     3 
 
2) Feeling hot              0      1          2     3 
 
3) Wobbliness in legs             0      1          2     3 
 
4) Unable to relax             0      1          2     3 
 
5) Fear of the worst happening           0      1          2     3 
 
6) Dizzy or lightheaded            0      1          2     3 
 
7) Heart pounding or racing            0      1          2     3 
 
8) Unsteady              0      1          2     3 
 
9) Terrified              0      1          2     3 
 
10) Nervous              0      1          2     3 
 
11) Feelings of choking            0      1          2     3 
 
12) Hands trembling             0      1          2     3 
 
13) Shaky              0      1          2     3 
 
14) Fear of losing control            0      1          2     3 
 
15) Difficulty breathing            0      1          2     3 
 
16) Fear of dying             0      1          2     3 
 
17) Scared              0      1          2     3 
 
18) Indigestion or discomfort in abdomen   0      1          2     3 
 
 187 
       Not at all A little Somewhat A lot 
 
19) Faint              0      1          2     3 
 
20) Face flushed             0      1          2     3 
 
21) Sweating (not due to heat)            0      1          2     3 
 
 
Beck, A.T., Epstein, N., Brown, G., &Steer, R.A. (1988). An inventory for measuring 
clinical anxiety:  Psychometric properties. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
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Centre for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale (CES-D) 
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved.  Please read each statement 
carefully and, using the scale below, circle a number (0 to 3) to indicate how often you 
have felt this way during the past week. 
 
  Rarely or none  Some or a  Occasionally Most or all 
      of the time little of the or a moderate  of the time 
 (Less than 1 day)      time      amount   (5-7 days) 
   (1-2 days)  of the time 
     (3-4 days) 
 
1. I was bothered by things 
 that usually don't bother me.  0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
2. I did not feel like eating; 
 my appetite was poor.  ..........0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
3. I felt that  I could not shake 
 off the blues even with help 
 from my family or friends.  ...0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
4. I felt that I was just as  
 good as other people.  ...........0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
5. I had trouble keeping my 
 mind on what I was doing.  ...0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
6. I felt depressed.  ....................0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
7. I felt that everything 
 I did was an effort.  ...............0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
8. I felt hopeful about the  
future.  ...................................0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
9. I thought my life has been  
a failure.  ................................0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
10. I felt fearful.  .........................0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
11. My sleep was restless.  ..........0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
12. I was happy.  .........................0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
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  Rarely or none  Some or a  Occasionally Most or all 
      of the time little of the or a moderate  of the time 
 (Less than 1 day)      time      amount   (5-7 days) 
   (1-2 days)  of the time 
     (3-4 days) 
 
13. I talked less than usual.  ........0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
14. I felt lonely.  ..........................0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
15. People were unfriendly.  .......0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
16. I enjoyed life.  .......................0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
17. I had crying spells.  ...............0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
18. I felt sad.  ...............................0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
19. I felt that people dislike me.  .0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
20. I could not get going.  ...........0........................ 1........................ 2........................ 3..... 
 
 
Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D Scale: A self-report depression scale for research in the 
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Ambiguous Situations Questionnaire (ASQ) 
 
Please imagine that the following situations are happening to you. For each excerpt, first 
rate how good or bad the situation would seem to you. Then, rate how unlikely or likely 
you would be to respond to this situation in the following ways and how much you agree 
or disagree with the statements that follow. Please make only one rating on each scale. In 
other words, circle only one number (from 1 to 9) on each rating scale. There are no right 
or wrong answers; just decide how you would most likely react in each situation. 
 
 
1.  I was told by my colleagues that my boss made a comment about my work. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?:  
  
I can't bring myself to ask my colleagues if my boss was pleased with my work or 
not. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
    Likely       Unlikely          nor Likely    Likely        Likely  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?:  
  
 I would appreciate it if my colleagues would come right out and tell me if the  
 comments they heard were good or bad. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 





2.  I went out on a date with a colleague. I wrote him/her an e-mail to say that I  
enjoyed myself; I’m still waiting to hear back from him/her. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I can't decide whether or not I should contact him/her again. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
    Likely       Unlikely          nor Likely    Likely        Likely  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 I am unimpressed that he/she is leaving me in the dark about whether he/she is 
 interested in me. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 





3.  It is my first night as a chef in the restaurant, and I have been asked for at the  
diners' tables twice. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 The host or hostess should tell me whether the diners are pleased or not  
 before I go out there and face them. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 




In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I don't know if I can bring myself to go out there and hear the diners' comments. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  




4.  After my check-up, the doctor told me he/she would call if there was a problem.  
It's a week later and I have not heard anything. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 Doctors' offices should call you one way or another; it's too much to expect that I  
 should go about my life as usual while dealing with this suspense. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I am disappointed with myself for being distracted while waiting to see if my  
 doctor might phone. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  




5.  I left my dog at the vet this morning and got a message this afternoon saying my  
dog's condition is as expected given his age and breed. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  




In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 Thinking about this will keep me from being able to focus on everything I have to  
 do today. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
    Likely       Unlikely          nor Likely    Likely        Likely  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 The vet should have been clear about my dog's current health. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 





6.  Since moving out on my own last year, I've noticed a significant change in the  
way my sister and I get along. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 My sister should just tell me how she feels about this change in our relationship. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I find it difficult to interact with my sister given this situation. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  





7.  Today, I was on the bus when I noticed some of my classmates sitting behind me,  
talking with each other in a low voice. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I wish I was able to join in the conversation, but I wouldn't feel comfortable  
 speaking to them unless I could be sure they weren't talking about me. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
    Likely       Unlikely          nor Likely    Likely        Likely  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 If my classmates have an opinion about me, they should come right out and say it. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 





8.  One month ago, I submitted my university application and I was told that I  
would receive a response in about 2 months. Today, I sorted through my mail 
and found a letter from the university. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I can't bring myself to open the letter; I wasn’t expecting it so soon. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  




To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 Why did they send the letter so soon? The surprise of receiving a letter earlier 
 than expected makes this process even more difficult. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 




9.  While I was out, my friend called and left a message on my answering machine,  
saying that we need to talk about something important. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 My friend should really have given me some idea of what it is we need to talk 
 about so I don't have to wonder what's going on. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I can't decide if I should call him/her back right away or not. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  




10.  In the middle of my flight, just when I was about to go the bathroom, the seat  
belt light went on without an explanation from the captain. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  




To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 The captain or the flight attendants should really make an announcement  
 whenever they put the seatbelt light on, so there's no confusion. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I really have to go to the bathroom, but I can't decide what to do. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  





11.  I'm going to a family reunion this summer; I haven't spoken to most of my  
cousins in 3 years. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I am disappointed with myself for feeling apprehensive about this family reunion  
 - why can't I look forward to it like everyone else? 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
    Likely       Unlikely          nor Likely    Likely        Likely  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
I wish we had family reunions more often so I would have a better idea of what to 
expect. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 




12.  I got a term paper back from my professor today and wasn't sure I understood  
the comments, which don't seem to fit with the grade I received. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 If the evaluations were more structured, I might be able to enjoy this course; 
 as it is, this confusion takes all the fun out of it. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I wish I wasn’t so bothered by the professor's comments; other students don't  
 seem to be having trouble understanding their feedback. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  





13.  I completed my tax returns today but I'm not sure that I interpreted the new  
guidelines correctly. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I can’t bring myself to mail my tax return because I'm not sure I did it properly. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  




To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 It annoys me that the guidelines are so difficult to follow and that there is no way  
 to check if I have applied them correctly. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 




14.  Two of my friends who graduated from my current program of study say they  
have spent the last year exploring their career options. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 Not knowing the state of the job market makes it difficult for me to succeed in  
 this program. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
    Likely       Unlikely          nor Likely    Likely        Likely  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 They should give us more information about job prospects while we're in the  
 program so we know what to prepare for. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 




15.  The teams for the volleyball competition were announced today, and I have  
been placed on a different team this season. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  




To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 Having to adapt to a new style of play could ruin the fun for me this season. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
In situations like this when I don't know what to expect, I have difficulty playing 
well. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  





16.  Today, I was surprised to hear a co-worker's opinion on a controversial current  
event. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 It bothers me that I'm so unsure of my own opinion that I don't know what to say. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
    Likely       Unlikely          nor Likely    Likely        Likely  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 It frustrates me that there isn't enough clear information on this issue to have a  
 firm opinion one way or the other. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 




17.  My life seems so unpredictable; I never quite know what is going to happen  
next, and I am often surprised by the way situations turn out for me. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 If I could only know in advance how a situation would turn out, 
 then I could plan things out properly and prevent unexpected outcomes. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I find this unpredictability is discouraging and makes me indecisive. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  





18.  While I was on my way out this evening, a person stopped and looked right at  
me. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 It makes me feel weak that I don't know what to do when I'm unsure about  
 someone's intentions. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  




To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 People should greet you when they look at you on the street to make their  
 intentions clear. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 




19.  I went jogging with my mother yesterday and I noticed she often had to stop to  
catch her breath. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 I want my mom to tell me why she needed to catch her breath. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I get so upset at the thought that something might be wrong with my mom that 
 I'm afraid to ask her how she's doing. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  




20.  The new person I've been dating told me last night that our relationship is so  
different from ones they've had in the past. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  




To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 My new date should be clear about whether this is a good or bad thing. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I don't know how to respond to my date's statement because I don't know what  
 he/she meant. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  





21.  Yesterday I received a message from the nurse at my clinic saying I should call  
her about having some tests done. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I can’t bring myself to call back and find out what kind of tests need to be done. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
    Likely       Unlikely          nor Likely    Likely        Likely  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 The nurse should have told me what tests I need. I shouldn't be left wondering  
 whether this is a serious problem or not. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 





22.  My supervisor announced that we will be having a team meeting tomorrow to  
discuss major changes to the salary structure in our company. 
 
 How good or bad does this situation seem to you? 
  
     Very       Somewhat        Neither good  Somewhat          Very  
    Good           good            nor bad        bad           bad  
.......1.............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?: 
  
 I don't know how they can expect us to take our jobs seriously if they can’t 
 guarantee us some financial stability. 
  
Completely      Somewhat      Neither Agree Somewhat    Completely 
  Disagree       Disagree       nor Disagree    Agree        Agree  
.......1............2............3............4............5............6............7............8............9....... 
  
In this situation, how likely would you be to react in the following way?: 
  
 I find it difficult to concentrate on my work not knowing what these changes are  
 going to be. 
  
   Not at all      Somewhat     Neither Unlikely Somewhat         Very  
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Frost’s Indecisiveness Scale (FIS) 
 
You will find below a series of statements which describe the tendency to be indecisive. 
Please use the scale below to describe to what extent each item is characteristic of you. 
Please circle a number (1 to 5) that describes you best. 
 
       Strongly              Strongly 
       Disagree               Agree 
 
1. I try to put off making decisions.  ...1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
2. I always know exactly what I   
 want.  ...............................................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
3. I find it easy to make decisions.  .....1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
4. I have a hard time planning my  
 free time.  ........................................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
5. I like to be in a position to make  
 decisions.  ........................................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
6. Once I make a decision, I feel  
 fairly confident that it is a good  
 one.  .................................................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
7. When ordering from a menu, I  
 find it difficult to decide what  
 to get.  ..............................................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
8. I usually make decisions quickly.  ..1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
9. Once I make a decision, I stop  
 worrying about it.  ...........................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
10. I become anxious when making  
 a decision.  .......................................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
11. I often worry about making the  




       Strongly              Strongly 
       Disagree               Agree 
 
12. After I have chosen or decided  
 something, I often believe I've  
 made the wrong choice or  
decision.  .........................................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
13. I do not get assignments done on  
 time because I can not decide  
 what to do first.  ..............................1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
14. I have trouble completing  
 assignments because I can't  
 prioritize what is more important.  .1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
15. It seems that deciding on the most  
 trivial thing takes me a long time.  .1...............2................3................4................5..... 
 
 
Frost, R. O, & Shows, D. L (1993). The nature and measurement of compulsive 
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Lay’s General Procrastination Scale (LGP) 
 
On a scale of 1 (LOW VALUE) to 5 (HIGH VALUE) please answer each of the following 
items. These statements are concerned with your opinions on different situations. No two 
statements are exactly alike, so please consider each statement carefully before responding. 
Answer as honestly as possible. Thank you. 
 
 False Not usually Sometimes Mostly  True 
 of me true for me  false/true   true  of me 
      for me for me 
 
1. I often find myself performing  
tasks that I had intended to do  
 days before.  ..............................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
2. I often miss concerts, sporting events, 
 or the like, because I don't get around  
to buying tickets  on time.  ........1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
3. When planning a party, I make the 
 necessary arrangements well in  
advance.  ....................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
4. When it is time to get up in the, 
 morning I most often get right  
out of bed.  ................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
5. A letter may sit for days after I write it  
 before I mail it.  .........................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
6. I generally return phone calls  
promptly.  ..................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
7. Even with jobs that require little else 
 except sitting down and doing them,  
 I find they seldom get done  
for days.  ....................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
8. I usually make decisions as soon as  
possible.  ....................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
9. I generally delay before starting on work  
 I have to do.   .............................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
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 False Not usually Sometimes Mostly  True 
 of me true for me  false/true   true  of me 
      for me for me 
 
10. When traveling, I usually have to rush 
 in preparing to arrive at the airport or 
 station at the appropriate time.  .1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
11. When preparing to go out, I am seldom 
 caught having to do something at the  
last minute.  ...............................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
12. In preparing for some deadlines, I often 
waste time by doing other things.  
....................................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
13. If a bill for a small amount comes, I pay it  
 right away.  ................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
14. I usually return a "R.S.V.P." request very 
 shortly after receiving it.  ..........1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
15. I often have a task finished sooner than  
 necessary.  .................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
16. I always seem to end up shopping for 
 birthday gifts at the last  
minute.  ......................................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
17. I usually buy even an essential item at the 
 last minute.  ...............................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
18. I usually accomplish all the things I plan 
 to do in a day.  ...........................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
19. I am continually saying "I'll do it  
tomorrow".  ...............................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
20. I usually take care of all the tasks I have 
 to do before I settle down and relax for  
the evening.  ..............................1.................2.................3..................4.................5..... 
 
 
Lay, C. H. (1991).  At last, my research article on procrastination. Journal of Research in 
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This questionnaire describes a number of situations that might occur in daily life, each 
followed by a thought in "quotations" that a person in the situation might have. Underneath 
this is a group of statements that describe how similar the thought is to how you would 
think in that situation. 
 
Please read each statement and imagine that it is happening to you. Then, read the thought 
(which is in "quotations") following that situation. Circle the statement underneath each 
thought that best describes how similar that thought is to how you would think in that 
situation. 
 
Because you may not have had the experiences described in some of the situations, it is 
important that you imagine that it is happening to you. Be sure that you don't rate the 
situation, just rate how much the thought (which is in "quotations") is like the way you 
would think. 
 
A. You have just come out of the store and notice a dent in your car that wasn't there 
before you went in. You think to yourself, "Oh no, the car is wrecked." 
 
This thought is: 
 
 almost  exactly a lot like  somewhat a little like   not at all 
   like I would  I would like I would   I would like I would 
       think   think      think     think     think 
 
If that thought ("Oh no, the car is wrecked.") was something like the way you would think 
in that situation, you would circle: 
 
  somewhat 
 like I would 
      think 
 





1. Your boss just told you that because of a general slowdown in the industry, he has  
to lay off all of the people who do your job including you.  You think to yourself "I  
must be doing a lousy job or else he wouldn't have laid me off." 
 
This thought is: 
 
 almost  exactly a lot like  somewhat a little like   not at all 
   like I would  I would like I would   I would like I would 
       think   think      think     think     think 
  ...............0......................1......................2......................3......................4.......... 
 
 
2. You just finished spending three hours cleaning the basement.  Your spouse  
however, doesn't say anything about it.  You think to yourself, "(S)he must think I  
did a lousy job." 
 
This thought is: 
 
 almost  exactly a lot like  somewhat a little like   not at all 
   like I would  I would like I would   I would like I would 
       think   think      think     think     think 
  ...............0......................1......................2......................3......................4.......... 
 
 
3. You went fishing for the first time today with some of your friends who love  
fishing.  Nobody got anything, and the group seemed to be discouraged.  You  
thought to yourself on the way home,  "I guess I made too much noise or did  
something that scared the fish off." 
 
This thought is: 
 
 almost  exactly a lot like  somewhat a little like   not at all 
   like I would  I would like I would   I would like I would 
       think   think      think     think     think 




4. You have three children who generally do quite well in school.  One of your  
children came home today and told you that he had to stay after school because he  
got into a fight.  You think to yourself, "He wouldn't have gotten that detention if I  
disciplined him more." 
 
This thought is: 
 
 almost  exactly a lot like  somewhat a little like   not at all 
   like I would  I would like I would   I would like I would 
       think   think      think     think     think 
  ...............0......................1......................2......................3......................4.......... 
 
 
5. You run a day care center.  Today, the mother of a child you have been having  
difficulty with calls and  notifies you that she has quit work and will be  
withdrawing her child from your program.  You think, "She probably thinks I  
wasn't handling him as well as I should." 
 
This thought is: 
 
 almost  exactly a lot like  somewhat a little like   not at all 
   like I would  I would like I would   I would like I would 
       think   think      think     think     think 
  ...............0......................1......................2......................3......................4.......... 
 
 
6. You took your children to the neighborhood pool for the afternoon.  Although your  
kids urged you to swim with them, you were enjoying lying in the sun.  Later you  
look up and see them arguing over a float.  You think to yourself, "If I had gone in  
the water, they probably wouldn't be fighting now." 
 
This thought is: 
 
 almost  exactly a lot like  somewhat a little like   not at all 
   like I would  I would like I would   I would like I would 
       think   think      think     think     think 
  ...............0......................1......................2......................3......................4.......... 
 
 
Lefebvre, M. F. (1981). Cognitive distortions and cognitive errors in depressed psychiatric 
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Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale – Self-Oriented & Other-Oriented 
 Perfectionism subscales (MPS) 
 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal characteristics and traits.  
Read each item and decide whether you agree or disagree and to what extent.  If you 
strongly agree, circle 7; if you strongly disagree, circle 1; if you fell somewhere in between, 
circle any numbers between 1 and 7.  If you feel neutral or undecided the midpoint is 4. 
 
  Strongly Moderately  Slightly Neutral Slightly Moderately Strongly 
 Disagree   Disagree Disagree   Agree     Agree  Agree 
 
1. When I am working on something, 
  I cannot relax until it is perfect.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7.... 
 
2. I am not likely to criticize  
 someone for giving up too easily.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7.... 
 
3. It is not important that the people  
 close to me are successful.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
4. I seldom criticize my friends   
 for accepting second best.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
5. One of my goals is to be  
 perfect in everything I do.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
6. Everything that others do  
 must be top-notch quality.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
7. I never aim for perfectionism  
 in my work.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
8. It doesn’t matter to me when  
 someone close to me does not  
 do their absolute best.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
9. I seldom feel the need to be perfect.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 218 
  Strongly Moderately  Slightly Neutral Slightly Moderately Strongly 
 Disagree   Disagree Disagree   Agree     Agree  Agree 
 
10. I strive to be the best  
 at everything I do.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
11. It is very important that I am  
 perfect in everything I attempt.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
12. I have high expectations for the  
 people who are important to me.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
13. I strive to be the best at  
 everything I attempt.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
14. I do not have very high standards  
 for those around me.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
15. I demand nothing less than  
 perfection  for myself.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
16. I can’t be bothered with people who  
 won’t strive to better themselves.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7..... 
 
17. It makes me uneasy to see  
 error in my work.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7..... 
 
18. I do not expect a lot  
 from my friends.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7..... 
 
19. If I ask someone to do something,  
 I expect it to be done flawlessly.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7..... 
 
20. I cannot stand to see people close  
 to me make mistakes.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
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  Strongly Moderately  Slightly Neutral Slightly Moderately Strongly 
 Disagree   Disagree Disagree   Agree     Agree  Agree 
 
21. I am perfectionistic in  
 setting my goals.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
22. The people who matter to me  
 should never let me down.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
23. I must work to my full  
 potential at all times.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
24. I do not have to be the best at  
 whatever I am doing.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
25. I do not have very high  
 standards for myself.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
26. I respect people who are average.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
27. I set very high standards for myself.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
28. I must always be successful  
 at school or work.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
29. It does not matter to me when a close  
 friend does not try their hardest.   
...1.................2.................3.................4................5.................6.................7... 
 
30. I seldom expect others to  




Hewitt, P. & Flett, G. (1991).  Perfectionism in the self and social contexts: 
conceptualization, assessment, and association with psychopathology. Journal of 























Appendix O  




Need for Closure Scale – Preference for Order & Preference for Predictability  
subscales (NFCS) 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each 
according to your beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale. 
 
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
  Strongly Moderately  Slightly Slightly Moderately Strongly 
 Disagree   Disagree Disagree Agree    Agree  Agree 
 
1. I think that having clear rules and order at work 
 is essential for success.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
2. I like to have friends who are unpredictable.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
3. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours  
 suits my temperament..   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
4. When dining out, I like to go to places where I. 
 have been before so that I know what to expect.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
5. I hate to change my plans at the last minute.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
6. I don't like to go into a situation without knowing  
 what I can expect from it.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
7. I think it is fun to change my plans at the last  
 moment.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
8. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation  




9. My personal space is usually messy and  
 disorganized.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
10. I believe that orderliness and organization are  
 among the most important characteristics of  
 a good student.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
11. I don't like to be with people who are capable of  
 unexpected actions.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
12. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because  
 I know what to expect from them.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
13. I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks  
 clearly stated objectives and requirements.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
14. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables  
 me to enjoy life more.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
15. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 
16. I like to have a place for everything and everything  
 in its place.   
...1....................2....................3....................4....................5....................6..... 
 








Kruglanski, A. W., Webster, D. M., & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resistance and openness 
to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information. Journal of 
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1. Vividly imagine that you are afraid of the dentist and have to get some dental 
work done.  Which of the following would you do?  Check all of the statements 
that might apply to you. 
 
 ___ I would ask the dentist exactly what he/she was going to do. 
 
 ___ I would want the dentist to tell me when I would feel pain. 
 
 ___ I would watch all the dentist's movements and listen for the  
sound of the drill. 
 





2. Vividly imagine that you are being held hostage by a group of armed terrorists in 
a public building.  Which of the following would you do?  Check all of the 
statements that might apply to you. 
 
 ___ I would stay alert and try to keep myself from falling asleep. 
 
___ If there was a radio present, I would stay near it and listen to the  
bulletins about what the police were doing. 
 
 ___ I would watch every movement of my captors and keep an eye  
on their weapons. 
 







3. Vividly imagine that, due to a large drop in sales, it is rumored that several people 
in your department at work will be laid off.  Your supervisor has turned in an 
evaluation of your work for the past year.  The decision about lay-offs has been 
made and will be announced in several days.  Check all of the statements that 
might apply to you.  
 
___ I would talk to my fellow workers to see if they knew anything about  
what the supervisor's evaluation of me said. 
 
___ I would review the list of duties for my present job and try to figure out  
if I had fulfilled them all. 
 
___ I would try to remember any arguments or disagreements I might have  
had with the supervisor that would have lowered the supervisor's opinion 
of me. 
 
___ I would try to think which employees in my department the supervisor 




4. Vividly imagine that you are on an airplane, thirty minutes from your destination, 
when the plane unexpectedly goes into a deep dive and then suddenly levels off.  
After a short time, the pilot announces that nothing is wrong, although the rest of 
the ride may be rough.  You, however, are not convinced that all is well.  Check 
all of the statements that might apply to you. 
 
___ I would carefully read the information provided about safety features  
in the plane and make sure I knew where the emergency exits were. 
 
 ___ I would call for the flight attendant and ask her exactly what the  
problem was. 
 
___ I would listen carefully to the engines for unusual noises and would  
watch the crew to see if their behavior was out of the ordinary. 
 




Miller, S. M. (1987). Monitoring and blunting: Validation of a questionnaire to assess 
styles of information seeking under threat. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 52, 345-353. 
